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 Please note: The entire site is now under construction. 
 Please send me an email at rping@wright.edu if something isn't working.
 FOREWORD AND BACKGROUND--This web site contains substantive 
(theory testing) research 
   on responses to problems in "business" relationships such as business-
to-business 
   buyer-seller relationships, and salesperson-employer relationships.
Currently, it contains several of my theory testing papers in this area, and 
   it is intended to help stimulate additional thoughts and research on this 
topic.
Relationship termination in Sociology and Social Psychology (e.g., in 
romantic or friendship 
   relationships) has been heavily researched. There, it is believed that 
relationships go
   through stages that include creation and growth, and end with 
dissolution or termination.
   However, it is well known that there are dissatisfactory relationships 
that are maintained
   instead of terminated. 
        However, comparatively little is known relationship termination 
about "business-to-business"
   relationships. For example, in economics it is assumed that 
dissatisfactory business relationships
   are simply terminated. However, it is easy to find unsatisfactory 
business relationships that are 
   not terminated; at least not right away. Sometimes these relationships 
continue for quite awhile,
   even indefinitely, just like in marriages. 
However, the list of "knowledge gaps" in business-to-business 
relationship termination, and in the
   larger venue of responses to relationship problems, is considerable and, 
in my opinion, interesting. 
   For example, as far as I know, theoretical research on responses to 
problems in "business" 
 
   relationships such as buyer-seller relationships, and 
salesperson-employer relationships (what 
   could be termed Hirshman-based models) focuses on "explanation" and 
possibly prediction of 
   responses to relationship problems such as Loyalty (the beginning of 
the relationship), 
   Voice (Complaining), relationship Neglect and Exiting. However, anyone 
with "real world" business 
   experience might say: "OK, but what about relationship repair? Do 
business ever try to fix important
   relationships?"
        Further, when I do statistical cluster analysis on Exit, Voice, etc. 
data there are always hints of
   another cluster of respondents that is somewhere "in between" Voice 
and Neglect. I suspect these
   informants are wanting/trying to repair their business relationship. 
        However, I am not aware of any research in the business literature 
on relationship repair. Several 
   topics in this venue might include antecedents of business relationship 
repair (i.e., its explanation or 
   prediction), or conceptualizing intervention/repair constructs. (I have 
spent embarrassingly 
   little time on these matters, but there might be a plausible model of 
repair with antecedents such as 
   Dissatisfaction, Alternatives, Investment, Switching Costs, 
Commitment, Social Constraints, 
   Relationship Partner Responsiveness, Self Interest, etc.)
        (I recently became aware of John Gottman's work on marriages. 
While the monograph I saw 
   was in the "pop," rather than academic, literature, Gottman does 
publish academically, and the 
   title specifically mentioned relationship repair.) (Further, although it is 
now dated, S. Duck and 
   R. Gilmore's Personal Relationships Volume 5, Academic Press, and 
citations in that 
   monograph might also be useful, especially for conceptualization.) (In 
addition, there is a robust 
   literature on relationships, and presumably their maintenance and 
repair, in the international 
   relations literature. However, my brief look at this literature was 
confusing, perhaps because I 
   found a lack of emphasis on "studies," only what appeared to be 
opinions and anecdotes. Still, 
   the current interest in Realpolitik (political self-interest and realism, as 
opposed to ideology, 
   morality, ethics or emotion) and the writings of Hans Morgenthau, for 
example, might lead 
   to some original relationship repair theory.)
        Returning to the cluster analyses mentioned above, while it is also 
possible that the "outlier" 
   respondents between Voice and Neglect in this cluster analysis are 
simply being 
   opportunistic (self-interest seeking with guile), some of these 
respondents didn't fit an 
   opportunist profile (see the papers below for more on opportunism).  
        There also is considerable confusion about the construct "Loyalty." 
The problems range from
   conceptualizing loyalty, to its operationalization in buyer-seller 
relationships, and they include its 
   maintenance and restoration, and its antecedents. These matters are 
different, in my opinion, from 
   relationship repair. The maintenance and restoration of relationship 
Loyalty should occur early in a
   relationship, whereas relationship repair should occur late in a 
relationship. Again, Gottman may be a 
   starting point. Further, cluster analysis and respondent scores in my 
(brief) post hoc analyses 
   suggest that in business, relationship Loyalty is a comparatively "rare 
bird." However, this may 
   simply be a measurement artifact.
         Similarly, relationship neglect, and its possible 
antecedents/covariants including imbalanced 
   relationship power, and attempts at relationship equity restoration 
ranging from lawsuits to 
   opportunism also are not well understood in my opinion. At the risk of 
overdoing comments 
   about cluster analysis, "neglecters" are usually the largest cluster in a 
study. (Again however, 
   this may be a measurement artifact.) 
         In addition, relationship repair could be described as moving away 
from relationship neglect. What 
   about actually maintaining relationship neglect? As cynical as this may 
sound, how does one keep 
   business relationship partners from exiting, regardless of how they feel 
about the relationship? As
   one colleague put it, "a customer is a customer, no matter how they 
feel."
        Please email me with your thoughts, and any and all questions--I 
would be delighted to 
   discuss these matters further.
Please note: If you have visited this web site before, and the latest 
"Updated" date (at the top of the page)
   seems old, you may want to click on your browser's "Refresh" or 
"Reload" button on the browser toolbar 
   (above) to view the current version of this web page.
All the material on this web site is copyrighted, but you may save it 
and print it out. My only request is
   that you please cite any material that is helpful to you using the individual 
citations for each of the papers
   shown below.
Don't forget to Refresh: Many of the links on this web page are in 
Microsoft WORD. If you have viewed one
   or more of them before, the procedure to view the latest (refreshed) 
version of them is tedious (The 
   browser's "Refresh" button may not work for Word documents on the 
web). With my apologies for the 
   tediousness, to refresh any (and all) Word documents in Chrome, for 
example, please click on the
   "three dots," then "more Tools," "Clear browsing data," and check 
"Cashed images and files." After 
   that, close the browser window, then re-launch it so the latest versions 
of all the WORD documents 
   are forced to download.
Your questions are encouraged; just send an e-mail to 
rping@wright.edu. Don't worry about being an 
   expert in relationship termination, or using "correct terminology" (or 
perfect English, for that matter).
A Table of Contents or Index to this website is not available. In the 
meantime, 
   please consider using your browser's search capability to go to the 
relevant material. For example, to find 
   material on Relationship Neglect in Chrome, for example, depress "Ctrl" 
and "f" together, then type the word
   "neglect" in the search box.
Selected Papers on Relationship Termination...
(PLS. CLICK ON A RED DOT)
"Notes on Salesperson-Employer Relationships: Responses to 
Relationship Problems and 
   their Antecedents" (An earlier version of Ping 2007, J. of 
Personal Selling and Sales 
   Mgt., revised December 2006).
The paper investigates the Hirschman-Rusbult model of responses to 
relationship problems in a 
   salesperson-employer context.
"Unexplored Antecedents of Satisfaction in a Marketing 
Channel" (An earlier version of 
   Ping 2003, J. of Retailing, revised December 2006).
The paper investigates several antecedents of satisfaction from the Hirschman-
Rusbult model of 
   responses to relationship problems in a buyer-seller relationship context.
"Relationship Commitment and Opportunistic Behavior" (An 
earlier version of Ping 2002, 
   Summer Am. Mktng. Assn. Educators Conf. Proceedings, 
revised December 2006).
The paper investigates opportunism in retailers.
"Taking Another Look at Organizational Commitment" (An 
earlier version of Ping 2001, 
   Acad. of Mktng. Sci. Conf. Proceedings, revised December 
2006).
The paper investigates organizational commitment in salespersons.
"Exiting in a Marketing Channel" (An earlier version of Ping 
1999," J. of Retailing, revised 
   December 2006).
The paper investigates Hirschman's sequence of responses to relationship 
problems that begins with 
   Loyalty and ends with Exiting in retailers.
"Voice in Business-to-Business Relationships: Cost-of-Exit 
and Demographic 
   Antecedents" (An earlier version of Ping 1997, J. of 
Retailing, revised December 2006).
The paper investigates several antecedents of Voice in a marketing channel 
context.
"Some Uninvestigated Antecedents of Retailer Exit Intention" 
(An earlier version of Ping 
   1995, J. of Bus. Res., revised December 2006).
The paper investigates several demographic antecedents of Exiting in retailers.
"Does Satisfaction Moderate the Association Between 
Alternative Attractiveness and Exit 
   Intention in a Marketing Channel?" (An earlier version of 
Ping 1994, J. of The Academy 
   of Mktng. Sci., revised December 2006).
The paper investigates the interaction between Satisfaction and Alternative 
Attractiveness in their 
   association with Exiting in a marketing channel context.
"The Effects of Satisfaction and Structural Constraints on 
Retailer Exiting, Voice, 
   Loyalty, Opportunism, and Neglect" (An earlier version of 
Ping 1993, J. of Retailing, 
   revised December 2006).
The paper investigates the Hirschman-Rusbult model of responses to 
relationship problems in a 
   marketing channel context.
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Responses to problems in committed relationships, those characterized by an implicit or 
explicit pledge of relationship continuity, have received attention in several literatures outside of 
personal selling. There it is argued that an offended party will exit the relationship as a last resort. 
First they are likely to respond with loyalty, remaining silent with confidence that things will get 
better, or with voice, constructive attempts to change objectionable relationship conditions. 
Relationship neglect, allowing the relationship to deteriorate, and opportunism, surreptitious self-
interest seeking, also have been proposed as responses to relationship problems. Antecedents of 
these responses include relationship satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, past relationship 
investment, and the cost to switch relationships. 
This research proposes that organizational commitment and goal congruency are 
uninvestigated antecedents of these responses, that several previous hypotheses are incorrect, and 
there are uninvestigated linkages among the antecedents. These proposals are explored using 





What do salespersons do when they experience problems with their employer, such as 
territory reduction, commission caps, or being passed over for a promotion? While salespersons' 
responses to problems with their employer have not been formally studied as far as we know, it is 
easy to guess what they might do: they might complain, or they might think about working 
somewhere else.  
The situation may be more complex, however. In the economics literature Hirschman (1970) 
proposed that instead of simply exiting a (committed) relationship, offended parties are likely to 
either complain first, which he termed voice, or they could be optimistically silent, which he 
termed loyalty. He described voice as complaining to the relationship partner with the 
expectation that the problem would be remedied and the relationship would survive. This has 
been termed positive complaint behavior (see Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982) to distinguish 
it from more negative complaint behavior (e.g., Singh 1990). Later research characterized voice 
as constructive attempts by the subject to change objectionable relationship conditions; actively 
seeking problem removal by contacting the relationship partner in a positive, relationship 
preserving, manner, and cooperatively discussing and working with the relationship partner to 
improve the situation (see Ping 1993). 
Hirschman was equivocal in his discussions of loyalty, alternately characterizing it as either 
"remaining silent, confident that things will get better" or "not exiting." Since then, Hirschman's 
loyalty has been generally characterized as "optimistic silence" in the responses-to-relationship-
problems literature, but the concept remains somewhat enigmatic (see Goodwin 1991). 
Researchers typically characterize Hirschman's loyalty as a predisposition to overlook problems 
because they fix themselves. Problems are viewed as transitory phenomena: they work 





Nevertheless, as Ping (1993) pointed out, most marketing literatures, including personal 
selling, focus on relationship formation and maintenance, and what could be termed motivation 
within the relationship. These literatures implicitly assume that subjects (eventually) simply exit 
a dissatisfactory relationship. As a result, they typically pay little attention to other responses to 
relationship problems besides exiting, or turnover as it is termed in personal selling. However, 
these and other responses to relationship problems may occur ahead of exit and thus provide, as 
Hirschman (1970) argued, useful "early warnings." Thus, because of the economic importance of 
relationship maintenance in personal selling, recognition of these responses and appropriate 
interventions are or should be important to maintaining employer-salesperson relationships. 
In addition to proposing alternatives to exiting, Hirschman also proposed that exit, voice and 
loyalty had antecedents that included the respondent's overall satisfaction with the relationship, 
their investment in the relationship, and the attractiveness of alternative relationships. While he 
had plans to do so (see Hirschman 1970:146), apparently he never tested his proposals. 
However, Rusbult and her colleagues, among others, have tested Hirschman's proposals in 
romantic relationships (e.g., Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; see also Rusbult 1980), and 
employment relationships (e.g., Farrell and Rusbult 1981, Rusbult and Farrell 1983). Based on 
multidimensional scaling, she also proposed and tested an additional response to relationship 
problems in romantic relationships, relationship neglect, which she characterized as passively 
letting the relationship deteriorate (Rusbult and Zembrodt 1983; see Rusbult, Zembrodt and 
Gunn 1982). Farrell (1983) also proposed and tested this response to problems in employment 
relationships (see Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988). Relationship neglect involves not 
caring about the relationship, expending no effort to maintain it, and a willingness to let the 





exiting. Farrell (1983) stated that employee neglect behaviors included lax and disregardful 
behaviors, and suggested they included lateness and absenteeism (also see Rusbult, Farrell, 
Rogers and Mainous 1988). 
The Hirschman-Rusbult model of responses to relationship problems has been extended to 
include opportunism, self interest seeking with guile, that could be viewed as an aggressive-
retaliatory response to relationship problems (Ping 1993) (see Rosse and Miller 1984; also see 
Homans 1974; Walster, Berscheid and Walster 1976). An individual's opportunism occurs within 
a relationship the opportunist usually wishes to continue. Thus, an opportunist must hide their 
self-interest maximizing from the relationship partner. It was introduced in the economics 
literature to explain the "failure of markets," firms choosing to cease external contracting for 
their inputs or outputs in response to opportunism, and vertically integrating instead to obtain 
these inputs or outputs (see Williamson 1975). Despite arguments that it should be rare in 
individuals (e.g., Hill 1990), it has been self-reported in several contexts, including salespersons 
(see Anderson 1988).  
Based on Porter's work on exit barriers (e.g., Porter 1980), among others (Levinger 1979, 
Johnson 1982), an additional antecedent of the responses to relationship problems was proposed, 
the cost to switch to an alternative relationship (Ping 1993). The resulting Hirschman-Rusbult-
Ping model has been tested in a marketing channel context (see Ping 1993). 
The present research extends this model by proposing that goal congruency, the subject's 
perception that what is beneficial to one party is beneficial to the other, and organizational 
commitment are antecedents of the responses to relationship problems. Anderson (1988) studied 
goal congruency in salespersons as an antecedent of opportunism. Goal congruency, the subject 





agency-theory literature (see Jensen and Meckling 1976). There it is viewed as a desirable 
organizational trait that should be cultivated because it is a substitute for bureaucratic 
surveillance (Ouchi 1980). Organizational commitment, identification with and involvement in 
an organization, has been well studied and it is believed to be an antecedent of exiting or 
turnover in several literatures (see Brown and Peterson 1993, Mathieu and Zajac 1990). 
There are also uninvestigated linkages among the antecedents of responses to relationship 
problems. Ping (2003) studied some of these linkages, including the direct linkages between 
satisfaction and alternative attractiveness and investment. The present research proposes that all 
the antecedents of responses to relationship problems are linked, in some cases in novel ways. 
The present research investigates the Hirschman-Rusbult-Ping model with the additional 
antecedents organizational commitment and goal congruency, and the linkages among the model 
antecedents, in a salesperson context. Along the way it proposes an alternative theoretical view of 
employee opportunism in order to generate several novel hypotheses. This research also proposes 
that several hypotheses in the Hirschman-Rusbult-Ping model have been incorrectly stated in the 
past. The model-test results include unexpected findings such as the performance of 
organizational commitment, and overall it is offered as a small step toward further understanding 
salesperson responses to employment relationship problems. 
LITERATURE 
Hirschman's proposal of other responses to relationship problems besides exiting (Hirschman 
1970) and their antecedents, and the research of Rusbult and her colleagues on her extension of 
Hirschman's model (Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1983) have generated considerable research in 
several literatures. For example, when this article was written the Social Science Index listed 





colleagues application of the Hirschman-Rusbult model to employer-employer relations (Rusbult 
and Farrell 1983) (see Dowding, Mergoupis and Van Vught 2000; Hagedoorn, Van Yperen, Van 
de Vliert and Buunk 1999; and Goodwin 1991 for summaries). Within Marketing, Ping's 
extension of the Hirschman-Rusbult model (Ping 1993) was cited more than 30 times. 
Literature directly or indirectly related to the model is summarized in Bansal, Taylor and 
James (2005); De Wulf and Odekerken-Schroder (2001); Ping (1993), and Ping (2003). For 
example, the Hirschman-Rusbult model (Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1983) was proposed and 
tested in two steps. Rusbult (1980) proposed what she termed an investment model that 
contained satisfaction, alternatives, investment and exiting. Similar proposals have been made by 
other authors (e.g., Johnson 1982; Ko, Price and Mueller 1997; Brown and Peterson 1993).  
Several of the responses to relationship problems and their antecedents have been studied 
individually, some of them in personal selling. Exiting or turnover has been extensively studied 
in many literatures including personal selling (e.g., Bansal, Taylor and James 2005; see Brown 
and Peterson 1993 for a summary). However, voice and opportunism have received 
comapratively less attention in Marketing (see Ping 1997 for a summary of voice research, and 
Jap and Anderson 2003 for a summary of opportunism). The investment model antecedents, 
satisfaction, alternatives and investment, have been extensively studied (see Geyskins, 
Steenkamp and Kumar 1999; Le and Agnew 2003), and these antecedents have received 
considerable attention in personal selling (see Brown and Peterson 1993 for summaries). 
Switching costs have also received attention (Ping 1993; Lam, Shankar, Erramilli and Murthy 
2004; Burnham, Frels and Mahajan 2003; Jones, Mothersbaugh and Betty 2002). However, 
Hirschman's loyalty as a response to relationship problems, and Rusbult's neglect have received 





conceptualized in Marketing as simply not exiting, with little or no consideration of relationship 
problems (see for example the citations in Bell, Auh and Smalley 2005). 
In addition to those with exiting or turnover, most of the linkages in the Hirschman-Rusbult-
Ping model have been observed (e.g., Sinclair and Fehr 2005; Sverke and Goslinga 2003; 
Maitland 1995; Derlega, Winstead, Lewis and Maddux 1993; Goodwin 1991; Singh 1990; 
Whitney and Cooper 1989; Lyons and Lowery 1989; Anderson 1988; and Farrell and Rusbult 
1981; Ping 1993, 1999; Rusbult 1980; Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult and Farrell 
1983; Rusbult and Zembrodt 1983; Rusbult, Johnson and Morrow 1986; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers 
and Mainous 1988). However, the results have been mixed for several responses (see Table 3). 
While other explanations are plausible, some of the hypothesized associations appear to be 
sensitive to differences in study context. For example, relationship neglect and alternative 
attractiveness have been unassociated, or negatively or positively associated, depending on 
context. Thus, an objective of the present research is to test the Hirschman-Rusbult-Ping model 
in the salesperson context. 
RESPONSES TO RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS  
IN SALESPERSON-EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIPS 
 
We will argue the antecedents of the responses to relationship problems satisfaction, 
organizational commitment, goal congruency, alternative attractiveness, past relationship 
investments, and switching costs are associated with the responses, loyalty, voice, opportunism, 
neglect and exiting. We will then argue the antecedents are themselves linked to each other. 
Beginning with the responses to relationship problems, authors have argued that relationship 
satisfaction should be positively associated with responses to relationship problems that are 
relationship positive: loyalty, the subject remaining silent with confidence that things will get 





conditions. Specifically, as relationship satisfaction increases and the relationship becomes more 
valuable (Thibaut and Kelly 1959) relationship "positive" responses to relationship problems, 
those that do no harm to the relationship, should be likely (see Hirschman 1970, Rosse and Hulin 
1985, Rusbult and her colleagues, Ping 1993). Similarly, as relationship satisfaction increases 
and the relationship becomes more valuable, relationship "negative" responses to relationship 
problems, those that allow or cause harm to the relationship should be less likely. Thus, 
satisfaction should be negatively associated with relationship neglect, allowing the relationship to 
deteriorate (Ping 1983, Rosse and Hulin 1985, Rusbult and her collegues); opportunism, 
surreptitious self-interest seeking at the expense of the relationship partner (Anderson 1988, 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Ping 1983; and exiting (see the citations in Brown and Peterson 1993, 
Hirschman 1970, Rusbult and her colleagues, Ping 1993).  
Formally, 
H1a: satisfaction is positively associated with loyalty, voice and organizational 
commitment, and negatively associated with opportunism and neglect. 
 
Similarly, attributes of a satisfactory relationship, including goal congruency and 
organizational commitment, should also be associated with responses to relationship problems. 
Specifically because goal congruency and organizational commitment also make a relationship 
perceptually more valuable, they should be positively associated with responses to relationship 
problems that do no harm to the relationship, loyalty and voice. Similarly, as goal congruency 
and organizational commitment increase and the relationship becomes more valuable, responses 
to relationship problems that allow or cause harm to the relationship should be less likely. Thus, 
goal congruency and organizational commitment should be negatively associated with 






Satisfaction has been observed to be negatively associated with exiting when organizational 
commitment is not measured (e.g., Netemeyer, Johnson and Burton 1990). However, based on 
Williams and Hazers 1986 and other studies (e.g., Davy, Kinicki and Scheck 1991, see Brown 
and Peterson 1993 and Mathieu and Zajac 1990 for summaries) the satisfaction-exiting 
association should be mediated by organizational commitment (however, see Sager 1994, and 
Curry, Wakefield, Price and Mueller 1986--as Brooke, Russell and Price (1988) suggested, the 
link between these two variables may be more complex than previous thought and empirical 
research have suggested). Specifically, satisfaction should increase organizational commitment, 
which then decreases exiting. The relationship is similar to clouds creating rain in order to create 
puddles, but clouds not necessarily directly creating puddles. Thus, we should withdraw the 
prediction that there is a direct link between satisfaction and exiting, and hypothesize instead that 
satisfaction is positively associated with organizational commitment, which in turn is negatively 
associated with exiting. Thus, satisfaction should not be directly associated with exiting when 
organizational commitment is measured. This is consistent with Rosse and Millers (1984) 
arguments that dissatisfied employees first withdraw emotionally before they withdraw 
physically. 
In summary,  
H1b: goal congruency and organizational commitment are positively associated with 
loyalty and voice, and negatively associated with opportunism, exiting and neglect.  
 
Previous studies have hypothesized that alternative attractiveness should be negatively 
associated with loyalty and neglect, and positively associated with voice, opportunism and exit. 
As the attractiveness of alternatives increases and the subject becomes less likely to be passive 
when there are relationship problems (Ping 1993), they subject should be more inclined to be 





1993, Provan and Skinner 1989), or exit (see the citations in Brown and Peterson 1993, Ping 
1993, and Rusbult and her collegues). They should also be less inclined to be passive by being 
loyal, optimistic silence (Hirschman 1970, Rusbult and her collegues, Ping 1993), or pessimistic 
silence, neglect (Rusbult and her collegues, Ping 1993). 
However, we disagree with previous arguments that alternative attractiveness should be 
positively associated with voice. For example, Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988 and 
others have argued that subjects are likely to be active rather than passive in their responses to 
relationship problems when there are alternatives, and they should be vocal. Nevertheless, that 
alternatives to the present relationship should decrease the likelihood of voice was one of the 
reasons for Hirschman's monograph (see Hirschman 1970:44). He argued that, other things being 
equal, one is likely to be vocal when there are few alternatives to the present relationship, not 
when there are more. Thus, we propose that alternative attractiveness should be negatively 
associated with voice.  
Thus,  
H2: alternative attractiveness is negatively associated with voice, loyalty and neglect, and 
positively associated with opportunism and exiting. 
 
Previous research has also argued that relationship investment and switching cost should be 
positively associated with the positive responses to relationship problems (loyalty and voice) and 
negatively associated with the negative responses (relationship neglect, opportunism and exit). 
When sunk costs such as relationship investments, or future costs, switching costs, are high, 
subjects should prefer positive responses to relationship problems that safeguard or avoid these 
costs (Hirschman 1970, Rusbult and her collegues, Ping 1993), and they should avoid negative 
responses that risk losing or incuring these costs (see the citations in Brown and Peterson 1993, 





However, we disagree that opportunism should be negatively associated with investment and 
switching cost (e.g., Ping 1993). Opportunism at the level of an individual could plausibly be 
viewed as an equity restoring behavior (see Walster, Berscheid and Walster 1976). Equity as it is 
used here, has been characterized as "keeping score" of partner's rewards and costs in a 
relationship, relative to the subject's rewards and costs. Equity has been heavily researched, and 
the evidence suggests that in high quality relationships partners do not "keep score." However, in 
lower quality relationships one or both relationship partners should be acutely aware of any 
imbalance of relationship rewards and costs. There, opportunism might unilaterally reduce the 
opportunist's relationship cost, and increase their rewards, and/or increase partner's relationship 
cost and/or decrease their rewards. While there is always a risk of discovery, if this risk is low 
enough or far enough in the future, an opportunistic salesperson, for example, could falsify call 
reports (a cost reduction for the salesperson) or inflate expense reports (an increased reward to 
the salesperson with an increased cost to the employer) to "even the score up a bit" (improve 
equity). Thus, we hypothesize that past relationship investment and the cost to switch 
relationships should increase equity restoring activities such as opportunism. 
Formally,  
H3: investment and switching cost are positively associated with opportunism, loyalty and 
voice, and negatively associated with exit and neglect. 
 
Turning to the linkages among the antecedents of responses to relationship problems, agency 
theory predicts that principals (e.g., firms) and their agents (e.g., employees) should have 
divergent goals (e.g., the firm maximizes its profit while employees maximize their profit) (see 
Eisenhardt 1985, Leibenstein 1982). To the extent the organizations goals and objectives 
approximate those of the individual (goal congruency) the individual should be attracted to the 





to the individual. These rewards should increase the subject's satisfaction and strengthen their 
identification with the organization, and thus increase an individual's efforts to maintain and 
build the relationship (Ouchi 1980), which captures Mowday, Steers and Porters (1979) 
definition of the concept of organizational commitment (p. 226). Thus,  
H4: goal congruency is positively associated with satisfaction and organizational 
commitment. 
 
Using several theoretical arguments, Johnson and Rusbult (1989) proposed that relationship 
satisfaction should reduce the attractiveness of alternatives. Because the subject's comparison 
level for alternatives (CLalt) with respect to satisfaction should have been increased in a 
satisfactory relationship (Thibaut and Kelly 1959), the satisfaction available in alternative 
relationships should appear less attractive in comparison. Using similar logic, attributes of a 
satisfactory relationship such as goal congruency should raise the subject's CLalt for goal 
congruency, and the goal congruency available in alternative relationships should also appear less 
attractive. Similarly, using other authors' logical arguments (see Scanzioni 1979) Dwyer, Schurr 
and Oh (1987) proposed that in committed relationships alternative relationships should be less 
attractive. Johnson and Rusbult (1989) also concluded that greater commitment was associated 
with what they termed alternative devaluation. Thus,  
H5: satisfaction, organizational commitment and goal congruency are positively associated 
with alternative unattractiveness. 
 
Similarly, a satisfactory relationship should perceptually magnify the cost to switch 
relationships. Johnson (1982) implied that exiting obtains when cost to stay exceeds the cost to 
leave. This hints that when satisfaction is high switching costs may be perceived as high. Rusbult 
(1980, p. 174) stated that as satisfaction increases, relationship costs should decrease. Using 





satisfactory relationship should be low (e.g., Walster et al. 1976), the additional costs to switch 
relationships should appear unattractive in comparison (e.g., Ping 1990). Depth interviews with a 
convenient sample of salespersons suggested no one voluntarily would incur these unnecessary 
costs if they are satisfied with their present employer. Using dissonance logic (Festinger 1957), 
switching costs that are unnecessary and unattractive are likely to be evaluated as perceptually 
high, rather than perceptually low.  
Thus, the costs to switch from a satisfactory relationship should appear unattractive (Ping 
1990), and satisfaction and switching cost should be positively associated. 
Using similar logic, the attributes of satisfactory relationships, including goal congruency and 
organizational commitment, should lower the subject's CLalt for costs, and switching costs 
should also appear less attractive and thus likely to be judged as high. Thus, the attributes of a 
satisfactory relationship, including goal congruency and organizational commitment, should be 
positively associated with switching cost. 
In summary,  
H6: satisfaction, organizational commitment and goal congruency are positively associated 
with switching cost. 
 
Using consistency arguments (Festinger 1957), Ping (2003) argued that past investments in a 
relationship should be likely to increase the subject's satisfaction with their relationship. Subjects 
tend to alter their feelings to be consistent with their past actions (Festinger 1957), in this case 
past investments. Since subjects are likely to seek satisfaction rather than dissatisfaction 
(Homans 1961), increased investments should be likely to increase satisfaction (rather than 
dissatisfaction). This effect should also extend to other feelings in a satisfactory relationship, 
such as goal congruency and organizational commitment. Thus,  





commitment, and goal congruency. 
 
Ping (2003) argued that investments also increase alternative unattractiveness and switching 
cost. Investment should be a combination of those investments that are transferable to another 
relationship and those that are not. Investments that are nontransferable to alternative 
relationships should increase the unattractiveness of these alternatives and the cost to switch to 
these alternatives because subjects should not want to lose them and be forced to incur the costs 
in time, money and effort to replace them. In turn, the magnitude of the time, money and effort to 
replace the nontransferable switching costs should increase the unattractiveness of alternative 
relationships (Porter 1980). Thus investment increases alternative unattractiveness and switching 
costs, and switching costs increase alternative unattractiveness.   
In summary, 
H8: investment should be positively associated with alternative unattractiveness and 
switching cost; and 
H9: switching cost should be positively associated with alternative unattractiveness. 
 
Previous studies lend empirical support to some of these proposals (see Table 3), and the 
proposals are summarized in Figure 1. 
A TEST OF THE PROPOSED MODEL USING SALESPERSONS 
The Figure 1 model was tested using a mailed-out survey of salespersons. 
Sampling  The study population was U.S. salespersons who represented a single firm that 
also employed them--it excluded independent agents and brokers. The sampling frame was the 
subscription list of a major personal selling publication, and the sample was selected using n-th 
name selections of 100 pretest salesperson names and addresses, then 900 final-test salesperson 
names and addresses. 





preliminarily evaluate the measures. 1 These were followed by the pretest mailing used to gauge 
the response rate, and to further assess the psychometric properties of the measures.2 While the 
study measures were judged sufficiently reliable and valid for the final test mailing, minor 
changes were made to the cover letter, and the questionnaire instructions and format. 
Final Test  Two hundred seventy eight usable responses resulted from the final-test mailing, a 
31% usable response rate. Based on a comparison of the demographics of the responses and 
published salespersons' demographics, the responses were judged to be representative of the 
study population. 
Measures  The study concepts were measured used existing scales or adaptations or existing 
scales. The conceptual and operational definitions of these measures are shown in Table 1. For 
example, satisfaction was conceptualized as the subject's global evaluation of relationship 
fulfillment (see Brown and Peterson 1993). The conceptual domain of satisfaction was the 
overall evaluation of the relationship; an appraisal of the relationship attributes that are reward-
ing, profitable or instrumental. Its operational definition was the belief that the relationship is 
satisfactory, and items included, "All in all, my relationship with my company is very 
satisfactory." Satisfaction was initially measured using two scales, one developed by Bagozzi 
(1980), and one adapted from a measure developed by Ping (1993). Based on their scenario 
analysis, pre- and final-test performances, the second measure was chosen to estimate the Figure 
1 structural model.3 
Exiting was operationalized as exit propensity, the disinclination to continue the current 
relationship, and it was initially measured using two scales, one developed by Bluedorn (1982), 
and another adapted from a measure developed by Ping (1993). Based on the scenario analysis 





Goal congruency and opportunism were measured using scales developed by Anderson 
(1988), and the measures for alternative attractiveness, switching cost and voice, were adapted 
from measures developed by Ping (1993).  
Organizational commitment was measured using a scale developed by Mowday, Steers and 
Porter (1979). However, it was multidimensional.5 The measures for loyalty, investment, and 
neglect, which were adapted from measures developed by Ping (1993), and the opportunism 
measure, were also multidimensional. For these multidimensional measures the Factor 1 items of 
each scale were used instead of the full measure.6 
Reliability and Validity After minimal item weeding to attain internal consistency,7,8 the 
measures were judged to be internally and externally consistent. The reliabilities of the study 
variables were above .85, which suggested they were reliable (see Table 2). Example items for 
these measures are shown in Table 1.  
Each measure was judged to be content or face valid, and each latent variable was correlated 
with other latent variables in theoretically plausible directions (see Table 2), which suggested 
their construct validity. With one exception, each measure had an Average Variance Extracted 
(AVE, the percentage of variance not due to measurement error) (see Fornell and Larker 1981) 
above 0.5, which suggested their convergent validity (see Table 2). With the same exception, 
each measure's squared correlation, or percentage covariance, with each of the other study 
variables was less than their error-free variance percentages, AVE's, of both variables involved in 
the correlation, which suggested their discriminant validity (i.e., they were empirically distinct 
from one another) (see Fornell and Larker 1981).  
Organizational commitment (OC), however, was not convergent or discriminant valid, and it 





variance, AVE, was less than 0.5 (0.47) suggesting it was composed primarily of error variance, 
and thus not convergent valid. In addition, its percentage covariance, its squared correlation, with 
at least two other study variables, satisfaction and goal congruency, was greater than the 
percentage error-free variance, AVE's, of both variables involved in the correlation, suggesting it 
was empirically indistinct from these variables--all its error-free variance was involved in 
covariance.9 Thus, because OC was composed of more than 50% error variance and it was 
empirically identical to several other study variables, retaining OC in the Figure 1 model was 
judged to be inappropriate on validity grounds.  
Measurement and Structural Models  Nevertheless, two Figure 1 models were estimated 
using LISREL 8 and maximum likelihood estimation. Specifically, the revised measurement and 
structural models for Figure 1, without Organizational Commitment, were estimated and judged 
to fit the data (see Tables 4 and 5).10 And, because of organizational commitment's prominence 
in the selling and employment literatures, the Figure 1 model was also estimated with 
organizational commitment.  
However, lack of discriminant validity usually produces subtle, to obvious, estimation 
difficulties because of the higher correlations between one or more latent variables that 
frequently attends discriminant invalidity. Estimating the Figure 1 structural model with 
organizational commitment initially produced standardized structural coefficients for 
organizational commitment that were greater than 1 in absolute value ( |1| ) (see Table 6), 
probably because of its near-collinearity with several variables (see Table 2). Standardized 
structural coefficients are related to correlations and should be less than or equal to |1| (see 
Blalock 1979), suggesting the initial estimates were improper. However, in this case the 





structural disturbances (ζ's) among the responses to relationship problems and re-estimating (see 
Table 7).  
Results  The results of estimating these two models, the (remedied) Figure 1 model with 
Organizational Commitment (the OC model), and the Figure 1 model without organizational 
commitment (the non-OC model), are shown in Tables 7, 4 and 5, and they are summarized in 
Table 3. The hypotheses were generally supported by both these estimations. Specifically, each 
of the responses to employer problems was significantly associated with one or more proposed 
antecedents. In addition, each of the proposed antecedents was associated with one or more 
responses to relationship problems, and one or more of their hypothesized antecedents. The 
explained variances (R2) ranged from low to comparatively high. The explained variances for of 
opportunism and exit, for example, were comparatively high (59% and 69-70% respectively), but 
the explained variances of voice, neglect and loyalty were lower (21-24%, 35-40% and 4-8% 
respectively) (see Table 4). 
DISCUSSION 
RESPONSES TO RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS 
Several of the observed direct associations were significant, but their total associations (direct 
plus indirect associations) were not, and vice versa. For example, investment's (INV) direct 
association with neglect (NEG) was not significant (see Table 3), while its total association, or 
total effect, was significant (see Table 8). Because these total effects reflect, for example, INV's 
effect on NEG via all the model paths between INV and NEG--the INV --> NEG path, plus the 
indirect INV --> satisfaction --> NEG path, plus the indirect INV --> alternatives (ALT) --> NEG 






The Figure 1 model with Organizational Commitment (OC), the OC model, and the Figure 1 
model without organizational commitment, the non-OC model, were interpretationally equivalent 
in most cases; their structural coefficients agreed in significance and, for significant structural 
coefficients, in sign, except for the ALT-voice association, and the ALT-opportunism and ALT-
neglect associations. Nevertheless, we primarily will rely on the non-OC model estimates for 
interpretation, for the reasons previously mentioned: OC failed to be convergent and discriminant 
valid, and its structural model required remediation with correlated structural disturbances to 
remove its infeasible standardized structural coefficients greater than 1 in absolute value. 
However, we will return to the OC model later.  
Discouraging Turnover 
In the study, turnover (exiting) was likely to be discouraged by alternative unattractiveness, 
investments, switching costs, goal congruency, organizational commitment, and indirectly by 
satisfaction. These results support the well-worn prescription in sales management to increase 
salespersons' satisfaction in order to reduce the likelihood of turnover. However, increased 
relationship-specific investment, from, for example, more product training, and increased 
switching cost, with, for example, improved medical or dental insurance, were also likely to play 
a (lesser) role in discouraging turnover in the study.  
The significant satisfaction, investments and switching costs associations with alternatives 
suggested that alternative attractiveness was reduced by increased satisfaction, investments and 
switching costs, which in turn were likely to reduce turnover in the study. However, alternative 
attractiveness was positively correlated with exiting (see Table 2), so directly reducing alternative 
attractiveness instead of relying on satisfaction, investment or switching cost to reduce it may 





using, for example, "success stories" of clients who switched from the competition. 
However, based on the magnitude of their (standardized) total effects, satisfaction and 
organizational commitment, followed by goal congruency were most important in discouraging 
turnover (see Table 8). Alternatives and switching costs were a distant second, followed by 
investment. Thus, busy sales managers in the study should probably have attended first to 
satisfaction and goal congruency in their sales force. Once these were progressing satisfactorily, 
increasing switching costs and possibly alternative unattractiveness should have been next, and 
increasing sales force investments should have been last. 
For emphasis, unattractive alternatives, investments and switching costs were (somewhat) 
likely to discourage turnover in the study. This was one of the arguments that Allen and Meyer 
1990, among others (see Levinger 1979), made regarding relationship commitment: individuals 
stay in (appear to be committed to) a relationship either because they want to (i.e., relationship 
quality is high) or because they have to (e.g., the alternatives are not attractive, etc.). In this case 
salespersons were more likely to stay in their relationship because they wanted to, than because 
they had to. 
However, this was true only for salespersons with levels of satisfaction and alternative 
attractiveness that were at the study average. Ping (1994) proposed there was an interaction 
between satisfaction and alternative attractiveness in their association with exiting. This was also 
true in the present study. As a result, as satisfaction declined the magnitude of the (positive) 
effect of alternative attractiveness on exiting became larger. Eventually, salespersons who had 
levels of satisfaction below the study average were likely to stay in their relationship because 
they had to--the effect of alternative attractiveness on exiting (its structural coefficient) for these 





low satisfaction salespersons in the study direct alternative attractiveness reduction efforts by 
sales managers may have been more likely to be efficacious than their satisfaction or goal 
congruency management. 
In a re-estimation of the model containing organizational commitment with the satisfaction-
to-exiting path free, the direct path between satisfaction and exiting was non significant (β =  
-0.193, t = -1.93). While this association might have been significant with a larger sample, its 
comparatively small structural coefficient is consistent with other satisfaction-organizational 
commitment-exiting studies, and such results add to the evidence that there may be minimal or 
no direct relationship between satisfaction and exiting in the presence of organizational 
commitment in employee relations.11 However, in the present study this result should be 
considered provisional--organizational commitment was empirically indistinct from both 
satisfaction and exiting. Nevertheless, for emphasis, in the model containing organizational 
commitment, satisfaction was significantly but indirectly associated with exiting, and it was the 
"driver" of non-exiting for salespersons with average or above average levels of satisfaction.  
We shall return to managing turnover later under Increasing Satisfaction. 
Avoiding Employment-Relationship Neglect 
As previously discussed, there appears to be a response to relationship problems where the 
subject withdraws emotionally from the relationship (Ping 1993) without physically exiting, 
relationship neglect. It was conceptualized in the present study as not caring about the 
relationship, expending no effort to maintain it, planning to do nothing to improve relationship 
conditions, and willingness to let the relationship die. While exiting and opportunism have been 






Neglect was negatively correlated with voice in the study, which suggested salespersons who 
are neglecting the relationship are not likely to be vocal (complain). Neglect was comparatively 
rare in the study. About 7% of the sample did not disagree they were neglecting the relationship, 
and in focus groups conducted before the study neglect seemed to be a pessimistic silence about 
the likelihood of things getting better, as opposed to loyalty's optimistic silence.  
In these focus groups, there may have been two types of neglect: one that attends exiting--
mentally "moving on" to the alternative relationship as part of the exiting process. And, there 
may have been another type of neglect that was emitted by dissatisfied salespersons who did not 
want to exit, possibly because of structural constraints (Ping 1993) such as the alternative 
required relocating the family against their will. This was also suggested in the study. Neglect 
was positively correlated with exiting (see Table 2), and among salespersons who did not 
disagreed they were neglecting the relationship, 66.7% agreed or strongly agreed they intended to 
exit the relationship. 
However, 33.3% of salespersons in the sample who did not disagreed they were neglecting 
the relationship also did not agree they intended to exit. The focus groups results hinted that 
among those who were neglecting their relationship but did not intend to exit, structural 
constraints may have been perceived as high. Indeed in the study for salespersons who did not 
disagree they were neglecting the relationship but did not agree they intended to exit, 66.7% 
agreed or strongly agreed switching cost was high. 
These results support Rosse and Hulin's (1985) assertions that subjects first emotionally 
withdraw from a dissatisfactory committed relationship. However, these results suggest that 
exiting may be a separate matter, at least for some--33.3% of salespersons who did not disagree 





This had management implications in the study. While as a percentage of the sample neglect 
was comparatively rare, it attended exiting for most of those in neglect. Stated differently, 
neglect, lax behaviors such as lateness and absenteeism, and disregardful behavior such as 
avoidance and lack of contact, was for most salespersons in the study an indicator of those who 
were exiting. Parenthetically, salesperson silence might also have suggested relationship neglect 
for those salespersons who have been with the organization long enough to perceive they have a 
large investment in the relationship--14.8% of the sample were loyal and also silent.  
The significant alternatives-neglect (total) association was in an unexpected direction in the 
study. Specifically, while its effect was minor when compared to satisfaction and goal 
congruency, neglect was increased by alternative attractiveness instead of decreased as 
hypothesized. However, this association has been observed to be variously nonsignificant 
(Rusbult, et al. 1988), positive (Ping 1993) or negative (Rusbult, et al. 1982) in previous studies, 
suggesting it may be sensitive to study context. Specifically, recalling the interviews where 
neglect may have attended "moving on," these results suggest that salespersons in the study who 
were neglecting their relationship may have been mentally "moving on" to an alternative 
relationship and neglecting the relationship as part of their exiting process. Indeed, for 
salespersons who did not disagree they were neglecting their relationship, 77.8% agreed the 
alternatives were attractive. More important, the positive alternatives-neglect (total) association 
suggested these salespersons might not have been concerned about appearances and the attendant 
possibility of organizational retaliation as they exited. 
For emphasis, it was not the case that structural constraints had little affect on neglect in the 
study. Based on the relative magnitudes of their structural coefficients, dissatisfaction and lack of 





of the sample viewed alternatives as attractive, and in a re-estimation of the non organizational 
commitment model restricted to salespersons in relationship neglect, alternatives were only the 
"driver" of neglect (standardized beta = 0.823, t-value = 2.33)--the other antecedents were non-
significant. Parenthetically, this effect was so strong that it showed up in the full sample. Thus, 
given relationship neglect, alternative attractiveness was likely to have aggravated it.  
As an aside, while investment decreased neglect in the full sample and switching cost had no 
effect on neglect, given relationship neglect, 88.9% of the sample did not disagree their 
relationship investment as high (investment ≥ 3), and 66.7% viewed switching cost as high 
(switching cost ≥ 3), suggesting these may have slowed exiting.  
Fortunately, satisfaction and goal congruency had the major attenuating effects on neglect 
(see Table 8). Thus, primary activities aimed at managing exiting in the study were also likely to 
have managed neglect in the study.  
We will discuss the positive correlation between neglect and opportunism (see Table 2), a 
relationship equity restoring behavior, later.  
Cultivating Voice 
As previously discussed, voice is positive complaining by those who are willing to 
cooperatively work to improve the situation. Voice alerts an organization to its errors of omission 
and commission (Hirschman 1970), and it should be negatively associated with exiting 
(Hirschman 1970; see Table 2). Thus, it may be desirable to cultivate voice in salespersons.  
In the present study voice was likely to be increased by relationship investment, goal 
congruency and unattractive alternatives (see Table 8). Of these, the primary drivers of voice 
were goal congruence and investment. 





predicted. However, in other studies this association has been observed to be either 
nonsignificant (Ping 1993, Rusbult et al. 1982) or positive (Rusbult et al. 1988). While other 
explanations are plausible, the varied alternative attractiveness-voice associations across studies 
suggest this association may depend on context. Specifically, there may be an interaction in the 
alternatives-voice association. An interaction can produce a positive association in one study, a 
non-significant association in another, and a negative association in a third study. This result will 
become clearer later.  
Probing the possibility of an interaction with alternatives, we found that satisfaction and 
alternatives interacted in their association with voice. The effect of this interaction was that, as 
the level of overall satisfaction varied across subjects in the sample, for subjects with low overall 
satisfaction alternatives were positively associated with voice. However, for subjects with overall 
satisfaction near or above the study average alternatives were negatively associated with voice.  
In studies where this interaction was not specified the observed alternatives-voice association 
would be approximately the association at the study average of satisfaction (see Aiken and West 
199?). Thus, in studies where this association has been nonsignificant (Ping 1993, Rusbult et al. 
1982), the study average of overall satisfaction may have been low. This is suggested by the 
subjects with low overall satisfaction in the present where alternatives were positively associated 
with voice. In another study where the association was positive (Rusbult et al. 1988), the study 
average of overall satisfaction may have been higher than the present study. This is suggested by 
the subjects with higher overall satisfaction in the present where alternatives were negatively 
associated with voice. 
We speculate that in the present salesperson context when overall satisfaction was 





problems, thus reducing voice. In that case, one could always change selling organizations if 
things were not fixed. 
For emphasis, Hirschman (1970) predicted that subjects would become more vocal when 
there were few alternatives to the present relationship. Based on the interaction, this may have 
applied only to satisfied subjects in the study. However, Hirschman's discussions of voice 
suggest his prediction may have assumed satisfied subjects as well. His "voice" was emitted by 
subjects willing to cooperatively work to improve the situation. In different terms, they expected 
repair. However, Rusbult's predictions that alternative attractiveness should increase voice may 
have assumed less satisfied subjects, although this was not apparent in their discussions of voice. 
In the consumer literature, Singh (1990) observed several voice "styles" ranging from passive, to 
"irate" and "activist," and this may have reflected varying levels of overall satisfaction and 
alternatives.  
Thus, assuming there are always at least minor employment problems in selling 
organizations, and recalling that increasing voice is desirable because it alerts management to 
organizational lapses, increasing goal congruency (see the discussion of this topic under 
Increasing Satisfaction below), and to a lesser extent increasing relationship investment, with for 
example more product training may have been efficacious the study. In addition, assuming a high 
satisfaction salesforce, increasing alternative unattractiveness, with for example a newsletter 
containing success stories of customers who made the switch from a competitor, might have been 
employed to increase voice. 
Fornell and Wernerfelt (1987) suggested directly influencing voice in consumers using 800 
numbers and quick and competent complaint processing. Variations on this theme for employees 





messages, suggestion boxes, or a managerial "open door" policy for complaints might also have 
increased voice in the study. Sales managers may also have wished to publicize to their 
salespersons successful outcomes proceeding from other salespersons' use of voice. They may 
also have actively solicited salesperson voice by asking for their "number one complaint" in sales 
meetings or in private. They may also have considered using salesperson satisfaction surveys to 
facilitate voice. 
The Enigma of Relationship Loyalty 
As previously discussed, Hirschman's loyalty, remaining silent, confident that things will get 
better, has been characterized as a predisposition to overlook relationship problems because they 
fix themselves. These loyal subjects view problems as transitory phenomena; problems work 
themselves out or are fixed by others, so they ignore them. In the study, loyalty was positively 
associated with satisfaction and switching costs. However, the variance in loyalty explained by 
these variables was low. Rusbult et al. (1988) also observed low explained variance in loyalty (R2 
= 0.123). Thus, in this context Hirschman's loyalty remains enigmatic (Goodwill 1991) because 
its antecedents or drivers, "causes," are not accounted-for by the proposed model. Stated 
differently, the proposed model does not convincingly suggest how loyalty is "created" or 
maintained in this context. 
However, Hirschman (1970) argued that (relationship) loyal subjects should first attempt 
voice, and they should exit only if that fails to improve matters. Indeed, freeing the loyalty-to-
voice path in the non-organizational commitment model suggested it was significant 
(standardized betaloyalty to voice = - 0.451, t-value = -7.67), however the direction of this path could 
not be determined.12 Nevertheless, Hirschman's argument hints that subjects might begin a 





loyalty and the number of years the subject had been with their present company, tenure was 
significantly associated with loyalty among subjects with 2 or fewer years with their present 
company (standardized betayears to loyalty = - 0.384, t-value = -2.14). Thus, study subjects may have 
begun their relationship as loyal, but were likely to become vocal after about 2 years. Stated 
differently, relationship loyalty may have been a dispositional response to relationship problems 
in the study attendant to being newly committed to the relationship. 
Parenthetically, we probed loyal subjects to determine their "profile" using their average 
satisfaction, and their perceived alternative attractiveness, investment, and switching costs. 
Salespersons reporting higher loyalty (loyalty greater than 3) also reported above average 
satisfaction, alternative unattractiveness, investment, and switching costs. In addition, because 
the study subjects may have been loyal for only the first few years, their percentage of the sample 
was comparatively small (7%).  
Bearing in mind that relationship loyal salespersons may be a small segment, and based on 
Hirschman's (1970) and others arguments in effect that efforts to increase loyalty may also 
decrease the positive aspects of voice, sales managers interested in preserving loyal behavior in 
the study may have maintained high satisfaction and the perception of high switching costs 
among those who have recently joined the organization within the last few years.  
Holding Opportunism at Bay 
Opportunism, surreptitious self-interest seeking, is not new to the personal selling literature. 
Anderson (1988) investigated it and found the primary influence on opportunism in salespersons 
was goal congruency. This was also true in the present study. However, unattractive alternatives 
also decreased opportunism, and the investment-opportunism direct effect was significant and its 





Table 8). In fact, these variables explained nearly 60% of the variance in opportunism.  
The proposed view of opportunism as an equity-balancing mechanism received some 
support. It was positively associated with alternatives, and negatively associated with goal 
congruency as hypothesized. However, while investment and switching cost were directly 
associated with opportunism as hypothesized, the indirect paths from investment and switching 
cost via alternative and goal congruency suppressed these associations because they were 
negative in sign. As a result, their combined or total effects were nonsignificant, although the 
investment-opportunism effect approached significance suggesting that in a larger sample it 
might have been significant. Thus, as past or sunk costs (investments in the relationship) 
increased, opportunism may have been (weakly) likely to increase. This suggests that subjects 
may have been (weakly) likely to have compensated for some of their past relationship costs 
using opportunism, and thus opportunism may have been a (weak) sunk cost re-balancing 
mechanism for some subjects in the study context.  
Anderson (1988) also observed an hypothesized quadratic in goal congruency (Ouchi 1979). 
This quadratic (goal congruency squared) was significant in the present study and it intensified 
the investment and switching cost effects so they were significant in total. However, their 
comparative effect size when compared to goal congruency still suggested that investments and 
switching costs were considerably less important in the study context when compared to goal 
congruency and alternative attractiveness. Thus, while the opportunism associations with goal 
congruency and investment are predicted by Transaction Cost Analysis (see Anderson 1988), the 
alternative association is not, and a fair comparison of the two perspectives on opportunism, 
Equity versus Transaction Cost Analysis, is that an equity view generates several novel 





not strongly disconfirmed. 
In study of buyers and suppliers, Jap and Anderson (2003) observed an interaction with 
opportunism. In that study, among respondents reporting low opportunism, the goal congruency-
opportunism association was nonsignificant, and investment, among other variables, was 
significant. With high opportunism, goal congruency was significant, and investment was less so. 
In the present study, with high opportunism, alternatives, investment, and goal congruency were 
significant and the quadratic in goal congruency was nonsignificant. However, with low 
opportunism, satisfaction and the quadratic in goal congruency were significant and goal 
congruency was nonsignificant. While other explanations are plausible, this suggests the 
antecedents of opportunism may be context dependence.  
Turning to the nature of opportunism, 34.8% of the sample disagreed or strongly disagreed 
they were opportunistic, suggesting that opportunism may have been common in the sample. 
This percentage was reduced to 20% for subjects with high goal congruency and few attractive 
alternatives. However, this suggests that while opportunism was likely to have been attenuated 
for some in the study, it may also have been an innate human tendency as Williamson (1975), 
among others argued. 
Opportunism has been characterized as unlikely in individuals (e.g., Hill 1990), and others 
have argued that tolerating it may be less expensive than the sacrifices required to reduce it 
(Williamson 1981). Nevertheless, recalling that opportunism, for example padded expense 
reports, when discovered, might be viewed by outsiders as grounds for dismissal in this era of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, it now may be increasingly important to hold opportunism at bay in selling 
organizations. Fortunately several management activities that might have increased voice in the 





increasing goal congruency and alternative attractiveness reduced the reported opportunism 
percentage in the present study to 20%. Of these, increasing the salespersons' perceptions of goal 
congruency had the largest effect on opportunism.  
Parenthetically, it may have been fortunate that investment had a small effect on opportunism 
in the study. These results suggest that investment may be a two-edged sword. Increasing it 
should reduce subject mobility (Jackson 1985, Klemperer 1987) and thus their exiting. However, 
in the study higher investment appeared to be (weakly) associated with higher opportunism. 
Thus, while lower investment might have produced lower opportunism in the study, its effect 
may not have been strong enough to dissuade managers in the study from maintaining or 
increasing investment because of the mobility reduction effects it should produce. 
ANTECEDENTS 
Increasing Satisfaction 
The hypothesized linkages among antecedents of the responses to relationship problems were 
all significant in the hypothesized directions. Investment and goal congruency, for example, were 
antecedents of satisfaction. In fact these two antecedents of the responses to relationship 
problems explained more than 60% of the variance in satisfaction (see Table 4). However, goal 
congruency by far had the largest effect on satisfaction (see Table 8).  
The maintenance of relationship satisfaction is obviously desirable in salesperson-employer 
relationships. It has been reported to be strongly and positively associated with organizational 
commitment in other studies, and it was empirically identical to organizational commitment in 
the present study. Because organizational commitment, and indirectly, satisfaction, have been 
negatively related to exit intention (see Brown and Paterson 1993), and satisfaction reduced 





for salesperson satisfaction management in the study were suggested. Sixty-one percent of the 
variance in relationship satisfaction was explained primarily by goal congruency and to lesser 
extent investment (see Table 3). This suggests that satisfaction management activities aimed at 
increasing goal congruency and relationship investment may be important to relationship 
maintenance in this context.  
However, there is little in the personal selling literature on the management of goal 
congruency. Thus, it may be instructive to look at the items that composed opportunism. The 
logic for looking at opportunism is, using Aristotelian logic, if A implies B, then not B implies 
not A. Or, in this case if goal congruency is likely to imply not opportunism, then not 
opportunism is likely to imply (not not) goal congruency. Factor 1 of opportunism was composed 
primarily of items involving the company's lack of candor, and the requirement for altered facts 
and exaggerated needs to get what is needed. Other opportunism items included the requirement 
for presenting facts so the subject looks good, and that honesty does not pay. Thus goal 
congruency in this context might have been increased, for example, by improved management 
candor and reduced difficulty in getting what is needed, presumably for selling or the customer. 
Unfortunately, the items of goal congruency are less revealing. The strongest loading item on 
goal congruency was the sense of team effort between the subject and the company. Thus, goal 
congruency in this context might have been increased using, for example, "beat the boss" golf 
outings. Investment might have been increased by increasing relationship specific investments in, 
for example, product training, and by emphasizing longevity with valuable awards for longevity.  
Parenthetically, the logic involving the items of opportunism suggest a novel approach to 
managing turnover using goal congruency. Specifically, since goal congruency was likely to 





rewarding honesty may have been likely to attenuated exiting. 
Reducing Alternative  Attractiveness 
The Figure 1 satisfaction-alternatives path and the paths to alternatives from investment, 
switching cost and goal congruency were all significant in the hypothesized directions (see Table 
8). In fact more than half of the variance in alternatives was explained by these variables. 
Specifically, satisfaction followed by goal congruency were most likely to decrease alternative 
attractiveness in the study. These results suggest that salespersons in the study were likely to 
devalue their alternatives, as Johnson and Rusbult (1989) and others argued, primarily as the 
relationship quality variables, satisfaction and goal congruency, increased, and secondarily as 
structural constraints such as investments and switching costs increased. 
Sales managers in the study interested in reducing alternative attractiveness and thus reducing 
exiting, neglect and opportunism, and cultivating voice may have considered two approaches: 
indirectly by increasing satisfaction, investment, switching costs and goal congruency, and 
directly by, for example, tailoring promotional activities specifically for their sales persons in 
order to reduce alternative attractiveness. Promoting superior sales support, comparatively or 
unilaterally, for example, may be efficacious. Providing "success stories" in newsletters, 
ostensibly aimed at customers but directed to sales persons, that tell of other customers who 
switched from the competition firms may also be useful. 
Increasing Switching Costs 
Switching costs had the antecedents satisfaction, investment and goal congruency. Of these 
antecedents satisfaction and investment were largest, followed by goal congruency. Thus, 
managers in the study interested in increasing switching costs and thus increasing loyalty and 





benefits that would be lost in exiting such as improved educational benefits for the subject or 
their family.  
Organizational Commitment 
Organizational commitment did not perform well in the study. Its discriminant validity has 
not been previously investigated as far as we know, and it was discriminant invalid, empirically 
indistinct from several other constructs, in the study. For example, organizational commitment's 
association with satisfaction in the study may have been due to the fact that all of its variance was 
shared with satisfaction or due to measurement error (see Endnote 9 for details). Stated 
differently, organizational commitment contained no error-free variance that was not shared with 
satisfaction--its squared correlation with satisfaction. This was also true for organizational 
commitment and exiting, alternatives and goal congruency in the study (see Table 2).  
We probed the itemization of organizational commitment by omitting the six negatively 
worded items as Mowday, Steers and Porter (1979) suggested, and by omitting the exiting items 
to reduce the overlap with exiting (e.g., Davy, Kinicki and Scheck 1991). Unfortunately, it was 
still discriminant invalid, and it produced discriminant invalidity results that were nearly identical 
to those reported in Table 2.  
We elected not interpret the results of the Figure 1 model with organizational commitment 
because the model was difficult to estimate without remediation, and the remediated model's 
coefficient estimates did not always agree with those from the Figure 1 model without 
organizational commitment. For example, several coefficient estimates involving satisfaction and 
alternatives, variables with which organizational commitment was indistinct, were different in 
the Figure 1 model with organizational commitment. However, for associations involving 





and it strongly decreased neglect, as hypothesized (see Table 8). While such results should be 
considered provisional because of the difficulties with organizational commitment just discussed, 
this hints that salespersons who are organizationally committed may be likely to be vocal, and by 
implication salespersons who are not vocal may also be not likely to be organizationally 
committed. In addition, since organizational commitment was subsumed by exiting, salespersons 
who are not vocal may also be likely to be exiting. 
However, lack of empirical distinctness could be viewed as suggesting alternative 
operationalizations of organizational commitment. The rationale is that since all the error-free 
variance of organizational commitment is shared with, for example, alternatives, decreasing that 
variable should have increased organizational commitment in the study, even though the 
association was postulated to be in the opposite direction.  
Goal Congruency 
While its single hypothesized antecedent, investment, was significantly associated with goal 
congruency, this association was comparatively small and it explained little variance in goal 
congruency. Nevertheless, goal congruency was a powerful antecedent in the study. It produced 
several of the largest associations in the study. For example, its association with satisfaction, and 
with opportunism and exiting were second only to the satisfaction association with alternatives 
(see Table 8). The management of goal congruency in this study was mentioned previously 
during the discussion of satisfaction. 
IMPLICATIONS 
While generalizing from a single study is risky, most of the plausible implications of the 
study results have been discussed above. Nevertheless, most of the structural constraint (Ping 





investments and switching costs, were significant or approached significance. But, as a group 
their effects on the responses were comparatively minor compared to the relationship quality 
variables of satisfaction, goal congruency and possibly organizational commitment in the study. 
This suggests that busy managers in the study may have preferred to manage relationship quality 
before tackling structural constraints. 
As far as we know, this is the first investigation of discriminant validity in the Mowday, 
Steers and Porter's (1979) organizational commitment scale. As previously discussed, 
organizational commitment was operationally the same construct as satisfaction and goal 
congruency in the present study, and it was operationally subsumed by alternative attractiveness, 
exiting, and perhaps opportunism. While organizational commitment's indistinctness from other 
relationship variables might have been remedied by a different operationalization (e.g., Allen and 
Meyer 1990), this may be a daunting task. As previously mentioned, re-itemizations of 
organizational commitment produced the same lack of discriminant validity in the present study. 
Further, Allen and Meyer (1990) have suggested that satisfaction and organizational commitment 
are facets of a higher order construct, affective commitment. If this is correct (see Ko, Price and 
Mueller 1997), it means that organizational commitment and satisfaction should be highly 
correlated: their items should measure the same higher order construct, affective commitment. 
While the distinctness or lack thereof in organizational commitment and satisfaction is unknown 
in other studies involving them jointly, it may be empirically incorrect to continue to specify 
organizational commitment, in the Mowday, Steers and Porter's (1979) sense, with satisfaction, 








Hirschman (1970) implied there is a progression of responses to relationship problems that 
begins with his notion of loyalty. Ping (1999) proposed that loyalty is likely to be followed voice, 
then neglect and finally exiting. Although loyalty was not highly correlated with voice in the 
present study, it might be interesting and instructive to investigate further the correlations among 
loyalty, voice, neglect and exit shown in Table 2. 
Most of variance in loyalty, voice, neglect, switching cost and goal congruency were 
unexplained in the present study. As the satisfaction-alternatives interaction in voice suggested, 
interactions and quadratics do not usually explain much variance. Nevertheless, other 
(hypothesized) interactions and quadratics might account for some additional variance in loyalty, 
voice and neglect. In addition, modeling the plausible linkages among the responses to 
relationship problems just mentioned might account for more variance in voice and neglect.  
However, we suspect that more theoretical work is needed on loyalty, voice, neglect, 
switching cost and goal congruency. For example, the variability in the alternatives-voice 
association should probably be investigated further. Post hoc probing uncovered an interaction 
with satisfaction in that association. However, based on the low explained variance in voice, 
additional variability may be due to the absence of important explanatory variables--the missing 
variables problem (see James 1980, Ping 2004). There was also evidence of two sub segments of 
neglect based on whether or not they intended to exit the relationship. Turning to voice, although 
there was little evidence of it in the present study, vocal subjects may return to being loyal if 
voice is efficacious. In addition, Hirschman's loyalty may be a personality trait for some: Singh 
(1990) found some consumers were passive when it came to voice, and in the present study 28% 





The study results suggest the notion of organizational commitment may also need more work. 
Summarizing recent arguments by several authors (e.g., Allen and Meyer 1990) and our own 
thoughts on relationship commitment, it should be a combination of wanting to stay in the 
relationship, and having to stay in the relationship (Johnson 1982). Wanting to stay in a 
relationship may have several facets including satisfaction and affective attachment, and possibly 
a moral belief that one ought to stay in the relationship, and a contribution to one's identity 
provided by the relationship. Affective attachment may have facets including the acceptance of 
relationship norms and values, a willingness to exert effort on behalf of partner, and the desire to 
remain in the relationship. Having to stay in a relationship may have several facets including 
alternatives, investments and switching costs. However, recent attempts to operationalize a 
multifaceted (organizational) commitment have suggested its operationalization and specification 
also may need work (e.g., Ko, Price and Mueller 1997). 
Little is known about interventions to reduce neglect and turnover (exiting). While its 
comparatively large associations suggest that goal congruency may provide a fresh approach to 
attenuating neglect and turnover, there are no studies that address the efficacy of what might 
work.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This research investigated a revised Hirschman-Rusbult-Ping model of responses to 
relationship problems, loyalty, voice, opportunism, neglect, as well as turnover (exit) propensity 
in a personal selling context. The model included the new antecedents, organizational 
commitment and goal congruency, in addition to satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, past 






The research also proposed an alternative theoretical view of employee opportunism, as an 
equity-restoring mechanism, to generate several unexplored associations. Further, it argued that 
several hypotheses in the Hirschman-Rusbult-Ping model were incorrectly stated in the past.  
The model test suggested additional insight into Hirschman's loyalty, and Rusbult et al.'s 
(1982) neglect. In addition, the magnitude of the goal congruency associations hinted at a fresh 
approach to managing turnover using goal congruency. It also produced unexpected findings 
such as the discriminant invalidity of organizational commitment in the study. Specifically, the 
relationship between salesperson overall satisfaction and their organizational commitment was 
more complex in the study than previous research has suggested. Relationship satisfaction was 
empirically indistinct from organizational commitment using two measures of satisfaction and a 
well-researched measure of organizational commitment. While it may yet be possible to 
operationally separate these constructs, the present results hint there may be little practical 
difference between these two mental constructs for salespersons. 
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 Organizational commitment (OC) was excised from the final structural model because it was 
empirically indistinct from satisfaction (SAT) and Goal Congruency (GCon), and it was subsumed by 
several other model variables (see Footnote b in Table 2). 























Table 1- Summary of the Study Measures 
 
Conceptual    Operational 





A global evaluation of 
relationship fulfillment. 
 
Overall rating of the relationship; 
an appraisal of the relationship 
attributes that are rewarding, 
profitable, or instrumental. 
 




All in all, my relationship with 









volvement in an organ-
ization. 
 
The degree to which the individual 
identifies and is involved with the 
organization. 
 
Belief that the employer 
is the best possible 
choice of employers. 
 







The perception that what 
is beneficial or harmful to 
one relationship party is 
beneficial or harmful to 
the other. 
 
Common beliefs, actions, etc. 
between the relationship partners.  
 
The belief that the 
salespersons' and the 




Our salespeople strongly feel 
that they and the company work 








A global evaluation of the 
relationship fulfillment a-




An overall evaluation of the most 
salient and available alternative 
relationship, and generalized 
perceptions of the rewards 
available in that relationship.  
 
Satisfaction believed 
available in the best 
alternative relationship, 
above that available in 
the current relationship. 
 
In general, I would be __ satisfied 
with the alternative company 
than/as I am with my company. a. 
Much more   b. Slightly more  c. As 






The cost to build and 
maintain the current re-
lationship in anticipation 
of future exchanges 
 
Economic (e.g., money), activity 
(e.g., effort), and opportunity costs 
(e.g., time).  
 
Magnitude of the cost 
that went into building 
and maintaining the 
current relationship.  
 
Overall I have invested a lot in 







The cost to change to an 
alternative relationship. 
 
Economic, activity, and oppor- 
tunity cost to end the current rela-
tionship and secure an alternative 
relationship, and the psychic cost 
to achieve this end.  
 
The cost and loss that 
would be required to 
terminate the current re-
lationship and secure an 
alternative relationship.  
 
Considering everything, the 
costs to leave my current 
employer and join the best 







problems in silence with 
confidence that things will 
get better. 
 
Viewing problems as transitory 
phenomena that fix themselves; 
from the subject's perspective, 
problems work themselves out or 
are fixed by others, so the subject 
ignores them. 
 
The predisposition to 
overlook problems be-
cause they fix them-
selves.  
 
I will disregard any problem I 
have with this organization 
because I am sure that things 





Constructive attempts by 




Actively seeking problem removal 
by contacting relationship partner 
in a positive relationship pre-
serving manner, and cooperatively 
discussing and working with 
partner to improve the situation.  
 
The intention to notify 
constructively and work 
with partner to solve re-
lationship problems.  
 
I will suggest changes if I have 





Allowing the relationship 
to deteriorate. 
 
Not caring about the relationship, 
expending no effort to maintain the 
relationship, and willingness to let 
the relationship deteriorate.  
 
Planning to do nothing 
to improve conditions 
in the relationship.  
 
If things are not right with my 
employer I will consider letting 







The disinclination to con-
tinue the current rela-
tionship.  
 
Thinking of exiting, intending to 
search for alternatives, evaluating 
alternatives, intending to exit.  
 
Planning to leave the 
relationship.  
 
I will probably consider 
working for another company in 






Self interest seeking with 
guile. 
 
Actions that maximize one's self-
interest at the expense of the 
relationship partner. 
 
The belief that 
salespersons in the 
company must deceive 
the company to get 
what they need. 
 
Our salespeople feel they 
sometimes have to exaggerate 
their needs in order to get what 














 Error disattenuated correlations from the Figure 1 measurement model containing organizational commitment 
(OC). The correlations in the Figure 1 measurement model without OC differed from those shown in the third 
decimal place. 
b
 Organizational commitment (OC) was judged to be empirically indistinct from SAT, ALT, EXI, and GCon, and 
nearly so for OPP (see Table 1 for definitions of SAT, ALT, etc.). OC and SAT for example had more shared or 
common variance, the square of their correlation .8892
2
 = .7907, than either one had in error-free variance--their 
AVE's (= .4726 and .7252 respectively). Stated differently, all of the error free variance of OC, 47.26%, and all of 
the error free variance of SAT, 72.52%, was shared between the two variables (the square of their correlation .8892
2
 
= 79.07%) (i.e., OC and SAT were empirically the same variable). However, because SAT was empirically distinct 
from the other study variables while OC was not in several other cases (OC and ALT, for example had more shared  
SAT ALT INVST SCost LOY VOI
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
SAT 1.0000
ALT -0.7108 1.0000
INVST 0.2350 -0.1411 1.0000
SCost 0.3442 -0.4409 0.3888 1.0000
LOY 0.0843 -0.1229 -0.0488 0.1383 1.0000
VOI 0.2466 -0.2497 0.2782 0.1091 -0.4479 1.0000
OPP -0.5485 0.4767 0.1245 -0.0218 0.0932 -0.2712
EXI -0.7308 0.7579 -0.1949 -0.5093 -0.1255 -0.2143
NEG -0.5798 0.4718 -0.1402 -0.1386 0.1133 -0.4141
GCon 0.7718 -0.5533 0.1416 0.1981 0.0328 0.3611
OC
b
0.8892 -0.7296 0.1715 0.2891 -0.0050 0.3653
corr(*,OC)
2
0.7907 0.5323 0.0294 0.0836 0.0000 0.1334
AVE 0.7252 0.7420 0.8055 0.6181 0.5392 0.7754
Reliability 0.9452 0.9400 0.9610 0.8786 0.8518 0.9651
OPP EXI NEG GCon OC
-------- -------- -------- -------- --------
OPP 1.0000
EXI 0.4362 1.0000
NEG 0.3722 0.5104 1.0000
Gcon -0.7165 -0.5996 -0.4289 1.0000
OC
b
-0.6491 -0.7420 -0.6049 0.8364 1.0000
corr(*,OC)
2
0.4213 0.5505 0.3660 0.6995
AVE 0.6048 0.8721 0.7650 0.6814 0.4726

















 = 53.23%, than OC had in error-free variance--i.e., all of OC's error free variance, 
47.26%, was shared with ALT), OC was reluctantly removed from the Figure 1 model. The alternative, retaining OC, 
was judged to be inappropriate not only because OC was convergent and discriminant invalid, the Figure 1 structural 
model containing OC also produced standardized structural coefficients for OC that were greater than 1, probably 
because of the near-collinearity between SAT and OC, and inflated standard errors that resulted in many 
nonsignificant structural coefficients. 
DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY OF OC…
Squared
Correlation 
AVE of: of: AVE of:       Conclusion:
SAT SAT-OC OC
0.7252 0.7907 0.4726       SAT & OC empirically identical constructs.
ALT ALT-OC OC
0.7420 0.5323 0.4726      OC empirically subsumed by ALT.
OPP OPP-OC OC
0.6048 0.4213 0.4726       OC almost empirically subsumed by OPP.
EXI EXI-OC OC
0.8721 0.5505 0.4726       OC empirically subsumed by EXI.
GC GC-OC OC

















































 See Table 1 for definitions of SAT, VOI, etc. A + sign denotes a positive association, a - sign indicates a negative 
association. NS denotes a nonsignificant association while a + or a - in parentheses indicates that the observed 
association "approached" significance in the indicated direction (+ for positive, etc.) (i.e., the association may have 
been significant in a larger sample). 
b
 Directionality was reversed.  
Present Study… Previous Studies…
   Observed… Ping Rusbult Rusbult Anderson Ping
Hypoth-      (Total Effects) (1993) et al. (1982) et al. (1988) (1988) (2003)
Association esized No OC With OC (Channels) (Romantic) (Employment) (Sales) (Channels)
SAT-LOY + NS(+) NS NS + +
-VOI + NS NS + + + +
b
-OPP - NS NS NS
-EXI - - - - -
-NEG - - - - - -
-ALT - - - -
-INV + + + +
b
-Scost + + +
-OC + +
ALT-LOY - NS NS NS - -
-VOI - - NS NS NS +
-OPP + + NS(+) +
-EXI + + + + + +
-NEG - + NS + - NS
INVST-LOY + NS NS NS + +
-VOI + + + + + +
-OPP + + + NS +
-EXI - NS NS NS - -
-NEG - NS NS - - -
-ALT - NS NS
-SCost + + + +
SCost-LOY + + + +
-VOI + NS NS NS
-OPP + NS NS NS
-EXI - - - NS
-NEG - NS NS NS
-ALT - - - -
GCon-LOY + NS NS
-VOI + + +
-OPP - - - -
-EXI - - -
-NEG - - -
-SAT + + +
-ALT - - -
-INV + + +














Table 4- Figure 1 Structural Model Parameter Estimates without Organizational Commitment 
 
Loadings
Ind- Ind- Ind- Ind- Ind-
ica- ica- ica- ica- ica-
tor SAT tor ALT tor INVST tor SCost tor LOY Construct
sa1 0.8190 al1 0.7853 in1 0.8051 sc1 0.3476 lo1 0.8430 Loading
16.6972 21.4304 19.3949 6.5969 11.3335 t-value
sa2 1.0000 al3 0.8933 in3 0.9082 sc2 0.3775 lo2 1.0000 Loading
21.3655 25.4474 6.7198 t-value
sa3 0.8827 al4 1.0000 in4 0.9467 sc3 0.8802 lo5 0.9580 Loading
24.2451 29.6946 25.6674 13.8702 t-value
sa4 0.8740 al5 0.8663 in5 1.0000 sc4 0.9769 lo7 0.9097 Loading
19.6358 27.2304 29.7372 12.8223 t-value
sa5 0.6313 al6 0.6283 in6 0.8997 sc5 1.0000 lo11 0.8329 Loading
16.2180 17.3242 32.6639 10.8169 t-value
sa6 0.8722 al7 0.7216 in8 0.9886 sc6 0.9115 Loading
23.6800 21.8915 41.6565 24.7156 t-value
sa8 0.8719 Loading
23.4977 t-value
VOI OPP EXI NEG GCon Construct
vo1 0.9815 op1 0.9481 ex2 1.0000 ne9 0.8593 gcon1 0.9767 Loading
19.2481 17.7792 19.6772 18.3070 t-value
vo2 0.9843 op2 1.0000 ex3 0.8634 ne13 0.9974 gcon2 0.9403 Loading
21.6612 25.8303 28.4627 20.0650 t-value
vo3 0.9422 op3 0.6279 ex4 0.9836 ne15 1.0000 gcon3 1.0000 Loading
22.5981 12.5078 42.4323 t-value
vo4 0.9962 op4 0.8620 ex5 0.9748 ne16 0.9704 gcon4 0.9584 Loading
28.4170 14.8718 40.0606 27.3460 16.9452 t-value
vo5 1.0000 op5 0.7203 ex7 0.9301 ne17 0.7886 gcon5 0.7636 Loading
13.1706 36.3543 22.8762 14.0048 t-value
vo6 0.9465 ex8 0.9514 ne18 0.7036 Loading






SAT ALT INV SCT GCon Construct
SAT - - - - 0.1784 0.7683 Beta
3.0229 13.9322 t-value
ALT -0.6162 - - 0.1573 -0.2564 -0.0472 Beta
-7.4917 2.3661 -5.2689 -0.6008 t-value
INVST - - - - - - - - Beta
t-value
Scost 0.3903 - - 0.4654 - - -0.1446 Beta
3.8333 5.6226 -1.4064 t-value
LOY 0.0911 -0.0260 -0.1112 0.0908 -0.0894 Beta
1.1068 -0.4207 -1.8308 1.9583 -1.2786 t-value
VOI -0.1629 -0.1185 0.2444 -0.0530 0.2770 Beta
-2.2744 -2.2083 4.6253 -1.3262 4.4870 t-value
OPP 0.0515 0.2076 0.2767 0.1114 -0.7216 Beta
0.5252 2.8223 3.8350 2.0335 -8.0540 t-value
EXI -0.3845 0.4836 0.0598 -0.2716 -0.1401 Beta
-4.0768 6.7556 0.8683 -5.1283 -1.7607 t-value
NEG -0.4066 0.1614 -0.0640 0.1061 0.0108 Beta
-4.4921 2.3975 -0.9734 2.1108 0.1426 t-value














































MODEL FIT STATISTICS: a 
 Chi Square/df/p-value/RMSEA/CFI/GFI/AGFI = 4629/1675/0.0/0.0798/0.8546/0.6487/0.6162 
________________________ 
a
 There is little agreement on model-to-data fit statistics (e.g., Bollen and Long 1993). GFI and AGFI may be 
inadequate for fit assessment in larger models (see Anderson and Gerbing 1984). A Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of 
0.90 or higher suggests acceptable fit (see McClelland and Judd 1993). A Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) of 0.05 suggests close fit, an RMSEA between 0.051-0.08 suggests acceptable fit (Brown 
and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog 1993). 
PSI's
SAT ALT INVST Construct
0.3710 0.4281 0.4937 Psi
8.5366 9.5264 11.1461 t-value
SCost LOY VOI Construct
0.8062 0.3428 0.2798 Psi
10.5637 7.7010 9.5952 t-value
OPP EXI NEG Construct
0.4017 0.4694 0.4360 Psi





SAT ALT INVST SCost LOY Construct
0.6113 0.5601 - - 0.2262 0.0465 R Sqd
VOI OPP EXI NEG GCon Construct
0.2173 0.5934 0.6906 0.3558 0.0199 R Sqd
Measurement Errors
sa1 sa2 sa3 sa4 sa5 sa6 Indicator
0.4717 0.2197 0.1655 0.3401 0.3025 0.1780 Theta-Eps
11.2372 9.7672 9.6937 10.8526 11.2859 9.8983 t-value
sa8 al1 al3 al4 al5 al6 Indicator
0.1834 0.2601 0.3393 0.1382 0.1505 0.2868 Theta-Eps
9.9592 10.6349 10.6455 8.0028 9.1967 11.1691 t-value
al7 in1 in3 in4 in5 in6 Indicator
0.2071 0.2125 0.1450 0.1074 0.0325 0.0752 Theta-Eps
10.5573 11.4538 11.0658 10.6680 7.2298 10.2997 t-value
in8 sc1 sc2 sc3 sc4 sc5 Indicator
0.0418 0.7715 0.8760 0.2414 0.1894 0.0966 Theta-Eps
8.2910 11.8122 11.8090 10.0906 8.9385 6.1108 t-value
sc6 lo1 lo2 lo5 lo7 lo11 Indicator
0.2873 0.3155 0.1905 0.1831 0.2384 0.3553 Theta-Eps
10.2798 10.3791 8.2870 8.4478 9.5302 10.5853 t-value
vo1 vo2 vo3 vo4 vo5 vo6 Indicator
0.1778 0.1247 0.0992 0.0402 0.0789 0.0644 Theta-Eps
11.1963 10.8904 10.7357 8.6775 10.2463 10.0830 t-value
vo8 vo9 op1 op2 op3 op4 Indicator
0.0902 0.1033 0.3649 0.3110 0.4913 0.5695 Theta-Eps
10.5962 10.7703 8.8326 7.9204 10.9255 10.3041 t-value
op5 ex2 ex3 ex4 ex5 ex7 Indicator
0.5633 0.1452 0.3619 0.0832 0.1093 0.1486 Theta-Eps
10.7800 9.7343 11.2615 8.2306 9.1515 10.0759 t-value
ex8 ne9 ne13 ne15 ne16 ne17 Indicator
0.3616 0.2485 0.0850 0.1347 0.0991 0.1320 Theta-Eps
11.1240 10.9714 8.1671 9.5406 8.8625 10.4193 t-value
ne18 gcon1 gcon2 gcon3 gcon4 gcon5 Indicator
0.3001 0.3507 0.2139 0.3316 0.4504 0.5158 Theta-Eps





Table 5- Figure 1 Measurement Model Parameter Estimates without Organizational Commitment 
 





Measurement Errors (see Table 4--measurement errors were identical to the third decimal place +/- .010) 
 
MODEL FIT STATISTICS: a 
 Chi Square/df/p-value/RMSEA/CFI/GFI/AGFI = 4528/1665/0.0/0.0788/0.8591/0.6556/0.6215 
________________________ 
a
 There is little agreement on model-to-data fit statistics (e.g., Bollen and Long 1993). GFI and AGFI may be 
inadequate for fit assessment in larger models (see Anderson and Gerbing 1984). A Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of 
0.90 or higher suggests acceptable fit (see McClelland and Judd 1993). A Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) of 0.05 suggests close fit, an RMSEA between 0.051-0.08 suggests acceptable fit (Brown 
and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog 1993). 
PHI




ALT -0.6847 0.9746 Phi/Psi
(0.0758) (0.0936) SE
-9.0291 10.4141 t-value
INVST 0.1609 -0.0978 0.4937 Phi/Psi
(0.0435) (0.0432) (0.0443) SE
3.6959 -2.2646 11.1455 t-value
Scost 0.3428 -0.4443 0.2789 1.0422 Phi/Psi
(0.0660) (0.0688) (0.0474) (0.0963) SE
5.1952 -6.4553 5.8836 10.8193 t-value
LOY 0.0480 -0.0719 (0.0202) 0.0836 0.3494 Phi/Psi
(0.0379) (0.0386) (0.0269) (0.0399) (0.0458) SE
1.2666 -1.8624 (0.7495) 2.0940 7.6289 t-value
VOI 0.1437 -0.1472 0.1167 0.0665 (0.1581) 0.3567 Phi/Psi
(0.0374) (0.0378) (0.0268) (0.0379) (0.0261) (0.0363) SE
3.8443 -3.8951 4.3592 1.7578 (6.0679) 9.8333 t-value
OPP -0.5299 0.4657 0.0868 -0.0219 0.0544 -0.1601 Phi/Psi
(0.0728) (0.0707) (0.0446) (0.0649) (0.0398) (0.0394) SE
(7.2809) 6.5907 1.9445 (0.3373) 1.3681 (4.0622) t-value
EXI -0.8788 0.9216 -0.1687 -0.6404 -0.0916 -0.1577 Phi/Psi
(0.0945) (0.0955) (0.0536) (0.0871) (0.0475) (0.0460) SE
(9.3021) 9.6502 (3.1466) (7.3550) (1.9287) (3.4256) t-value
NEG -0.4647 0.3824 -0.0809 -0.1163 0.0549 -0.2031 Phi/Psi
(0.0593) (0.0565) (0.0358) (0.0525) (0.0319) (0.0333) SE
(7.8392) 6.7718 (2.2618) (2.2169) 1.7193 (6.0946) t-value
GCon 0.7204 -0.5227 0.0946 0.1924 0.0191 0.2060 Phi/Psi
(0.0791) (0.0703) (0.0426) (0.0632) (0.0377) (0.0389) SE
9.1042 -7.4307 2.2194 3.0438 0.5056 5.2914 t-value




EXI 0.5319 1.5174 Phi/Psi
(0.0855) (0.1395) SE
6.2224 10.8791 t-value
NEG 0.3022 0.5163 0.6739 Phi/Psi
(0.0563) (0.0707) (0.0678) SE
5.3678 7.2992 9.9454 t-value
GCon -0.6793 -0.7064 -0.3369 0.9170 Phi/Psi
(0.0800) (0.0887) (0.0552) (0.1033) SE





Table 6- Figure 1 Structural Model Results with Organizational Commitment a  
 
BETAS (with t-values) 
 
            SAT        ALT      INVST      SCost       GCon         OC 
       --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
 SAT       --         --         --         --         --         --    
           --         --         --         --         --         -- 
 
 ALT       --         --         --         --         --      -1.1554  
           --         --         --         --         --      -4.0763 
 
 INV       --         --         --         --         --         --    
           --         --         --         --         --         --   
 
 SCost     --         --         --         --         --         --    
           --         --         --         --         --         --   
 
 LOY     1.3675    -0.5014    -0.1676     0.0631     0.7381    -2.3304  
         4.8324    -3.3360    -1.9670     0.6625     3.4473    -5.1920 
 
 VOI    -1.4899     0.2549     0.3253    -0.0018    -0.4235     2.3153  
        -5.6779     1.9023     4.2330    -0.0217    -2.2218     5.6212 
 
 OPP     0.3419     0.0904     0.1878     0.0934    -0.4721    -0.5749  
         2.1314     1.0331     3.6374     1.6234    -3.8271    -2.3626 
 
 EXI       --       0.3157     0.0230    -0.2438     0.0338    -0.4753  
           --       4.6468     0.5809    -5.4478     0.3758    -4.0789 
 
 NEG     0.3327    -0.1350    -0.0762     0.0724     0.6529    -1.6279  
         1.6686    -1.2235    -1.2019     1.0194     4.0937    -5.0725 
 
 GCon      --         --         --         --         --         --   
           --         --         --         --         --         --   
 
 OC      0.6449       --      -0.0384     0.0160     0.3713       --    
        11.0894       --      -1.2318     0.4875     7.0187       --   
 
 
MODEL FIT STATISTICS:b 
 Chi Square/df/p-value/RMSEA/CFI/GFI/AGFI = 5929/2166/0.0/0.0792/0.8348/ 




 Standardized structural coefficients. The table reads from column to row. For example the standardized association 
between SAT and VOI was -1.4899, and the corresponding unstandardized association had a significance of t = -
5.6779. Because standardized structural coefficients should be between 0 and 1 in absolute value ( |1| ), the 
standardized structural coefficients greater than |1| for SAT-LOY, SAT-VOI, OC-ALT, OC-LOY, OC-VOI, and OC-
NEG suggest there is something wrong. See Table 7 for a revised model and see Table 1 for the definitions of SAT, 
VOI, etc. 
b
 There is little agreement on model-to-data fit statistics (e.g., Bollen and Long 1993). GFI and AGFI may be 
inadequate for fit assessment in larger models (see Anderson and Gerbing 1984). A Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of 
0.90 or higher suggests acceptable fit (see McClelland and Judd 1993). A Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) of 0.05 suggests close fit, an RMSEA between 0.051-0.08 suggests acceptable fit (Brown 









BETAS (with t-values) 
 
            SAT        ALT      INVST      SCost       GCon         OC 
       --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
 SAT       --         --       0.1284       --       0.7536       --    
           --         --       3.0281       --      14.0577       -- 
 
 ALT    -0.2458       --       0.0937    -0.2535     0.1764    -0.6008  
        -2.0371       --       2.0302    -5.1847     1.8858    -3.9499 
 
 INV       --         --         --         --         --         --    
           --         --         --         --         --         --   
 
 SCost   0.3184       --       0.3222       --      -0.1709     0.0926  
         2.0487       --       5.6350       --      -1.4192     0.4792 
 
 LOY     0.3412    -0.1851    -0.1253     0.1271     0.1456    -0.5804  
         1.8560    -1.6285    -1.7544     1.5956     0.9986    -2.3142 
 
 VOI    -0.5137    -0.0824     0.2867    -0.0626     0.2406     0.5297  
        -3.2150    -0.8442     4.6222    -0.9138     1.9140     2.4569 
 
 OPP     0.1441     0.1577     0.1953     0.1058    -0.6037    -0.2216  
         1.1146     1.9642     3.8440     1.8785    -5.6631    -1.2694 
 
 EXI       --       0.3337     0.0226    -0.2444    -0.0095    -0.4313  
           --       5.2847     0.5821    -5.5549    -0.1189    -4.1846 
 
 NEG    -0.2099     0.0499    -0.0550     0.1076     0.2874    -0.6457  
        -1.4888     0.5627    -0.9877     1.7211     2.4915    -3.2912 
 
 GCon      --         --       0.1415       --         --         --    
           --         --       2.2740       --         --         --   
 
 OC      0.6125       --      -0.0247       --       0.3627       --    
        10.0692       --      -0.7528       --       6.2303       --   
 
SQUARED MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS FOR STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS (EXPLAINED VARIANCE) 
 
         SAT        ALT      INVST      SCost        LOY        VOI 
    --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
      0.6118     0.6146     - -        0.2281     0.0810     0.2448 
 
         OPP        EXI        NEG       GCon         OC 
    --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 




* Standardized structural coefficients. The table reads from column to row. For example the standardized association 
between SAT and VOI was -0.5137, and the corresponding unstandardized association had a significance of t = -



















































 Standardized total effects. The table reads from column to row. For example the standardized total effect of SAT on 
ALT was -0.7093, and the corresponding unstandardized total effect had a significance of t = -8.4980. 
Betas from SAT ALT INV SCT GCon Construct
  non-OC SAT - - - - 0.2346 0.7533 Beta
  Fig. 1 Model
a
3.8884 13.9322 t-value
ALT -0.7093 - - -0.1407 -0.2653 -0.5441 Beta
-8.4980 -2.3019 -5.2689 -9.2869 t-value
INVST - - - - - - - - - - Beta
t-value
Scost 0.3735 - - 0.3888 - - 0.1456 Beta
3.8333 6.7679 2.4753 t-value
LOY 0.2364 -0.0428 -0.0494 0.1659 0.0147 Beta
2.0897 -0.4206 -0.7652 2.2379 0.2209 t-value
VOI -0.1612 -0.1655 0.2797 -0.0386 0.3365 Beta
-1.6459 -2.2082 4.7138 -0.5997 5.6698 t-value
OPP -0.0528 0.2060 0.1248 0.0597 -0.7527 Beta
-0.6471 2.8223 1.9727 1.1166 -12.8138 t-value
EXI -0.6637 0.3872 -0.1948 -0.3278 -0.5822 Beta
-8.5573 6.7555 -3.2622 -7.2001 -10.4291 t-value
NEG -0.5709 0.1935 -0.1422 0.0802 -0.4372 Beta
-6.2022 2.3975 -2.3361 1.3545 -7.2579 t-value
GCon - - 0.1411 Beta
2.2660 t-value
Betas from SAT ALT INV SCT GCon OC Construct
  Fig. 1 Model SAT - - - - 0.2350 0.7536 Beta
  with OC
a
3.8969 14.0577 t-value
ALT -0.7131 - - -0.1411 -0.2535 -0.5441 -0.6243 Beta
-8.5625 -2.3078 -5.1847 -9.3152 -3.9014 t-value
INVST - - - - - - - - - - Beta
t-value
Scost 0.3758 - - 0.3888 - - 0.1459 0.0926 Beta
3.8572 6.7680 2.4811 0.4792 t-value
LOY 0.1617 -0.1851 -0.0488 0.1741 0.0407 -0.453 Beta
1.4191 -1.6285 -0.7552 2.3342 0.6064 -1.9648 t-value
VOI -0.1504 -0.0824 0.2784 -0.0417 0.3285 0.5754 Beta
-1.5250 -0.8442 4.6902 -0.6506 5.5154 2.8882 t-value
OPP -0.0657 0.1577 0.1245 0.0659 -0.7492 -0.3102 Beta
-0.7997 1.9642 1.9670 1.2437 -12.7479 -1.9088 t-value
EXI -0.5969 0.3337 -0.1951 -0.3290 -0.5846 -0.6623 Beta
-8.4901 5.2847 -3.2667 -7.3528 -10.5025 -5.4387 t-value
NEG -0.6052 0.0499 -0.1402 0.0943 -0.4178 -0.6669 Beta
-6.5130 0.5627 -2.3032 1.6207 -6.8956 -3.6877 t-value
GCon - - - - 0.1415 - - - - - - Beta
2.2740 t-value
OC 0.6192 - - 0.1721 - - 0.8294 - - Beta





          Endnotes 
 
 
1. A scenario analysis is an experiment using the study questionnaire. The questionnaire is 
combined with a written description or scenario of the subject's situation. In the present case one 
scenario described a situation in which the student subject was a sales person with low 
satisfaction, many alternative employers, etc. In the next subject's scenario their satisfaction was 
high, etc. For the six independent variables in the Figure 1 model, there were 26 (= 64) scenarios, 
one for each possible combination of high or low independent variables, and each scenario was 
duplicated several times to increase sample size.  
 
2. Because the pretest produced only 30 responses, psychometric assessment was limited to 
single constructs because factor analysis, etc. requires large samples. Thus, pretest psychometric 
assessment consisted primarily of comparing the pretest results to the scenario analysis results for 
material differences. 
 
3. The Bagozzi (1980) measure exhibited low reliability and convergent validity in the pretests. 
Its Average Variance Extracted (AVE) was especially low, 0.37, suggesting the measure was 
63% error (see Fornell and Larker 1981). While more than 50% error variance was unacceptable, 
the measure was included in the final test to gauge the results again. However, similar behavior 
obtained. Its AVE in the final test was higher, 0.45, but the measure was still composed of more 
than 50% error variance, making the results of any covariance analysis untrustworthy. 
 
4. In addition to being multidimensional in the pretests, the Bluedorn (1982) measure exhibited 
implausible correlations with other study measures. For example, it was either not significantly 
correlated or positively correlated with the satisfaction measures--Michaels and Spector 1982 
reported similar results. 
 
5. Organizational commitment was unidimensional in the test that accompanied its proposal (see 
Mowday, Steers and Porter 1979). However, it has been multidimensional when used in a 
salespersons context (e.g., Sager 1994). 
 
6. Other approaches were possible. For example, a second-order construct could be specified 
using the factors as "indicators" (see for example Gerbing, Hamilton and Freeman 1994 for more 
on second-order constructs). Alternatively, the indicators within each factor could be summed 
and an under-specified latent variable could be specified. These approaches were considered but 
rejected because the resulting constructs exhibited low reliability and average extracted variance. 
 
7. Item weeding was done with considerable care to preserve content or face validity--how well 
the items appeared to tap the target construct. However, measures used with covariant structure 
analysis appear to be limited to about six items (see discussions in Anderson and Gerbing 1984, 
Gerbing and Anderson 1993, Bagozzi and Heatherton 1994, and Ping 2004). One explanation is 
that correlated measurement errors, ubiquitous in survey data but customarily not specified in 
covariant structure analysis, eventually overwhelm (single-construct) model-to-data fit as more 








8. Other approaches were possible. The unidimensional items could be summed and the Figure 1 
model could be estimated using a saturated model (see Williams and Hazer 1986). However, this 
approach was rejected for a variety of reasons including that the approach is not well documented 
and it is not widely used.  
 
9. For example, in Table 2 the squared correlation between satisfaction (SAT) and organizational 
commitment (OC), 0.79, was greater than the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) of either SAT 
or OC (0.73 and 0.47, respectively). This squared correlation is the percent covariance SAT and 
OC share in common. Because their covariance was greater than the error-free variance of either 
SAT or OC, this suggested that SAT and OC were empirically indistinguishable, indistinct, in the 
study--they were operationally the same construct in the study (see the discussion under 
Organizational Commitment, and the Table 2 Footnote b for more). 
 
10. The Figure 1 structural model without organizational commitment did not fit the data. 
However, freeing the satisfaction-exiting path in the Figure 1 model is theoretically justified and 
it produced acceptable model-to-data fit. 
 
11.  Sager (1994) observed a direct satisfaction-exit association in the presence of organizational 
commitment. However, that study's associations did not account for measurement error that can 
produce inefficient structural coefficient estimates (i.e., the structural coefficients can vary 
widely from study to study). 
12. Directionality can sometimes be suggested using modification indices, or by specifying the 
path in question with paths in both directions, a non-recursive model (see Bagozzi 1980). In this 
case fixing the loyalty-voice path to zero and examining the resulting modification indices for the 
loyalty-to-voice and voice-to-loyalty paths was equivocal because the modification indices were 
identical. A bi-directional (non-recursive) specification of the loyalty-voice path to see which of 











































Robert A. Ping, Jr. 
Department of Marketing 
College of Business 
Wright State University 









 This paper investigates several antecedents of satisfaction that are managerially actionable in 
marketing channel relationships. Using structural equation analysis it tests plausible simultaneous or bi-
directional (nonrecursive) satisfaction-alternative attractiveness and satisfaction-voice associations to 
shed additional light on whether, for example, increased satisfaction is likely to reduce alternative 
attractiveness, as is generally believed, or vice versa. The results also suggest the existence of feedback 
loops to satisfaction that operate via investment in the relationship, so that relationship investment and 
switching cost may be antecedents of relationship satisfaction. The paper concludes with suggestions for 






 Much of the research on long-term inter firm relationships (Arndt 1979, Wind 1970) has 
concentrated on the creation and maintenance of these relationships (see Wilson 1995; also see Anderson 
and Narus 1990; Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Ford 1980; Frazier 1983; Frazier and Rody 1991; Gadde 
and Mattsson 1987; Håkansson 1982; Hallén, Johanson and Seyed-Mohamed 1991; Heide and John 
1990, 1992; Stern and Scheer 1991; Webster 1979). As a result, it is widely believed that satisfaction is 
central to the creation and maintenance of these relationships (see Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Frazier 
1983; Ping 1993; Wilson 1995). Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987), for example, suggested that relationship 
satisfaction may reduce the buyer-seller relationship subject’s perception of the attractiveness of 
alternative exchange relationship partners. Johnson and Rusbult (1989) reported a similar effect in 
committed interpersonal relationships, and argued that this was a relationship maintenance mechanism 
they termed "devaluation of alternatives." However, satisfaction has been conceptualized to be a result of 
comparison to alternatives, as well as relationship reward, cost, and fairness (Johnson 1982; also see 
Ajzen 1977; Hatfield and Traupman 1981; Kelley and Thibaut 1978; Rusbult 1980; Thibaut and Kelley 
1959). Thus, alternative attractiveness may reduce relationship satisfaction (Anderson and Narus 1984; 
Frazier 1983; Rusbult 1980; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). In summary, it is plausible that satisfaction and 
alternative attractiveness may also be simultaneously or bi-directionally (nonrecursively) associated. 
 Similarly Ping (1993) reported that firms’ satisfaction was positively associated with their use of 
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voice (attempts to change rather than escape from objectionable relationship conditions) in a marketing 
channel. In discussing the study results, he proposed that it was plausible that firms' satisfaction increases 
their voice, but that their voice should subsequently increase these firms' satisfaction. Stated differently, 
he proposed that satisfaction and voice may also be bi-directionally or simultaneously (nonrecursively) 
associated. 
 This study investigates these bi-directional associations, and thus expands our understanding of 
them, because of the implications they have for relationship continuity and therefore (interfirm) 
relationship marketing. After discussing the linkages between satisfaction, voice and alternative 
attractiveness, the paper summarizes these linkages in a bi-directional or nonrecursive structural model. 
To be consistent with the relationship investment model for marketing channel relationships (Ping 1993; 
see Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988), and in order to 
ensure that the structural model is identified (i.e., the structural coefficient estimates are unique), the 
other variables in the relationship investment model for marketing channel relationships (i.e., relationship 
investment and switching cost), plus several observed variables (e.g., subject firm revenue, the duration 
of the buyer-seller relationship, etc.), are also included in the model. A test of these proposed 
associations using a survey involving firms in long term buyer-seller relationships, and structural 
equation analysis, is then reported. 
 The results of the study contribute to several literatures, including relationship marketing and 
marketing management. For example, the study fills a gap in the reactions-to-dissatisfaction literature by 
providing a deeper understanding of the investment model and antecedents of satisfaction. The study also 
contributes to the relationship marketing literature by suggesting several managerially actionable 
antecedents of relationship satisfaction. Finally, the study further illuminates the antecedents of voice, 
which has been observed to be negatively associated with relationship exiting (Ping 1999, Spencer 1986; 
see Fornell and Didow 1980; Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987; Fornell and Westbrook 1984). 
SATISFACTION, ALTERNATIVES ATTRACTIVENESS, AND VOICE 
SATISFACTION AND ALTERNATIVE ATTRACTIVENESS 
 In their description of the stages in the development of buyer-seller relationships, Dwyer, Schurr 
and Oh (1987) suggested that for exchange relationships in the committed stage of relationship 
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development, satisfaction reduces the attractiveness of alternative exchange relationships. They 
commented that once a relationship reaches the committed phase where relationship satisfaction is high, 
the relationship parties do not stop noticing alternatives, but they maintain their awareness of alternatives 
without constant testing of the current relationship (i.e., comparison with alternatives) (p. 19). Using a 
comparison level (Thibaut and Kelley 1959) argument, Johnson and Rusbult (1989) proposed there is a 
tendency to devalue alternative relationships, that proceeds from a high level of satisfaction with the 
present relationship (also see Ping and Dwyer 1988). From this perspective, alternatives should appear 
less attractive because the subject’s comparison level (CL) (Thibaut and Kelley 1959) has been increased 
as a consequence of involvement in the present satisfying relationship (p. 968). 
 However using almost the same arguments, alternative attractiveness is regarded by some authors 
as an antecedent of satisfaction (see Johnson 1982; Kelley and Thibaut 1978; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). 
Johnson (1982) argued that satisfaction grows out of the rewards and costs with the present partner, 
comparison of these rewards and costs to those available from other partners, and the relative payoffs 
(equity) between the partners (p. 54). In particular, they argued that as alternative attractiveness 
increased, overall satisfaction with the incumbent relationship should decline. Thus it is plausible that 
satisfaction and alternative attractiveness are bi-directionally related: satisfaction should negatively 
influence alternative attractiveness, and as alternative attractiveness declines, this should positively 
influence satisfaction. Formally, 
   H1: Satisfaction negatively influences the attractiveness of alternatives, and 
alternative attractiveness negatively influences satisfaction. 
 
SATISFACTION AND VOICE 
 Hirschman (1970) proposed that members or clients of an organization have three behavioral 
options available to them when there are relationship problems: exit the relationship, use voice, or remain 
loyal (i.e., refuse to exit the relationship, and suffer in silence, confident that things will get better, p. 38). 
Arguing for the importance of voice at a time when exiting was believed to be the primary reaction to 
relationship problems, he explained that voice also alerted a firm to its failings. His arguments for the 
importance of voice are instructive. First he argued that firms will unavoidably have what he termed 
performance lapses in their products or services. However, he noted that losses from customer exiting 
will be small for a firm with demand that is highly inelastic with respect to these lapses. However, repair 
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of these lapses may not take place because the firm may not be alerted that something is wrong with its 
product or service. At the other extreme, he argued that if demand is highly elastic with respect to 
performance lapses, repair may also not take place; this time because the firm will cease to exist because 
of customer exiting. For repair to be possible he argued, the firm's elasticity of demand with respect to 
performance lapses should be neither very large nor very small. Instead, the firm should have a mixture 
of what he termed alert and inert customers. Alert customers would make the firm aware of its failings 
via exit and voice, but the inert customers would provide it with the time and dollar cushion needed for 
repair efforts to come to fruition (p. 24). 
 Not surprisingly, Hirschman (1970) recommended that firms provide mechanisms to increase 
customer voice and thus increase the firm’s likelihood of being alerted to its performance lapses. Another 
argument for encouraging voice is that it decreases elasticity with respect performance lapses: some 
vocal customers will likely not exit until it is clear that their voice is having no effect. Not surprisingly, 
voice has been observed to be associated with reduced relationship exiting (Ping 1999, Spencer 1986). 
Other authors have argued deterministicly that voice should be associated with increased market share 
and lower costs of obtaining new customers (Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987:345; also see Fornell and 
Didow 1980; Fornell and Westbrook 1984). 
 Echoing the Hirschman-Rusbult proposals, Ping (1993) argued that reactions to problems in 
channel relationships included the Hirschman-Rusbult option of voice (see Hirschman 1970; Rusbult, 
Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988).1 He argued that satisfied firms in 
committed relationships should react to inter-firm problems with voice rather than simply exiting their 
relationships. However because in committed relationships their partner firms were also likely to be 
satisfied with the relationship, these partner firms should be likely to resolve relationship problems in a 
                                                          
1
 Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982) conceptualized voice as a combination of Hirschman’s (1970, 1974) original 
notion of alerting partner, plus working with partner to improve relationship conditions. This expanded notion of 
voice includes constructive actions aimed at relationship improvement beyond alerting partner, and more fully 
accounts for “...any attempt at all to change, rather than escape from, an objectionable state of affairs...” in 
committed relationships (Hirschman 1970:30). The Hirschman-Rusbult conceptualization of voice is consistent with 
Hirschman’s (1970) characterization of voice, but it seems to exclude other perhaps more negative (i.e., less 
relationship-maintenance oriented) conceptualizations of voice such as negative word of mouth (Diener and Grayser 
1978; see Richins 1983; Singh 1990a,b). As a result, voice in the present paper involves active, constructive (i.e., 
relationship preserving) behavior aimed at partner and intended to change an objectionable state of affairs, including 
but not limited to alerting partner of relationship problems. 
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mutually satisfactory manner when they are made aware of relationship problems. In this manner firms' 
voice should be likely to further increase their satisfaction (Homans 1961), and thereby help to maintain 
relationships as others have argued (see Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987). In different words, committed 
subject firms' voice should be likely to produce favorable resolutions of relationship problems, which are 
then likely to increase the vocal firms' relationship satisfaction. 
 As a result, satisfaction and voice should also be simultaneously or bi-directionally related. That 
is, satisfaction should positively influence voice, and as voice increases as a result, it should positively 
influence satisfaction. In particular, 
   H2: Satisfaction positively influences voice, and voice positively influences 
satisfaction. 
 Because of their importance to the model under consideration, the other investment model 
variables (Ping 1993), switching cost and relationship investment, will be included in the model. In 
addition, although they appear to take us away from the primary focus of the study, satisfaction, variables 
such as subject firm revenue, the number of its employees and competitors, how long they have been 
open, and the duration of the buyer-seller relationship will also be included in the model to ensure 
structural model identification (see Bagozzi 1980a, Berry 1984, and for example Bagozzi 1980b). 
INVESTMENT AND SWITCHING COST ASSOCIATIONS 
Satisfaction and Relationship Investment 
 Satisfaction should be positively associated with investment in the relationship. In long-term 
buyer-seller relationships satisfied parties to these relationships should voluntarily invest in them to 
maintain and build them in anticipation of future exchanges (Macneil 1980). To explain, as subject firms 
become more satisfied with their relationships their attraction to these relationships should increase 
(Thibaut and Kelley 1959). Their efforts, cooperation, and thus their inputs to these relationships should 
therefore increase (Blau 1964; Hunt and Nevin 1974). In summary, as their satisfaction increases, subject 
firms' investments in their relationships should also increase. Formally, 
   H3: Satisfaction is positively associated with investment. 
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Investment and Voice 
 Hirschman (1970) proposed that investment in the relationship should increase the investor's use 
of voice (pp. 37, 40). Ping (1993) explained that increases in firms' relationship investments should make 
future exchanges with their partner firms perceptually more valuable (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; 
Frazier 1983; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). Thus, these investments should make them less likely to be 
passive when there are relationship problems (Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult, Farrell, 
Rogers and Mainous 1988), because they now have more to lose if their relationships are lost (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979; Walster, Berscheid and Walster 1976). As a result, as their relationship investments 
increase, firms should respond positively to relationship problems by preferring to contact the partner 
firm, and work cooperatively to resolve problems and maintain the relationship. Formally, 
  H4: Investment is positively associated with voice. 
Investment and Switching Cost 
 Increased investments in relationship should increase the perceived cost of switching to another 
exchange relationship. As firms' investment in their relationships increase, some of these investments are 
likely to be relationship-specific. These investments are by definition nontransferable to other exchange 
relationships. If they are substantial, they should be perceived as indicative of the magnitude of the costs 
to establish and maintain an alternative relationship, not only because they are relationship-specific and 
thus they would be lost, but also because they would likely have to be reincurred in an alternative 
relationship. As a result, increased investment in relationships should perceptually increase the cost of 
switching to alternative exchange relationships (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Walster, Berscheid and 
Walster 1976), and relationship investment should be positively associated with switching cost. In 
summary, 
   H5: Investment is positively associated with switching cost. 
Switching Cost and Alternative Attractiveness 
 High perceived costs of switching to alternative relationships should decrease the attractiveness 
of those alternative relationships. As the costs of exiting the incumbent exchange relationship and 
establishing another relationship increase, the perceived costs associated with alternative relationships 
should also increase (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Walster, Berscheid and Walster 1976). This in turn 
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should reduce the attractiveness of alternative relationships (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987, Frazier 1983), 
and thus switching cost should be negatively associated with alternative attractiveness. Formally, 
  H6: Switching cost is negatively associated with alternative attractiveness. 
OBSERVED VARIABLES 
Voice Associations with Observed Variables 
 In addition to these unobserved (latent) variables, observed variables such as subject firm 
revenue and the number of their employees should also be associated with their use of voice.2 As in the 
satisfaction-voice association, the revenue (a reward) a firm derives from exchanges with their partner 
firm should make future exchanges with them more valuable (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Frazier 1983; 
Homans 1974; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). As their revenue attributed to the relationship increases, the 
subject firm should respond positively to relationship problems by preferring to contact the partner firm 
and work cooperatively to resolve problems and maintain the relationship. Hence for firms' important 
relationships we hypothesize that, 
   H7: Revenue is positively associated with voice. 
 A firm with many employees should also be more vocal when there are relationship problems 
with their partner firm. All other factors being equal, firms with many employees should be more 
inclined to attempt to work with their partner firms to resolve relationship problems; they may not only 
have the personnel resources to do so, but their buyer-seller relationships are likely to be either 
maintained by their partner firms or maintained jointly. To explain, their size and any attendant market 
power should make them attractive to their partner firms as revenue sources, and this in turn should 
produce bilateral or partner-maintained relationships (see Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). For bilateral 
relationships voice should a natural consequence of the relationship when there are problems (Dwyer, 
Schurr and Oh 1987; Macneil 1980). In partner-maintained relationships subject firm voice is likely to be 
rewarded by partner, and thus it is therefore likely to be repeated (Homans 1974). 
                                                          
2
 As mentioned earlier, these and several other observed variables are required for methodological purposes in order 
to ensure that the resulting structural model is identified, and thus that the structural coefficient estimates (i.e., ’s) 
are unique. These variables were included in the study based on a combination of the plausibility of their 
associations with the latent variables and their usefulness in the identification process. Although the paper 
concentrates on the latent variable associations, the associations of these observed variables with the latent variables 
in the study will be stated as hypotheses for completeness. 
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 For this reason, firms with many employees should be inclined to exercise the voice option when 
there were problems in the exchange relationship, and  
   H8: Number of employees is positively associated with voice. 
Other Associations with Observed Variables 
 In addition observed variables, such as the length of time a firm has done business with their 
partner, how long a firm has been in business, and the number of competitors in a firm’s market, should 
be associated with that firm’s investment in their relationship with their partner firm. In particular, the 
length of time firms have done business with their partner firms should be positively associated with the 
amount of investment made by the subject firms in the relationship. In long-lived economic exchange 
relationships, relationship commitment in many of these relationships should have been maintained or 
have grown (Blau 1964), the total number of investment opportunities should have increased with the 
length of the relationship, and the duration of the relationship itself may be perceived by some firms as a 
relationship investment. As a result, investment by firms in long-lived economic exchange relationships 
should have increased (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Macneil 1980). 
 Similarly relationship investment and switching cost should be affected by how long firms have 
been in business. Firms that have been in business for many years should be comparatively more 
knowledgeable of available alternatives, and relatively more experienced in dealing with the category of 
firms represented by their partner firms (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). In addition, some of these durable 
firms may have attractive levels of market power. Because knowledge, experience and any market power 
may be sources of countervailing power (Dwyer 1980), these subject firms should be less dependent on 
their partner firms (Emerson 1962). This reduced dependency should make these subject firms less 
inclined to invest in their current relationships and their costs to switch to alternative supplier 
relationships should therefore be less. 
 Finally, economic theory predicts that as the number of competitors increases, each competitor's 
sales and return on investment should decrease (Chamberlin 1933). As a result, firms' investment in their 
relationship with their partner firms should decline as the number of their competitors increases. Not only 
are the subject firms relatively less able to invest in relationships when there are many competitors, their 
outcomes (e.g., sales) are reduced in a crowed market and this may reduce the attractiveness of the 
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relationship with their partner. This in turn should reduce their relationship commitment and thus their 
inclination to invest in their relationships (Blau 1964). In summary, 
   H9: Investment is positively associated with relationship duration, and 
negatively associated with the number of years in business and the number of 
competitors. 
and 
   H10: Switching cost is negatively associated with the number of years in business. 
 These associations are summarized in Figure 1. 
THE STUDY 
MEASURES 
 The observed variables were measured with open-ended questions. These items asked for the 
retailer's prior year sales, the number of years the retailer had done business with the primary wholesaler, 
the number of years the retailer had been in business, the number of competitive stores in the retailer's 
service area, and the retailer's number of employees. Table 1 summarizes these items. 
 The unobserved variables satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, voice, investment, and 
switching cost were measured using balanced five-point Likert scales developed by Ping (1993). These 
measures are discussed below using Ping's (1993) conceptualizations,  and are also summarized in Table 
1. 
Voice 
 Voice, active and constructive attempts by the subject firm to change relationship conditions, 
was operationalized as the intention to constructively notify and work with the partner firm to change 
relationship conditions (Ping 1993; Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and 
Mainous 1988). The conceptual domain of voice includes actively seeking problem removal by 
contacting the partner firm in a positive (i.e., relationship preserving) manner, positively confronting the 
partner firm with problems, and cooperatively discussing and working with the partner firm to improve 
the situation, all with a desire to maintain the relationship. 
 The four items in the voice measure involved the retailer talking to the wholesaler, suggesting 




 We conceptualized satisfaction as the global evaluation of relationship fulfillment by the subject 
firm (Dwyer and Oh 1987). Its domain encompasses attributes of the exchange relationship that the firm 
considers rewarding, profitable, or instrumental (Ruekert and Churchill 1984), or unrewarding, costly, 
unfair or frustrating (Ping 1993). 
 The five items in the satisfaction measure assessed the retailer's overall satisfaction with the rela-
tionship (two items), perceived fairness in the relationship with the wholesaler (two items), and how 
good a company to do business with the wholesaler was. 
Alternative Attractiveness 
 The attractiveness of the best alternative exchange relationship, the subject firm’s perception of 
the satisfaction available in the best available alternative relationship, was operationalized as the subject 
firm's perception of the overall satisfaction available from the best alternative exchange relationship, in 
addition to the overall satisfaction available in the existing exchange relationship (Ping 1993). This 
conceptualization includes a firm's generalized perceptions of the rewards and costs available in the most 
salient available alternative exchange relationship. 
 The four items in the alternative attractiveness scale dealt with the retailer's perception of how 
good a wholesaler the best available alternative would be: its fairness, its products and services, its 
policies, and in general how satisfied the retailer would be with the alternative wholesaler. 
Investment 
 We operationalized investment, the sunk costs a firm expends to build and maintain the exchange 
relationship in anticipation of future exchanges, as the perceived magnitude of the relationship assets that 
would be lost or no longer useful if the relationship were terminated (Ping 1993). The conceptual domain 
of investment includes sunk economic and opportunity costs such as money, time, and effort. 
 The final-test scale items measured the retailer's overall investment in the relationship with the 
wholesaler (two items), and the time, effort and energy the retailer put into building and maintaining this 
relationship (two items). 
Switching Cost 
 Switching cost, the perceived magnitude of the costs required to terminate the current economic 
exchange relationship and secure the alternative (Porter 1980), was operationalized as the magnitude of 
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the additional cost and effort that would be required to change wholesalers (Ping 1993). The domain of 
switching cost includes monetary expenses to end the current relationship and secure the alternative, and 
the psychic costs to achieve this objective. 
 The four switching cost scale items involved the amount of retailer time and money, and the 
costs and losses, that would be required of the retailer in switching wholesalers. 
MEASURE PERFORMANCE IN OTHER STUDIES 
 The voice, satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, investment and switching cost measures were 
reliable, and exhibited construct and discriminant validity in previous studies. For example, the 
satisfaction measure was reliable, and it exhibited construct and discriminant validity in Ping (1993), 
Dwyer and Oh (1987), Gaski (1986), Gaski and Nevin (1985), and Ruekert and Churchill (1984). The 
alternative attractiveness, voice, investment and switching cost measures were similarly reliable, and 
exhibited construct and discriminant validity in Ping (1993). 
SAMPLE 
 The study population was hardware retailers. The sampling frame was the subscribers of a 
hardware retailing trade publication that was judged to represent the study population. The key informant 
in the sampling unit was the store owner, manager, or executive. This sample was obtained specifically 
for this study and it has not been used before.  
 A pre-test and the final test samples were selected randomly using n-th name sampling, and this 
produced one hundred and nine pretest names and addresses, and five hundred and ninety two final test 
names and addresses. The survey questionnaire was mailed to these pretest and final test samples, and 
two post card follow-ups in the final test produced 231 usable questionnaires (39% response). These 
responses were then used to determine the reliability and validity of the latent variable measures. 
RESULTS 
Reliability 
 The pretest responses were used to assess the psychometric properties of the latent variable 
measures. These measures were unidimensional using multiple group analysis (Anderson, Gerbing and 
Hunter 1987), they were internally and externally consistent (see Gerbing and Anderson 1984) using 
ordered similarity coefficients (Hunter 1973), and had coefficient alphas of .85 or above (see Table 2). 
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 Using the final test responses, the psychometric properties of the latent variable measures were 
re-examined using LISREL 8 and maximum likelihood single and multiple confirmatory factor analysis 
(Jöreskog 1993). The final test measures were unidimensional, and internally and externally consistent 
(see Table 3). They displayed latent variable reliabilities greater than .91, and average extracted 
variances above .73 (Fornell and Larker 1981) (see Table 3). 
 The investment measure required the deletion of an item to attain internal consistency. This 
deletion was based on an examination of its content validity before and after item deletion, and the fit 
statistics available in a single factor analysis. The item deletion did not appear to impair the content or 
face validity of the investment measure, and it substantially improved its internal consistency. 
Validity 
 The measures for the latent variables were judged to be content valid. In addition, the average 
extracted variances for the latent variables suggested convergent and discriminant validity for these 
measures  (see Fornell and Larker 1981) (also see Table 3).3 The study's latent variables were also 
construct valid: they were significantly and plausibly correlated with at least one other study variable 
(see Table 3). 
Measurement and Structural Models 
 The Goodness of Fit (GFI) and Adjusted Goodness of Fit (AGFI) indices of the measurement 
model were slightly low. However, Anderson and Gerbing (1984) observed that these statistics are 
sensitive to model parsimony and thus may be inappropriate for larger models. The measurement model 
corresponding to Figure 1 was judged to fit the data based on the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) (Bentler 
1990) (see Bollen and Long 1993, McClelland and Judd 1993), and the Root Mean Squared Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) statistic (Steiger 1990, see Browne and Cudeck 1993) (see Table 3). The 
Figure 1 structural model was identified and thus it coefficient estimates were unbiased,4 and it was also 
judged to fit the data based on CFI and RMSEA (see Table 4). 
                                                          
3 Fornell and Larker (1981) suggested that if the Average Variance Extracted statistic for a latent variable were 
greater than .5, then the common variance captured by the variable was greater than its measurement error, and this 
was sufficient evidence of convergent validity. They also argued that if the extracted average variances for a pair of 
variables were greater than the square of the correlation between these variables, each variable was distinct and this 
provided evidence of discriminant validity. In the present case the average extracted variances exceeded .5, and they 
exceeded the square of the largest latent variable correlation shown in Table 3. 
4
 The bi-directional associations were identified because each endogenous variable involved in these associations 
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Hypotheses Test Results 
 The study hypotheses were generally supported (see Table 4). Of the fourteen hypothesized 
associations, ten of the direct associations shown in Figure 1 (e.g., voice-to-satisfaction, satisfaction-
investment, etc.) were significant. However, the satisfaction-voice and satisfaction-alternative 
attractiveness associations were not bi-directional; the investment association with voice, and the years-
in-business-switching-cost associations were not significant; and the revenue-voice association was 
negative instead of positive. The association between voice and satisfaction was from voice to 
satisfaction only, and satisfaction did not directly affect voice (although satisfaction was significantly but 
indirectly associated with voice via investment, which will be discussed shortly). Similarly, alternative 
attractiveness affected satisfaction, and satisfaction did not directly affect alternative attractiveness 
(although satisfaction was also significantly but indirectly associated with alternative attractiveness via 
investment and switching cost, which will also be discussed shortly). 
 A second structural model was estimated by trimming the nonsignificant bi-directional paths in 
Figure 1 (i.e., the satisfaction-to-voice and satisfaction-to-alternative attractiveness paths were dropped).5 
6 The structural model estimation results from this trimmed model are shown in Table 5. Overall, the 
interpretation of the structural coefficients changed little between the two models, except for the voice 
association with investment, which approached significance in the bi-directional model, and was 
significant in the trimmed model. Table 6 shows the total (i.e., direct plus indirect) effects among the 
study variables in the trimmed Figure 1 model (see Bollen 1989:376). As this exhibit suggests, while 
satisfaction did not significantly affect alternative attractiveness directly in the trimmed model (see Table 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(i.e., satisfaction, voice, and alternative attractiveness) had one or more instrumental variables (see Berry 1984). The 
Figure 1 structural model can be shown to be identified, but the formal proof is long. A sketch of the proof is as 
follows: Bollen (1989) argued that structural equation model identification is a separable process, and it is sufficient 
to prove the measurement model is identified, then prove the structural model is identified. The measurement model 
is identified using Bollen’s (1989:245) second two-indicator rule, and the structural model is identified using Berry’s 
(1984) order condition plus his algorithm. 
5
 The lack of significant bi-directional associations could be viewed as suggestive of the directions of these 
associations in the population, and a trimmed model may be more representative of the population model (see for 
example Bagozzi 1980b). 
6
 This trimmed model is also nonrecursive because of the feedback loops to satisfaction (i.e., the satisfaction-
investment-voice-satisfaction loop and the satisfaction-investment-switching cost-alternative attractiveness-
satisfaction loop). This model can also be shown to be identified using the Footnote 4 approach. 
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5), its indirect effect on alternative attractiveness voice via investment and switching cost was significant 
(see Figure 1 and Table 6).7 Similarly, the indirect effect of satisfaction on voice via investment in the 
trimmed model was also significant (see Figure 1 and Table 6). 
DISCUSSION 
SATISFACTION AND ALTERNATIVE ATTRACTIVENESS 
 The association between satisfaction and alternative attractiveness has been specified in previous 
research as a correlation (see for example Ping 1993; Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult, 
Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988), and it has not been specified in a directional manner until now. The 
associations between satisfaction and alternative attractiveness were significant when they were specified 
as unidirectional (see Table 5 for the results of the unidirectional alternative-attractiveness-to-satisfaction 
path specification; the results of a model with the direction of this path reversed is not reported), while in 
their joint (bi-directional) specification, the alternative attractiveness-to- satisfaction path was significant, 
while the satisfaction-to-alternative attractiveness path was not (see Table 4).8 
 However, the indirect satisfaction-alternative attractiveness path via investment and switching 
                                                          
7
 These remarks depend heavily on the assumption that the direction of satisfaction-investment path is from 
satisfaction to investment at least in the sample. While this is arguably a plausible direction for this association, a 
Figure 1 trimmed model with this path reversed (i.e., pointing in the opposite direction) also fit the data (not 
reported), and the resulting investment-satisfaction path coefficient was significant. It is believed this suggests that 
both directions for the satisfaction-investment path are equally likely (see Hershberger 1994 and the citations 
therein). Similarly, models with combinations of the directions of the Figure 1 paths from investments or switching 
cost reversed also fit the data, and the path coefficients on these reversed paths were also significant. However, we 
fixed all of the path coefficients on the paths to and from investment and switching cost at zero and used LISREL's 
modification indices to suggest the direction of these paths. With the satisfaction-investment path coefficient fixed at 
zero, for example, the modification index for freeing the satisfaction-to-investment path was larger than the 
modification index for freeing the investment-to-satisfaction path. This (weakly) suggests that the proper 
specification of the satisfaction-investment path is from satisfaction to investment, given this data. In summary, this 
approach (weakly) suggested the Figure 1 trimmed model was more appropriate that the other 8 models with 
combinations of their paths to and from investment and switching costs paths reversed, given this data set. 
8
 Significant but opposite unidirectional associations between two latent variables have been previously observed 
(see Bagozzi 1980b for citations). In such situations a bi-directional specification has been used to suggest which 
unidirectional specification is correct. Bagozzi (1980b) for example in his analysis of salesperson performance and 
satisfaction, used a bi-directional specification to sort out opposing unidirectional specifications of these two 
variables. He tested a bi-directional specification of the satisfaction-performance association and observed that only 
the path from performance to satisfaction was significant. In addition, his subsequent unidirectional specification of 
performance to satisfaction was also significant, and it is likely that the unidirectional satisfaction-to-performance 
coefficient would also have been significant had he reported it, based on his reported correlation between satisfaction 
and performance, and the performance-to-satisfaction structural coefficient also reported. 
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cost was (weakly) significant (see Figure 1 and Table 6).9 This result suggests that while all satisfied 
firms were not likely to devalue alternative attractiveness in the study (the direct satisfaction-to-
alternative-attractiveness path was not significant, see Table 4), satisfied firms with high investment in 
the relationship and high perceived switching cost were (weakly) likely to devalue their alternatives. As a 
result, Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) and others’ proposal that in a committed buyer-seller relationship 
the parties to this relationship may devaluate alternatives appears to be true in the study. However, the 
effect was indirect and weak compared to the direct  alternative-attractiveness-to-satisfaction effect, and 
higher investment and switching cost were involved. In different words, satisfied firms were likely to 
slightly devalue alternatives when they had invested in the relationship and perceived there were higher 
switching costs. 
Satisfaction and Voice 
 Until now, the path between satisfaction and voice has been assumed to be from satisfaction to 
voice, and it has been consistently observed to be significant in this specification (see for example Ping 
1993; Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988). Indeed, the 
(unidirectional) satisfaction-to-voice specification was significant in the present study (not reported). 
However in the Figure 1 bi-directional specification, the direct voice-to-satisfaction path was significant 
while the direct satisfaction-to-voice path was not significant. 
 Nevertheless, based on the Table 6 significant satisfaction-to-voice total effect (e.g., via the 
satisfaction-to-investment-to-voice path-- see Figure 1),10 satisfaction was still positively (but indirectly) 
associated with voice (however, this association was weak in comparison to the voice-satisfaction effect). 
These results suggest that while changes in satisfaction were not likely to directly affect voice (the direct 
satisfaction-voice association was nonsignificant), satisfaction was likely to increase investment, and this 
in turn was likely to increase voice. Stated differently, satisfaction affected voice by first increasing 
relationship investment. 
 The nonsignificant direct path from satisfaction to voice suggests that Ping’s (1993) remarks 
about a firm’s satisfied customers being the most likely to be vocal may be misleading. The significant 
                                                          
9
 See Endnote 7. 
10
 See Endnote 7. 
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indirect path from satisfaction to voice via investment in the trimmed model suggests that only satisfied 
firms with high investment in the relationship were more likely to be vocal. 
Other Investment Model Associations and Feedback Loops 
 These results suggest that the associations among satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, 
investment, and switching cost need not be specified as correlations as they have been in the past. In 
addition, the significant combined (total) effects shown in Table 6 suggest that satisfaction "fed back" to, 
or reinforced itself (i.e., affected itself), via investment, voice, switching cost, and alternative 
attractiveness.11 In this feedback loop satisfaction increased investment, which then increased voice and 
switching cost. Increased voice was likely to increase satisfaction, and increased switching costs 
decreased alternative attractiveness which increased satisfaction (see Figure 1). 
 While the combined effect of satisfaction reinforcing itself was comparatively weak (.031-- see 
Table 6), it suggests the importance of relationship investment in this study. If opportunities to increase 
investment in the relationship were not available to satisfied firms in the study, there may have been no 
voice or structural constraint feedback loops to satisfaction, and increased overall satisfaction may have 
had no synergistic (i.e., feedback or reinforcing) effect on itself. Specifically, management attempts to 
increase satisfaction by, for example, satisfactorily resolving relationship problems, may have ended with 
only their direct effect on satisfaction in this study. With opportunities to increase investment in the 
relationship, increased satisfaction fed back through the voice and alternative attractiveness loops to 
further increase satisfaction.12 
 Of these two feedback loops, the alternative attractiveness loop had the larger effect on 
satisfaction (TotalSAT,SAT-INV-SWC-ALT = .021 for the alternative attractiveness loop, TotalSAT,SAT-INV-VOI = .008 
for the voice loop). This suggests that any attempts to reduce alternative attractiveness were not only 
more directly effective in increasing satisfaction in comparison with attempts to increase voice (see Table 
5), they were more indirectly effective as well. 
                                                          
11
 See Endnote 7. 
12
 However this feedback effect died out rapidly in this context. The largest eigenvalue of the indirect coefficient 
matrix was .432, which guarantees convergence (of the cycling through the feedback loops) to the total effects matrix 
shown in Table 6 (Ben-Israel and Greville 1974; see Bollen 1989). However, the coefficients in the powers of the 
coefficient matrix quickly become small (e.g., the largest coefficient in B5 was 7.45E-08). 
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 Finally, the two feedback loops also suggest that using voice (weakly) increased the use of voice 
(see the voice-voice total effect in Table 5). Similarly, investment increased investment, switching cost 
increased switching cost, and alternative attractiveness increased alternative attractiveness. 
IMPLICATIONS 
 While it is very risky to generalize from a single study,13 assuming the maintenance of 
relationship satisfaction is desirable for maintaining buyer-seller relationships (Davidow and Uttal 1990; 
Dwyer Schurr and Oh 1987; Frazier 1983; Hirschman 1970; Ping 1993; see the Fall 1995 issue of the 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science), these results hint at several strategies for channel 
management in this context. Forty-three percent of the variance in relationship satisfaction was explained 
primarily by four relationship variables in the present study (i.e., voice, alternative attractiveness, 
investment, and switching cost-- see Table 6). This suggests that relationship management activities 
aimed at existing channel customers, such as reducing the attractiveness of their alternatives and 
cultivating their voice, along with designing and promoting opportunities for their additional relationship 
investment, may be important to relationship maintenance in this context  (relationship satisfaction has 
been reported to be strongly and negatively related to exit intention-- see Ping 1993). We will briefly 
discuss reducing alternative attractiveness, cultivating voice, and designing and promoting opportunities 
for additional relationship investment by existing channel customers (also see Cravens 1995). 
REDUCING ALTERNATIVE ATTRACTIVENESS 
 Since alternative attractiveness had the largest direct effect on satisfaction, the alternative 
attractiveness loop's effect on satisfaction was the larger of the two feedback loops, and both were 
negative, this suggests changes in perceptions of alternative attractiveness had the largest effect on their 
satisfaction in the study (see Table 6). For managers who may prefer to concentrate on only a few 
relationship maintenance factors, alternative attractiveness reduction might be the best strategy to 
maintain retailer customer satisfaction in this context. 
 Wholesalers interested in increasing retailer satisfaction may want to consider activities such as 
tailoring some of their promotional activities specifically for their established customers. Although there 
                                                          
13
 For example, many of the effects were comparatively weak, and could easily have been non significant in a 
different study (also see Endnote 7). However, the set of responses was judged to be representative of the study 
population, based on published demographics. 
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is little guidance in a marketing channel context, comparative advertising may be effective for this 
purpose. In addition, activities such as providing "success stories" in a newsletter directed to retailer 
customers, or the company website,  telling of other retailers who switched from competitive wholesalers 
may also be useful. For example, comparing logistics service levels may be effective (see LaLonde 
1985). 
ENCOURAGING VOICE 
  Similarly, since voice had the second largest effect on satisfaction, wholesalers interested in 
fostering long term relationships may wish to sincerely solicit retailer complaints and work to resolve 
them in a mutually satisfactory manner (Hirschman 1970, 1974; Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987). While 
Fornell and Wernerfelt (1987) suggested providing 800 numbers, and quick and competent complaint 
processing in a consumer context (p. 344), the situation may be more complex. For example, Laver 
(1976) observed that individuals have different sensitivities to quality declines. Hirschman (1970) 
explicitly made the same assumption (p. 24). In addition, Hirschman (1970) argued that voice was 
affected by the expectation of the success of voice. He elaborated by proposing that the expectation of 
the success of voice involves the subject's evaluation of the prospects of the declined firm getting back on 
track through a possible combination that firm's actions, the subject’s actions, and the actions of others 
(p. 38). He also argued that voice was affected by the advantage to be gained by using voice (see 
Banfield 1961). Singh (1990b) conceptualized this advantage as the worthwhileness of complaint: the 
costs versus the benefits to the subject. 
 Hirschman (1970) speculated that the importance of the purchase would also increase voice (p. 
41). This suggests that the importance of the relationship to the subject firm may also increase the 
likelihood of subject firm voice when there are relationship problems. In the present study the importance 
of the exchange relationship was high by design (the questionnaire instructions asked respondents to 
think of their primary wholesaler in completing the questionnaire). However, it is plausible that as the 
importance of the relationship declines, the picture portrayed in this study could change. 
 As previously mentioned, Hirschman (1970) argued there are customers that are passive (i.e., not 
vocal) when there are relationship problems, and he termed these customers "loyals" (see p. 3). Singh's 
(1990a) results suggest there are several consumer voice response styles ranging from passive, to “irate” 
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and “activist.” It is therefore plausible that firms may also cluster into voice response styles, and that 
there may be passive organizations when it comes to voice. 
 For these reasons, wholesalers may wish to consider additional means of increasing retailer 
voice, beyond  800 numbers, e-mail addresses, user community bulletin boards, and quick and competent 
complaint processing, such as publicizing to their retailing partners prior (successful) outcomes 
proceeding from the use of voice, having wholesaler sales persons actively solicit retailer voice, and 
using wholesaler-sponsored retailer satisfaction surveys to facilitate voice in less vocal retailing firms 
(e.g., those with higher revenue in this study-- see Table 6). 
INCREASING INVESTMENT 
 As previously suggested, investment was key to the voice and alternative attractiveness feedback 
loops in the present study.14 As a result, wholesalers may wish to consider increased emphasis on 
designing and marketing relationship investments to their retailing partners. Prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979) suggests that individuals, and presumably firms, should view additional relationship 
investment (a cost) noncumulatively. This in turn suggests that, all other things being equal, retailers with 
high and low levels of relationship investment should be equally likely to make additional investments in 
the relationship. However, the study results suggest that prior investors in the relationship are more likely 
to increase their relationship investment (the Table 6 INV-INV coefficient was significant). In addition, 
prospect theory suggests that investment opportunities should be offered as either a single large gain or a 
series of small costs (see Nagle and Holden 1995), depending on how the prospective investor might 
view the proposed investment. Opportunities for selling relationship investment could be identified using 
a series of customer satisfaction surveys, plus a systematic prospecting and follow-up selling activity 
aimed at, for example, long-time customers (see Table 6). 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 There may be more to learn about the antecedents of relationship satisfaction in marketing 
channel relationships. While the squared multiple correlation for satisfaction observed in this study was 
comparatively high, it suggests that satisfaction has other important antecedents. For example, Johnson 
(1982) suggested relationship satisfaction has as antecedents rewards, costs, alternative attractiveness, 
                                                          
14
 See Endnote 7. 
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and equity. Alternative attractiveness, and several reward/cost related variables (i.e., investment, 
switching cost and possibly voice) were investigated in the present study.15 
 Equity (see Frazier 1983) has been subsumed by the notion of relationship justice in other 
literatures (see Tyler 1994 for a summary). Relationship justice has been heavily researched, and is 
generally conceptualized as consisting of two facets: distributive justice (i.e., the fairness of the portions 
of outcomes received, Adams 1963), and procedural justice (i.e., the fairness of the procedures used to 
determine these outcomes, Thibaut and Walker 1975). Both procedural and distributive justice have been 
observed to be associated with satisfaction in other contexts (e.g., Folger and Konovsky 1989), and it is 
plausible that, with care and attention to established concepts that may be related to procedural justice 
(e.g., bureaucratization, see Dwyer and Oh 1987), distributive and procedural justice may be associated 
with satisfaction in marketing channel relationships. 
 Relationship rewards and costs may have important sub-dimensions. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) 
proposed that the determinants of rewards and costs in a relationship included the similarity of attitudes 
and orientations. Anderson (1988) for example, proposed goal congruency as an antecedent of 
opportunism in a personal selling context. Because congruent goals should be rewarding, it is plausible 
that this may also be an antecedent of satisfaction in long-term buyer-seller relationships. 
 Social psychology could be viewed as the study of person and situation (Fiske and Taylor 1991). 
As a result, satisfaction could be argued to be the result of these two influences. For example, Johnson 
(1982:54) proposed that relationship partners may define themselves in terms of a relationship (see 
Goffman 1961). A wholesaler may believe that, for example, they carry “only the best,“ which in turn 
might dictate their supplier relationships in each of their product categories. In addition, Rodin (1982) 
commented that changes in situation could also be important to satisfaction with the relationship. In the 
study context, for example, the appearance of hardware home centers such as Home Depot or Lowes in 
the retailer’s service area may effect hardware retailer satisfaction with their wholesaler (also see Dwyer 
and Oh 1987). 
 Another view of satisfaction would be to consider those things that produce dissatisfaction. 
                                                          
15
 Voice may be related to rewards and costs in that it could be viewed as an attempt to reduce relationship cost 
and/or increase relationship reward.  
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Behavior that is compared to that which is expected should affect relationship satisfaction (Thibaut and 
Kelley 1959). Macneil (1980) and others have proposed that there are expectations in economic exchange 
relationships that they term relational norms (see Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). In particular, Macneil 
(1980, 1983) and others suggest that in committed relationships these norms may include consistent 
behavior (i.e., role integrity, behaving as expected); mutuality (i.e., distributive justice-- see the above 
remarks regarding justice and Kaufmann and Stern 1988); relationship preservation (i.e., solidarity, 
maintaining beliefs and actions that preserve the relationship-- again see Kaufmann and Stern 1988), 
which may have as subdimensions, flexibility and harmonizing conflict (Macneil 1980); and supra-
contract norms (i.e., moral conduct) (also see Noordeweir, John and Nevin 1990). It is plausible that 
these and possibly other norms are related to satisfaction.  While Frazier (1983) and others have 
suggested that mutuality may be the most important of these, it would be interesting and perhaps valuable 
to channel relationship managers to know if this is empirically supported, since their performance 
relative to these norms should be controllable by these managers. 
 The results reported in the present study should be considered as suggestive of the satisfaction 
associations with alternative attractiveness and voice. More research is obviously required to firmly 
establish the lack of direct satisfaction-to-voice and satisfaction-to-alternative attractiveness effects, and 
the feedback loops. In particular, experiments and (longitudinal) field studies with observations of lags 
between satisfaction, voice and alternative attractiveness should be conducted. 
 It is plausible that the observed voice-to-satisfaction effect involves an indirect path via partner’s 
remedial action. In the present study the satisfied and invested firms that were inclined to react to 
relationship problems with voice may also have had partner firms that were very likely to resolve these 
problems. Perhaps a future study will specify partner’s remedial action separately from the voice-
satisfaction path to test for the possibility that voice may itself be rewarding (see Hirschman 1974; Singh 
1990a).16 
 As a final observation it would be interesting, and perhaps valuable to marketing channel 
managers, to investigate the efficacy of advertising that is specifically aimed at existing retailers, and 
                                                          
16
 Hirschman (1974) proposed that the exercise of voice itself is satisfying. While his remarks were aimed at the 
possibility that it was satisfying to use voice in and with a group (Blau 1964), Singh (1990a) found that consumer 
voicers variously reported that it bothered them not to complain, and that it felt good to complain. 
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designed to reduce alternative attractiveness. While some marketing practitioners believe comparative 
advertising works in a consumer context (see Rossiter and Percy 1987), there is relatively little guidance 
for comparative advertising aimed at long term channel partners. 
SUMMARY 
 Because relationship satisfaction is important in the maintenance of long-term buyer-seller 
relationships (Davidow and Uttal 1990; Dwyer Schurr and Oh 1987; Frazier 1983; Hirschman 1970; Ping 
1993), the paper reported the results of an investigation of the managerially actionable antecedents of 
satisfaction proposed in the investment model (Ping 1993; see Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; 
Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988). In the study, hardware retailers' satisfaction in their 
relationship with their primary wholesalers had direct antecedents that included their perception of 
alternative attractiveness and their use of voice, and indirect antecedents that included their relationship 
investment and their switching cost. In particular, retailers' satisfaction was likely to be negatively 
affected by their perception of alternative attractiveness, and it was likely to be positively affected by 
their use of voice, their relationship investments, and their perceived switching cost. 
 The study results suggested the existence of a (weak but significant) feedback loop in which 
firms' satisfaction was likely to reduce the attractiveness of their alternatives, which in turn further 
increased their relationship satisfaction. A second weak feedback loop was also observed, in which firms' 
satisfaction was likely to increase their voice, which in turn was likely to further increase their 
relationship satisfaction. These feedback loops to satisfaction operated via subject firm investment in the 
relationship, which suggested the importance of the availability of relationship investment options, and 
opportunities to exercise these options in the study. 
 24 
REFERENCES 
Adams, J. Stacey (1963), “Toward an Understanding of Inequity,” Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 67, 422-436. 
Ajzen, I. (1977), “Information Processing Approaches to Interpersonal Attraction,” in Theory and 
Practice in Interpersonal Attraction, S. Duck ed., New York: Academic Press. 
Anderson, Erin (1988), "Transaction Costs as Determinants of Opportunism in Integrated and 
Independent Sales Forces," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 9 (April), 247-64. 
Anderson, James C. and James A. Narus (1984), "A Model of the Distributor’s Perspective of 
Distributor-Manufacturer Working Relationships,” Journal of Marketing, 48 (Fall), 62-74. 
_______, David W. Gerbing and John E. Hunter (1987), "On the Assessment of Unidimensional 
Measurement: Internal and External Consistency, and Overall Consistency Criteria,” Journal of 
Marketing Research, 24 (November), 432-437. 
_______, and James A. Narus (1990), "A Model of Distributor Firm and Manufacturer Firm Working 
Partnerships," Journal of Marketing, 54 (January), 42-58. 
Arndt, Johan (1979), "Toward a Concept of Domesticated Markets," Journal of Marketing, 43 (Fall), 69-
75. 
Bagozzi, Richard P. (1980a), Causal Models in Marketing, New York: Wiley. 
_______ (1980b), “Performance and Satisfaction in an Industrial Sales Force: An Examination of Their 
Antecedents and Simultaneity,” Journal of Marketing, 44 (Spring), 75-77. 
Banfield, Edward C. (1961), Political Influence, New York: Free Press of Glencoe. 
Ben-Israel, A. and T.N. Greville (1974), Generalized Inverses: Theory and Application, New York: 
Wiley. 
Bentler, Peter M. (1990), "Comparative Fit Indexes in Structural Models," Psychological Bulletin, 107 
(March), 238-246. 
Berry, William D. (1984), Nonrecursive Causal Models, Beverly Hills: SAGE. 
Blau, Peter M. (1964), Exchange and Power in Social Life, New York: Wiley. 
Bollen, Kenneth A. (1989), Structural Equations with Latent Variables, New York: Wiley. 
______ and J. Scott Long (1993), Testing Structural Equation Models, Newbury Park, CA: SAGE, 294-
316. 
Browne, M. W. and R. Cudeck (1993), “Alternative Ways of Assessing Model Fit,” In Testing Structural 
Equation Models, Kenneth A. Bollen and J. Scott Long, eds., Newbury Park, CA: SAGE, 137-
162. 
Chamberlin, Edward H. (1933), The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Boston: Harvard University 
Press. 
Cravens, David W. (1995), “Introduction to the Special Issue,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 23 (Fall), 235. 
Davidow, William H. and Bro Uttal (1990), Total Customer Service, New York: Harper. 
Diener, B.J. and S.A. Grayser (1978), “Consumer Views of Redress Needs,” Journal of Marketing, 42 
(October), 21-27. 
Dwyer, F. Robert and Sejo Oh (1987), "Output Sector Munificence Effects on the Internal Political 
Economy of Marketing Channels," Journal of Marketing Research, 24 (November), 347-358. 
______, Paul H. Schurr, and Sejo Oh (1987), "Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships," Journal of 
Marketing, 51 (April), 11-27. 
Emerson, Richard M. (1962), "Power-Dependence Relations," American Sociological Review, 27 
(February), 31-40. 
Ford, David I. (1980), "The Development of Buyer-Seller Relations in Industrial Markets," European 
Journal of Marketing, 14 (5/6), 339-353. 
Fornell, Claes and Nicholas M. Didow (1980), "Economic Constraints on Consumer Complaining 
Behavior, " in Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 7, Jerry C. Olsen, ed. Ann Arbor, MI: 
 25 
Association for Consumer Research, 318-23. 
______ and David F. Larker (1981), "Evaluating Structural Equation Models with Unobservable 
Variables and Measurement Error," Journal of Marketing Research, 18 (February), 39-50.  
______ and Robert A. Westbrook (1984), "The Vicious Circle of Consumer Complaints," Journal of 
Marketing, 48 (Summer), 68-78. 
______ and Birger Wernerfelt (1987), "Defensive Marketing Strategy by Customer Complaint 
Management: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Marketing Research, 24 (November), 337-46. 
Frazier, Gary L. (1983), "Interorganizational Exchange Behavior: A Broadened Perspective," Journal of 
Marketing, 47 (Fall), 68-78.  
______ and Raymond C. Rody (1991), "The Use if Influence Strategies in Interfirm Relationships in 
Industrial Product Channels," Journal of Marketing, 66 (January), 52-69. 
Gadde, Lars-Erik and Lars-Gunner Mattsson (1987), “Stability and Change in Network Relationships,” 
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 4, 29-41. 
Gerbing, David W. and James C. Anderson (1984), "An Updated Paradigm for Scale Development 
Incorporating Unidimensionality and Its Assessment," Journal Marketing Research, 25 (May), 
186-192. 
Håkansson, Håkan (1982), International Marketing and Purchasing of Industrial Goods: An Interaction 
Approach, Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
Hallén, Lars, Jan Johanson and Nazeem Seyed-Mohamed (1991), “Interfirm Adaptation in Business 
Relationships,” Journal of Marketing, 55 (April), 29-37. 
Hatfield, E. and J. Traupman (1981), “Intimate Relationships: A Perspective from Equity Theory,” in 
Personal Relationships 1: Studying Personal Relationships, S. Duck and R. Gilmour eds., 
London: Academic Press. 
Heide, Jan B. and George John (1990), "Alliances in Industrial Purchasing: The Determinants of Joint 
Action in Buyer-Seller Relationships," Journal of Marketing Research, 27 (February), 24-36. 
______ (1993), "Do Norms Matter in Marketing Relationships?" Journal of Marketing, 56 (April), 32-
44. 
Hershberger, Scott L. (1994), "The Specification of Equivalent Models Before the Collection of Data," in 
Latent Variable Analysis- Applications for Developmental Research, A. von Eye, C.C. Clogg 
eds., Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Hirschman, Albert O. (1970), Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, 
and States, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
______ (1974), "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Further Reflections and a Survey of Recent Contributions," 
Social Science Information, 13 (February), 7-26. 
Homans, C. E. (1961), Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. 
______ (1974), Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, 2nd edn., New York: Harcourt, Brace, 
Jovanovich. 
Hunt, Shelby D. and John R. Nevin (1974), “Power in a Channel of Distribution: Sources and 
Consequences,” Journal of Marketing Research, 11 (May), 186-193. 
Hunter, John E. (1973), "Methods for Reordering the Correlation Matrix to Facilitate Visual Inspection 
and Preliminary Cluster Analysis," Journal of Educational Measurement, 10 (Spring), 51-61. 
Johnson, Michael P. (1982), “Social and Cognitive Features of the Dissolution of Commitment to 
Relationships,” in Personal Relationships: Dissolving Personal Relationships, S. Duck ed., 
London: Academic Press. 
Johnson, Dennis J. and Caryl E. Rusbult (1989), “Resisting Temptation: Devaluation of Alternative 
Partners as a Means of Maintaining Commitment in Close Relationships,” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 57 (6), 967-980. 
Jöreskog, Karl G. (1993), "Testing Structural Equation Models," in Testing Structural Equation Models, 
Kenneth A. Bollen and J. Scott Long eds., Newbury Park, CA: SAGE, 294-316. 
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” 
 26 
Econometrica, 47 (March), 263-291. 
Kelley, H.H. and J.W. Thibaut (1978), Interpersonal Relations: A Theory of Interdependence, New 
York: Wiley. 
LaLonde, Bernard J. (1985), "Customer Service," in The Distribution Handbook, New York: The Free 
Press. 
Laver, Michael (1976), "Exit, Voice and Loyalty Revisited," British Journal of Political Science, 6 
(October), 463-482. 
Macneil, Ian R. (1980), The New Social Contract An Inquiry Into Modern Contractual Relations, New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
______ (1983), “Values in Contract: Internal and External,” Northwestern University Law Review, 78, 
340-418. 
McClelland, Gary H. and Charles M. Judd (1993), “Statistical Difficulties of Detecting Interactions and 
Moderator Effects,” Psychological Bulletin, 114 (March), 376-390. 
Nagle, Thomas T. and Reed K. Holden (1995), The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing, Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall. 
Ping, Robert A. Jr. and F. Robert Dwyer (1988), “Relationship Termination in Marketing Channels,” in 
1988 American Marketing Association Winter Educators Conference Proceedings, G. Frazier et 
al. eds., Chicago: American Marketing Association, 245-250. 
Ping, Robert A. Jr. (1993), "The Effects of Satisfaction and Structural Constraints on Retailer Exiting, 
Voice, Loyalty, Opportunism, and Neglect," Journal of Retailing, 69 (Fall), 320-352. 
______ (1999), "Unexplored Antecedents of Exiting in a Marketing Channel,"  Journal of Retailing, 75 
(Summer), 218-241. 
Porter, Michael E. (1980), Competitive Strategy, New York: Academic Press. 
Richins, M.L. (1983), “Negative Word of Mouth by Dissatisfied Consumers, Journal of Marketing, 47 
(Winter), 68-78. 
Rodin, Miriam J. (1982), Non-Engagement, Failure to Engage, and Disengagement,” in Personal 
Relationships: Dissolving Personal Relationships, S. Duck ed., London: Academic Press. 
Rusbult, Caryl E. (1980), "Commitment and Satisfaction in Romantic Associations. A Test of the 
Investment Model," Journal of Experimental Psychology, 16, 172-186.  
______, Dan Farrell, Glen Rogers and Arch G. Mainous III (1988), "Impact of Exchange Variables on 
Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect: An Integrative Model of Responses to Declining Job 
Satisfaction," Academy of Management Journal, 31 (September), 599-627. 
______, Isabella M. Zembrodt and Lawanna K. Gunn (1982), "Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect: 
Responses to Dissatisfaction in Romantic Involvement," Journal of Personal and Social 
Psychology, 43 (6), 1230-1242. 
Singh, Jagdip (1990a), "A Topology of Consumer Dissatisfaction Response Styles," Journal of Retailing, 
Vol. 66, No. 1 (Spring), 57-99. 
______  (1990b), "Voice, Exit, and Negative Word-of-Mouth Behaviors: An Across Three Service 
Categories," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Sciences, 18 (Winter), 1-15. 
Spencer, D. G. (1986), "Employee Voice and Employee Retention," Academy of Management Journal, 
29, 488-502. 
Steiger, J.H. (1990), “Structural Model Evaluation and Modification: An Interval Estimation Approach,” 
Multivariate Behavioral Research, 25, 173-180. 
Stern, Louis W. and Lisa K. Scheer (1991), "Power and Influence in Marketing Channel Research: 
Observations on the State of the Art," in Advances in Distribution Channel Research, Gary L. 
Frazier ed., Greenwich CT: JAI Press, Inc. 
Thibaut, John W., Harold H. Kelley (1959), The Social Psychology of Groups, New York: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
______ and L. Walker (1975), “A Theory of Procedure,” California Law Review, 66, 541-566. 
Tyler, Tom R. (1994), “Psychological Models of the Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributive and 
 27 
Procedural Justice,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67 (5), 850-863. 
Walster, Elaine, Ellen Berscheid, and G. William Walster (1976), “New Directions in Equity Research,” 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology Vol. 9, L. Berkowitz ed., New York: Academic 
Press. 
______, William Walster and Ellen Berscheid (1978), EQUITY: Theory and Research, Boston: Allyn 
and Bacon. 
Webster, Fredrick E., Jr. (1979), Industrial Marketing Strategy, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
Wilson, David T. (1995), “An Integrated Model of Buyer-Seller Relationships,” Journal of the Academy 
of Marketing Science, 23 (Fall), 335-345. 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: 
Free Press. 
Wind, Yoram (1970), "Industrial Source Loyalty," Journal of Marketing Research, 7 (November), 433-6. 
 28 
Table 1-- MEASURE SUMMARY                                                                  
 
   Construct       Conceptual Definition    Operational Definition     Items                    Sample Item                     
 
Alternative Global evaluation of the Satisfaction believed to be      4 Overall the alternative wholesaler 
 Attractiveness relationship fulfillment available in the best   would be a much better company to do 
 (ALT)  available in the best alternative relationship.  business with than the current 
wholesaler. 
  available alternative 
  relationship. 
 
Investment Cost to build and main- Magnitude of the cost that     4 A lot of energy, time and effort have 
 (INV)  tain the current relation- went into building and main-  gone into building and maintaining the 
  ship in anticipation of taining the current   relationship with the current wholesaler. 
  future exchanges. relationship. 
 
Satisfaction Global evaluation of Belief that the relationship     5 All in all, my relationship with my 
 (SAT)  relationship fulfillment. is satisfactory.   primary wholesaler is very satisfactory. 
 
Switching Costs to change to an Cost and loss required to term-     4      Generally speaking the costs in time, 
 Cost  alternative relationship. inate the current relationship  money, effort and grief to switch 
 (SWC)    and secure an alternative  primary wholesalers would be high. 
    relationship. 
 
Voice  Constructive attempts Intention to notify construc-     4 I work with my primary wholesaler to 
 (VOI)  to change objection- tively and work with the  correct any mutual problems. 
  able relationship primary wholesaler to solve 
  conditions. relationship problems. 
 
Employees Retailer's number The number of employees     1 
 (EMPL)  of employees. at your store? 
 
Years in  Number of years How many years has your     1 
 Business  the retailer has store been open? 
 (OPEN)  been in business. 
 
Competitors Number of competitive The number of competing     1 
 (RIVAL) stores in retailer's  stores in your service area? 
  service area. 
 
Revenue  Retailer's revenue. Your last year's sales?      1 
 (SLS) 
 
Years with Number of years How many years have you     1 
 Wholesaler the retailer has done business with your 
  (WITH)  done business primary wholesaler? 
  with the supplier. 
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Table 2-- MEASURE PSYCHOMETRIC SUMMARY                       
 
       Item 
       Wording 
       Changes 
       Items        After 
Construct  Sample  Initial Final 2/df    Pretest 
Voice  Pretest    4        4  .88  
  Final    4        4 1.9/2 .93 None 
     (p=.49) 
Satisfaction Pretest    5        5  .95  
  Final    5        5 5/5 .94 None 
     (p=.42) 
Alternative Pretest    4        4  .91  
 Attractiveness Final    4        4 4.1/2 .93 None 
     (p=.11) 
Investment Pretest    5        5  .85  
  Final    5        4 9.4/2 .92 None 
     (p=.01) 
Switching Pretest    4        4  .91  
 Cost  Final    4        4 .78/2 .94 None 
     (p=.79) 
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Table 3-- MEASUREMENT MODEL RESULTS a                             
 
Latent Variable Covariances and Correlations:b 
                                                                     Variable                                                       
   Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   
   1.  SAT .44* -.52* .32* .25* .29* .10 .06 .02 -.00 -.00 
   2.  ALT -.30* .74* -.27* -.38* -.10 -.17* -.03 -.12 -.07 .01 
   3.  INV .16* -.18* .61* .55* .25* .11 -.10 .12  .07 -.13 
   4.  SWC .16* -.33* .42* .95* .15* .09  .00 .10  -.05 -.05 
   5.  VOI .08* -.03 .09* .06* .17*  .00 .00 .10 -.06 -.05 
   6.  WITH .08 -.18* .12 .11 .00 1.47* .41* .09 .09 .14 
   7.  OPEN .10 -.08 -.19 -.06 .00 1.32* 7.27* .06 .06 .05 
   8.  EMPL .02 -.13 .13 .19 .05 .14 .23 1.75* .51* .39* 
   9.  SLS -.00 -.10 .00 .14 -.05 .19 .26 1.09* 2.60* .19* 
  10. RIVAL -.00 -.00 -.12 -.01 -.02 .22 .18 .65* .40* 1.58* 
 
 Model-to-Data Fit 
 Chi-Square/df/p-value     .362/259/0 
 Comparative Fit Index c    .976 
 RMSEA d       .042 
 GFI/AGFI e       .889/849 
 
 
                                                            SAT   ALT   INV SWC  VOI 
 Average Variance Extracted:      .770    .768   .739  .802   .760 
 Latent Variable Reliability:        .943    .929   .919  .941   .926 
 
______________________________ 
a Maximum likelihood. 
b Covariances on and below the diagonal, correlations above. 
c .90 or above suggests acceptable fit (McClelland and Judd 1993). 
d Root Mean Square Error of Approximation-- .05 or less suggests close fit, .051-.08 
  suggests acceptable fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993; Jöreskog 1993). 
e GFI and AGFI may be inappropriate for assessing fit in larger models (Anderson 
  and Gerbing 1984). 
* t-value > 2. 
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 Table 4-- FIGURE 1 (BI-DIRECTIONAL) STRUCTURAL MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTS  
 
  Parameter    Estimatea    t-value 
 VOI,SATb  -0.047 - 0.28 
 SAT,VOI    0.811   2.31 
 SAT,ALT  -0.268  -2.47 
 ALT,SAT  -0.289  -1.55 
 INV,SAT    0.275   3.38 
 VOI,INV    0.091   1.64 
 SWC,INV     0.660   7.93 
 ALT,SWC  -0.282  -4.51 
 VOI,SLS  -0.045  -2.07 
 VOI,EMPL     0.138   3.03 
 INV,WITH    0.118   2.65 
 INV,OPEN  -0.050  -2.52 
 INV,RIVAL -0.131  -2.90 




 Chi-Square/df/p-value      .383/280/0 
 RMSEA c       .040 
 Comparative Fit Index d                         .976 
 GFI/AGFI e     .878/.847 
 
                           SAT ALT INV SWC VOI  
 Squared Multiple Correlations:  .43    .32   .20    .29    .03 
 
_______________________________ 
a Maximum likelihood. 
b VOI,INV is the effect of INV on VOI. 
c Root Mean Square Error of Approximation-- .05 or less suggests close fit, .051-.08 suggests 
  acceptable fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993; Jöreskog 1993). 
e .90 or higher suggests acceptable fit (McClelland and Judd 1993). 
d GFI and AGFI may be inappropriate for assessing fit in larger models (Anderson and Gerbing 
  1984). 
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 Table 5--TRIMMED FIGURE 1 STRUCTURAL MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTSa  
 
  Parameter    Estimateb  t-value 
 VOI,INVc  0.164  2.28 
 SAT,VOI   0.229  3.76 
 SAT,ALT  -0.516 -8.37 
 ALT,SWC -0.342 -4.89  
 INV,SAT   0.236  3.28 
 INV,WITH  0.186  2.67 
 SWC,INV  0.509  7.74 
 VOI,EMPL  0.236  3.28 
 VOI,SLS  -0.156 -2.16 
 INV,OPEN   -0.174 -2.50 
 INV,RIVAL  -0.189 -2.90 




 Chi-Square/df/p-value      384/282/0 
 RMSEA d       .040 
 Comparative Fit Index e                            .976 
 GFI/AGFI f       .881/.852 
 
            SAT VOI ALT INV SWC 
 Squared Multiple Correlations:  .37    .09   .15   .18    .28 
 
__________________________ 
a Figure 1 model with the nonsignificant bi-directional paths deleted. 
b Maximum likelihood. 
c VOI,INV is the standardized effect of INV on VOI. 
d Root Mean Square Error of Approximation-- .05 or less suggests close fit, .051-.08 suggests 
  acceptable fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993; Jöreskog 1993). 
e .90 or higher suggests acceptable fit (McClelland and Judd 1993). 
f GFI and AGFI may be inappropriate for assessing fit in larger models (Anderson and Gerbing 
  1984). 
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               Table 6-- TRIMMED MODEL STANDARDIZED TOTAL EFFECTSa b c             
 
            VOI      SAT       ALT     INV     SWC       SLS   EMPL   WITH    OPEN  RIVAL 
VOI           .009      .040      -.020     .169      .007      -.157     .239      .031      -.029     -.031 
          (2.02)   (2.07)    (-2.04)  (2.27)   (1.97)   (-2.16)   (3.27)   (1.73)   (-1.68)   (-1.78) 
SAT           .236      .031      -.532     .131      .182      -.036     .056      .024      -.017     -.024 
          (3.75)   (3.25)    (-8.28)  (4.23)    (4.33)   (-1.88)   (2.48)   (2.26)   (-1.20)   (-2.39) 
ALT          -.009    -.042       .022    -.180     -.350       .001    -.002    -.033        .021      .033 
         (-2.44)  (-3.02)    (3.02)  (-4.29)  (-4.83)    (1.62)  (-1.97)  (-2.27)    (0.86)    (2.40) 
INV           .056      .244      -.126      .031      .043     -.008     .013      .192       -.178     -.190 
          (2.57)   (3.21)    (-3.14)  (3.25)    (3.01)   (-1.66)   (2.03)   (2.67)   (-2.49)   (-2.90) 
SWC         .028      .124       -.064    .525       .022     -.004     .006      .098      -.061      -.097 
          (2.51)   (3.12)    (-3.07)  (7.66)    (3.02)   (-1.64)   (2.00)   (2.54)   (-0.88)   (-2.72) 
 
__________________________ 
a From the Figure 1 model with the nonsignificant bi-directional paths deleted. The table is read from 
column to row (e.g., the effect of SAT on VOI is .040, while the effect of VOI on SAT is .236). 
b Stability Index = .427 





























a SAT = Satisfaction, ALT = Alternative Attractiveness, INV = Investment, SWC = Switching Cost, VOI 
= Voice, WITH = years with Wholesaler, OPEN = Years in Business, EMPL = Number of Employees, 
SLS = Annual Revenue, and RIVAL = Number of Competitors. The indicator errors ('s) and structural 
disturbances ('s) were uncorrelated, and the exogenous variables (i.e., EMPL, SLS, WITH, RIVAL, and 












 RELATIONSHIP COMMITMENT AND OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR 
 






Relationship commitment has received considerable attention in several literatures outside of Marketing. 
There it is conceptualized as personal or affective commitment (wanting to stay in the relationship), and 
structural commitment (having to remain in the relationship). 
Opportunism (self-interest seeking with deception) was proposed in the markets-versus-hierarchies 
literature by Williamson (1975) as a macro explanation for backward or forward integration. It has also 
generated limited theoretical interest, and a modicum of empirical research, at the micro level because it should 
disappear in relational exchange (it endangers interfirm exchange relationships by increasing economic and 
social costs in these relationships). However, empirical research disconfirming this proposal has been mixed. 
This paper expands the concept of relationship commitment in interfirm relationships, and explores the 
apparently complex relationships between relationship commitment and opportunism. 
 
 
Research involving channel relationships has turned from unilateral relationships (i.e., with unbalanced 
power and dependence), to those that could be termed bilateral. Bilateral relationships have more nearly equal 
distributions of power and dependence, and they are usually characterized by high relationship quality. Over 
the course of this research, studies investigated variables characterizing unilateral relationships (e.g., the power 
and dependency literature-- see Gaski 1984 for a summary), and variables characterizing bilateral relationships 
(e.g., the relationship literature-- see Weitz and Jap 1995 for a summary). Studies that combine variables 
characteristic of both aspects of channel relationships, however, have been comparatively rare. 
Of interest in the present research because it is an important yet empirically under explored unilateral 
relationship behavior (Anderson 1988), retailer opportunistic behavior (i.e., self interest maximizing) that is 
guileful (i.e., deceives the exchange partner) was introduced in the economics literature. There it was termed 
opportunism and it was used to explain the failure of markets (see Williamson 1975).1 It is characterized by 
covert violations of relationship norms and expectations (see Williamson 1975). Despite arguments that it 
should be comparatively rare (e.g., Hill 1990), it has been self reported in studies channel relationships (see 
Dwyer and Oh 1987, John 1984, Joshi 1995, Phillips 1982, Ping 1993, and Provan and Skinner 1989). 
Interfirm relationship commitment has been conceptualized as an implicit or explicit pledge of relationship 
continuity (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). Gundlach et al. (1995) argued that it is evidenced by the magnitude 
of inputs to the relationship, affective attachment to the relationship, and the longevity of the relationship. 
Relationship commitment has been extensively studied in several literatures. Mowday, Porter and Steers 
(1982) argued that organizational commitment is characterized by an employee's acceptance of the organiza-
tion's values, a willingness to exert effort on behalf of this organization, and a desire to remain in the organiza-
tion. Meyer and Allen (1991) termed this the affective attachment aspect of organizational commitment. They 
argued that organizational commitment is also evidenced by being aware of the costs of leaving the relation-
ship, and having a moral belief supporting remaining in the relationship. 
Johnson (1982) argued that interpersonal commitment was composed of personal commitment and 
structural commitment. Personal commitment is characterized by satisfaction with the relationship, a moral 
belief supporting remaining in the relationship, and a contribution to one's identity provided by the relation-
ship. Structural commitment is characterized by many irretrievable investments in the relationship (i.e., those 
that would be lost if the relationship ended), unattractive alternative relationships, social pressure to remain in 
the relationship, and awareness of the costs and difficulty of ending the relationship. 
Summarizing these arguments, relationship commitment in general should be characterized by wanting to 
stay in a relationship. This should be characterized by satisfaction, affective attachment, a moral belief that one 
ought to stay in the relationship, and a contribution to one's identity provided by the relationship. Further, 
affective attachment should be shown by the acceptance of organizational values, a willingness to exert effort 
on behalf of the organization, and the desire to remain in the organization. 
The appearance of relationship commitment should also be characterized by having to stay in the relation-
ship. This construct, which we will term relationship dependence,2 should be characterized by unattractive 
alternatives, many relationship investments that would be lost if the relationship were ended, social pressures, 
the longevity of the relationship, and awareness of the costs and difficulty of ending the relationship. 
In channel relationships relationship dependence should be characterized by other variables, including 
many inputs to the relationship, and an awareness of the costs and difficulty of establishing a replacement 
relationship. Further; the perceived magnitude of the time, effort, money, incentives lost, and the risk that 
would be faced in replacing the relationship should be mobility barriers between the existing and alternative 




continue the relationship, that would be lost. They include the perceived cost to establish a replacement 
relationship, including the money, time, and effort involved in beginning the replacement relationship. These 
costs also include the risk that the replacement relationship would turn out to be a poor company with which to 
do business. 
 Combining Relationship Commitment and Opportunism 
Opportunism has been characterized as a natural inclination (Williamson 1975; see John 1984) that was 
argued to increase with partner firm's relationship dependence (Williamson 1975).3 Opportunism has been 
extensively discussed in several literatures. However, most disciplines implicitly assume parties in long term 
economic exchange relationships do as they promise. Perhaps as a result, opportunism has been the focus of 
comparatively little empirical research (Anderson 1988). In particular, two empirical studies have investigated 
opportunism as the focal variable in the interfirm literature.4 John's (1984) study could be characterized as 
involving several affective commitment variables, and Provan and Skinner (1989) study could be characterized 
as investigating several relationship dependence variables. 
Authors have argued that opportunism should be attenuated by high relationship quality (e.g., Goldberg 
1980) and thus it should be minimal in bilateral relationships. However, empirical studies have not consistently 
supported these arguments. For example, in John's (1984) study, firms' opportunism was negatively associated 
with their (positive) affective attitudinal orientation toward the relationship. However, in a study of several 
responses to relationship dissatisfaction, including opportunism, Ping (1993) reported that firms' satisfaction 
with their relationship was not associated with their opportunism.  
The present research will propose that these inconsistent associations between opportunism and 
satisfaction-related variables are the result of different levels of alternative relationship attractiveness across the 
reported studies (i.e., alternative relationship attractiveness is moderating the opportunism-satisfaction 
relationship). This research will also investigate the complex reality surrounding past proposals involving 
interfirm opportunism: that personal or affective commitment reduces opportunism, and relationship depend-
ence increases it. 
 Antecedents of Opportunism 




Authors have argued that firms with unattractive alternative replacement relationships should exhibit 
reduced opportunism (e.g., Anderson and Weitz 1986, Provan and Skinner 1989, Ping 1993). This association 
has been inconsistently observed. Firms' opportunism was negatively associated with their alternative unattrac-
tiveness in Ping (1993), but firms' opportunism was not associated with availability of alternatives in Provan 
and Skinner (1989). It is plausible that this association depends on, or is moderated by, different levels of 
relationship commitment across the two studies. In a committed interfirm relationship, future economic 
exchanges with partner should be valued highly (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). Conversely, any potential gains 
from opportunism should be less attractive to the committed subject firm than the potential of losses that might 
result if their opportunism were discovered and the relationship were ruined. Increases in alternative unattrac-
tiveness should amplify this effect because it makes the committed subject even more dependent on their 
partner (Emerson 1962, see Anderson and Narus 1984). This should make potential gains from opportunism 
even less attractive to the subject than the potential losses if their opportunism were discovered and negative 
sanctions such as relationship termination resulted (Joshi 1995, see Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
Formally, when firms' relationship commitment is high, increased alternative unattractiveness should make 
them likely to avoid behaviors such as opportunism that might damage or jeopardize the relationship (Provan 
and Skinner 1989), and (H1a) Alternative unattractiveness is negatively associated with opportunism when 
relationship commitment is high; 
When firms' relationship commitment is low, however, increases in firms' alternative unattractiveness 
should be viewed negatively by them. Alternative unattractiveness makes it difficult to exit the relationship, 
which should in turn be interpreted as a threat to freedom (a cost) (see Brehm 1972). Firms with unattractive 
alternative relationships should be more likely to engage in re-balancing operations to improve their relation-
ship rewards and costs if the interfirm balance of these rewards and costs becomes tipped in partner's favor. 
Frazier (1983), among others (see Brehm 1972, Walster, Berscheid and Walster 1976), argued that when 
relationship rewards are tipped in partner's favor, firms may decrease their relationship inputs (a cost) to reduce 
partner's relationship rewards. 
Opportunism could be viewed as a means to improve the balance of rewards and costs in an interfirm 




shirking relationship responsibilities, or firms' relationship rewards could be increased by overstating the extent 
of their local difficulties so partner firms provide additional relationship inputs. 
Thus, when relationship commitment is low, alternative unattractiveness should be positively associated 
with firms' balancing operations such as opportunism. Formally, (H1b): Alternative unattractiveness is 
positively associated with opportunism when relationship commitment is low. 
Opportunism and Relationship Costs 
The cost facets of relationship dependence can be categorized as past costs to establish and build the 
relationship (i.e., relationship investments, relationship duration, and irretrievable investments), or future costs 
to end the relationship and establish another (i.e., the costs of ending the relationship, new relationship startup, 
incentives lost, and new relationship risk). These costs should have associations with firms' opportunism that 
depend on how these costs are perceived by the firms. 
Costs such time, energy, and effort voluntarily invested to establish, build and maintain a relationship, 
should be negatively associated with opportunism. Costs and investments already voluntarily incurred, espe-
cially those that would be lost or obsoleted if the relationship were ended, should be safeguarded. Thus, these 
costs and investments should decrease the likelihood of opportunism, which risks damaging or losing the 
relationship. Specifically, past relationship inputs, especially investments of time, effort, and energy, should 
make the relationship perceptually more valuable (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Frazier 1983). When they 
increase their relationship investments, especially those that would be lost or obsoleted if the relationship were 
ended, firms should magnify the risks associated with their opportunism in comparison to its rewards (Kahne-
man and Tversky 1979), and opportunism should be avoided. Thus, as firms' relationship investments, includ-
ing the duration of the relationship, and irretrievable investments increase, the likelihood of opportunism 
should decline, and (H2a): Relationship investments, relationship duration, and irretrievable investments are 
negatively associated with opportunism. 
The time, effort, money, incentives lost, and risk firms would incur to end a relationship and establish an 
alternative replacement relationship, however, should be positively associated with opportunism. These costs 
that loom in the future and are unavoidable when changing relationships should be viewed negatively because 




or discount these unavoidable costs. Costs that would be incurred in the future to end the present relationship, 
including i) money and time required to physically terminate the relationship; and ii) lost incentives provided 
by partner to continue the relationship should be discounted by increased opportunism as a balancing opera-
tion. Costs that would be incurred in the future to establish an alternative relationship, including iii) money, 
time, and effort required to start the alternative relationship, and iv) the risk of the alternative relationship 
turning out to be a poor company with which to do business, should also be discounted by increased opportun-
ism as a balancing operation. Thus, as relationship ending, new relationship startup, incentives lost, and new 
relationship risk costs perceptually increase, firms should seek to discount these costs via opportunism. 
Formally, (H2b): Relationship ending costs, new relationship startup costs, incentives lost, and new relation-
ship risk are positively associated with opportunism. 
Unexplored Antecedents of Opportunism 
Opportunism may have several unexpected antecedents. Authors have proposed there are several possible 
responses to relationship problems (actions or inactions by the partner firm that violate relational norms-- see 
Kaufmann and Stern 1988) besides leaving the relationship or exiting (Hirschman 1970, Ping 1993). Hirsch-
man (1970) argued that when relationship problems first occur in a (committed) relationship, individuals react 
first with loyalty rather than simply exiting the relationship. He proposed this loyalty is characterized first by 
loyal behavior (remaining silent when there were relationship problems, with confidence that things will get 
better). If these problems persist, then they use voice (constructive attempts by the subject firm to change 
objectionable relationship conditions) is used, or they exit the relationship. 
Loyal Behavior  Loyal behaving subjects are silent when there are relationship problems because they are 
confident that things will get better (Hirschman 1970). This loyal behavior is characterized by an absence of 
complaint (Hirschman 1970), the belief that the relationship partner will remedy problems, and that there is no 
need for the loyal behaving subject to take action when there are relationship problems. Thus when relationship 
problems occur, loyal behaving firms should be disinclined to engage in actions designed to re-balance their 
rewards and costs in the relationship because the relationship partner will soon remedy the situation. Thus, as 
their loyal behavior increases, firms should be increasingly less likely to engage in opportunism, and (H3): 




Voice Vocal subjects, however, make constructive attempts to change objectionable relationship conditions 
(Hirschman 1970). This suggests that voice and opportunism behaviors should be unlikely to be emitted jointly 
because they are dissonant (see Festinger 1954). Voice is aimed at relationship repair, while opportunism, if 
discovered, risks ruining the relationship. Thus, vocal firms should be unlikely to engage in opportunism, and 
(H4): Voice is negatively associated with opportunism. 
  These hypothesized relationships are summarized in Figure 1. 
 A Study 
Conceptual and Operational Definitions 
Relationship Commitment Interfirm relationship commitment was conceptualized above as an implicit or 
explicit pledge of relationship continuity arising from wanting to stay in a relationship. Recalling that commit-
ment has been argued to be indicated by wanting to stay in a relationship because of satisfaction, affective 
attachment, a moral belief that one ought to stay in the relationship, and a contribution to one's identity 
provided by the relationship, interfirm relationship commitment was operationalized as overall satisfaction with 
the relationship, and affective attachment to it. The facets of interfirm relationship commitment related to 
relationship commitment arising from a moral belief that a firm should remain in the relationship or the 
relationship's contribution to a firm's identity were not operationalized in the preset study because focus groups 
with a convenient sample of firms from the study population strongly suggested that moral beliefs and contri-
bution to identity were unlikely to be a basis for relationship commitment in many interfirm relationships. 
Affective attachment was argued to be shown by the acceptance of organizational values a willingness to 
exert effort on behalf of the organization, and the desire to remain in the organization. Because interfirm 
relationships are more likely to develop norms and expectations (Macneil 1980) than to simply accept existing 
organizational vales, observance of relationship norms and expectations should be more indicative of affective 
attachment than acceptance of organizational values in interfirm relationships. However, because affective 
attachment in part involves observing relationship norms and expectations, while opportunism involves 
deceitful violation of these norms and expectations, their conceptual domains overlap in the area of norms and 
expectations. As a result, interfirm affective attachment was operationalized in the present study as willingness 




norms and expectations was not operationalized to avoid a domain overlap in the area of norms and 
expectations, and any attendant distortions of their construct and discriminant validities. In addition, it avoided 
overstating the association between opportunism and relationship commitment. 
These facets of relationship commitment were operationalized using previously developed measures that 
have shown acceptable psychometric properties. The conceptual domain of overall relationship satisfaction, the 
global evaluation of relationship fulfillment (Dwyer and Oh 1987), includes the fairness of the supplier, 
whether or not they are a good company to do business with, and overall satisfaction with the relationship. It 
was operationalized using a scale developed by Ping (1993), the items of which are shown in Appendix B. 
Willingness to exert effort on behalf of the relationship was measured with an existing scale that has 
previously shown acceptable psychometric properties, minimal neglect of the relationship (whether or not the 
subject firm will allow the relationship to deteriorate). Firms that are not willing to let their exchange relation-
ship deteriorate should be willing to exert effort on behalf of the relationship to keep it from deteriorating. The 
conceptual domain of willingness to exert effort on behalf of the relationship/minimal neglect of the relation-
ship includes the degree of caring about the relationship, the willingness to expend effort to maintain or 
improve the relationship, and whether or not the subject firm will let the relationship deteriorate (Rusbult, 
Zembrodt and Gunn 1982). Minimal neglect was measured using a scale developed by Ping (1993). The items 
for this and the other  study measures are shown in Appendix B. 
Similarly, the desire to remain in the relationship was measured using an existing measure that has 
previously exhibited acceptable psychometric properties, minimal exiting propensity: whether or not subject 
firm desires to continue the current relationship. Its conceptual domain includes not intending to engage in, or 
not engaging in, the activities associated with ending a relationship: thinking of ending the relationship and 
considering a replacement relationship, looking for a replacement relationship, and the intention to end the 
relationship. Minimal exiting propensity was measured using a scale developed by Ping (1993). 
Relationship Dependence Relationship dependence as was conceptualized above as the magnitude of mobil-
ity barriers between the present relationship and a replacement relationship. It was argued to be characterized 
by many irretrievable investments in the relationship (i.e., that would be lost if the relationship ended), unat-




culty of ending the relationship, many inputs to the relationship; and awareness of the costs and difficulty of 
establishing a replacement relationship, incentives provided by partner to continue the relationship that would 
be lost, the perceived cost to establish a replacement relationship, and the risk that the replacement relationship 
would turn out to be a poor company with which to do business. We operationalized these facets of relation-
ship dependence with the unattractiveness of the best alternative replacement relationship, the magnitude of 
inputs to the relationship and the investments in the relationship that would be lost if it were ended, the lon-
gevity of the relationship, and the costs and the difficulty of ending the relationship and starting a replacement 
relationship. The facet of interfirm relationship dependence involving social pressure was not operationalized 
in the preset study because focus groups with a convenient sample of firms from the study population strongly 
suggested that social pressure was not a basis for relationship dependency in many interfirm relationships. 
Relationship ending cost, the firms costs to end the current relationship, was measured using a new scale 
which is shown in Appendix B. Its conceptual domain includes the perceived magnitude of the anticipated 
costs to cancel the relationship, including time, money, and customer goodwill. Its measure development was 
guided by the switching cost literature (e.g., Porter 1980) and depth interviews with hardware retailers, and it 
involved a jury of academic experts to judge the resulting items using the above conceptual definition. 
The measure for new relationship startup cost, the time, money, and effort involved in preparing to use the 
alternative supplier, was also guided by the switching cost literature and depth interviews, and it utilized item 
judging by knowledgeable academic colleagues. The domain of new relationship startup cost includes the 
perceived magnitude of the costs of negotiating with the alternative supplier, changing displays, and setting up 
and getting ready to use the alternative supplier. 
The measures for incentives lost, the current suppliers inducements to continue the relationship that 
would be lost if the relationship were ended, and new relationship risk, the risk that the alternative supplier 
would turn out to be a poor company with which to do business, were also new measures and were developed 
as just described. The conceptual domain of incentives lost included the perceived magnitude of the incentives, 
inducements, and rewards for continuing the relationship that would be lost or forfeited in switching to the 




risk that the alternative supplier would not perform consistently with expectations, the perceived magnitude of 
the risks of poor service and performance, and the perceived magnitude of the risk of being a poor company 
with which to do business. 
Relationship investments, the costs the firm has incurred to build and maintain the relationship (Lund 
1985), was operationalized as the perceived time, effort and energy that have been invested to build and main-
tain the relationship. Irretrievable investments, the relationship investments that would be lost if the relation-
ship were ended, was operationalized as the perceived uniqueness of the relationship investments, and the per-
ception of how much of the investment in the relationship would be lost by changing primary suppliers. These 
constructs were measured with modifications of scales developed by Ping (1993) that were item judged as 
described earlier. 
Alternative unattractiveness, the perceived overall satisfaction available in an alternative replacement 
relationship, was operationalized as the overall fulfillment, or lack of it, available from the best alternative 
supplier in comparison to the existing relationship (Rusbult 1980). Its domain includes the perception of 
whether or not the alternative would be a good company to do business with; its fairness, products, services, 
and policies; and the anticipated overall satisfaction with the alternative supplier. 
Loyal behavior, abiding relationship problems in silence with confidence that things will get better 
(Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982), was operationalized as intending not to say anything to the partner firm 
about relationship problems; intending to overlook, ignore, or disregard relationship problems; and the belief 
that relationship problems will fix themselves. Voice, constructive attempts by the subject firm to change 
objectionable relationship conditions (Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982), was operationalized as intending to 
discuss relationship problems with the partner firm, intending to suggest changes in the relationship when there 
are problems, and intending to work with the partner firm to solve mutual problems. Both constructs were 
measured using measures developed by Ping (1993). 
Opportunism, self interest seeking with guile (Williamson 1975), was measured using the Dwyer and Oh 
(1987) opportunism measure. It was operationalized as intending to distort information, intending to fail to 
fulfill promises, and intending to shirking obligations (John 1984). 




using a single open-ended question (see Appendix B). 
As Figure 1 and the preceding discussion imply, relationship commitment was specified as a second order 
construct in the present study. It's indicators were the first-order constructs overall relationship satisfaction, 
minimal neglect, and minimal exiting propensity. 
While interfirm relationship dependence could also be specified as a second order construct, as implied by 
the hypotheses we elected instead to specify its first order constructs as directly associated with opportunism 
for several reasons, including that it allows the estimation of the path coefficients between these variables and 
opportunism (which is not possible using a second order construct).  
Sampling The study population was hardware retailers. They form long-term relationships with a single 
primary wholesaler for most of their merchandise.5 The key informant was the store owner, manager, or execu-
tive. Depth interviews conducted prior to the study suggested they were quite knowledgeable of the primary 
wholesaler relationship. These interviews also suggested their sentiments and perceptions were mirrored by 
other informants in the firms. 
Sampling involved systematic random (n-th name) selections of 600 pretest store names and 800 final-test 
names (with one key informant per store). 
Pretest The pretest responses (199) were used to evaluate the measures. They were unidimensional using 
maximum likelihood exploratory factor analysis, except for opportunism which was multidimensional. Relia-
bilities for these measures, including the F1 factor for opportunism (items 3-8) were above .80. They were 
judged to be valid (i.e., they were item judged to be content valid; they were correlated with the other study 
variables in plausible directions, suggesting their construct validity; their average extracted variances (AVE's) 
were above .50, which suggested convergent validity, and their AVE's were greater than the squared correla-
tions with the other study variables, suggesting discriminant validity (see Fornell and Larker 1981)). 
To utilize structural equation analysis, the model-to-data fit for each measure is investigated (see Anderson 
and Gerbing 1988, Jöreskog 1993), and items are dropped in inconsistent scales until measurement model fit is 
attained. However, authors have criticized dropping items from psychometrically acceptable (i.e., unidimen-
sional, valid and reliable) measures to attain model fit on the grounds that it impairs content validity (e.g., 




measures are typically bloated specific (operationally narrow) instances of the target construct. 
It is well known that fit improves by dropping items from a measure. Stated differently, fit declines as 
items are added to a measure, and Bagozzi and Baumgartner (1994) observed that it is practically impossible to 
obtain model-to-data fit in a measure with more than 6 items using survey data. Thus, itemizing a latent 
variable with each of its individual indicators may be inappropriate for a unidimensional measure with more 
than 6 items in structural equation analysis. 
Kenny (1979) may have been aware of these difficulties. He suggested that instead of specifying a latent 
variable with each of its individual indicators, a single indicator that was the sum of these indicators could be 
used, as Likert (1932) suggested. Variations of this procedure have been used elsewhere in the social sciences 
for established (long) multi-item measures (e.g., Heise and Smith-Lovin 1982; James, Mulaik and Brett 1982; 
and Williams and Hazer 1986), but the procedure is generally unfamiliar to researchers in Marketing. This 
suggestion has several merits (e.g., it permits the use of larger measures in structural equation analysis; it 
reduces the size of the input covariance matrix (ICM), which results in more cases per ICM element, and thus 
it reduces the asymptotic incorrectness of the ICM; and it produces more nearly continuous indicators that 
better approximate the assumptions underlying structural equation analysis), and the present research uses this 
summed specification for the latent variables in the Figure 1 model (see Appendix A for details).6 
Except for irretrievable investments, single construct measurement models for the measures did not ade-
quately fit the data (Dwyer and Oh 1987, John 1984, and Ping 1993 reported similar difficulties with these 
measures). In the sad process of fitting successive measurement models to determine which items to drop from 
measures that were nevertheless unidimensional using maximum likelihood exploratory (common) factor 
analysis (ML EFA), we were unable to determine how much lack of fit was due to the number of items in a 
measure and how much was due to actual inconsistency in the items. In addition, dropping items to attain 
model-data fit produced submeasures that were judged to be less rich, to completely unacceptable, on a domain 
sampling, and thus a content validity basis, when compared with the full measures. As a result, because the full 
measures were unidimensional using ML EFA (except for opportunism), they were retained for the final test. 
Final-Test Two hundred ninety-seven responses were usable from the final-test mailing after two postcard 




As before, single construct measurement models for the scales did not adequately fit the data. In addition, 
we continued to be unable to determine how much lack of fit was due to inconsistency and how much was due 
to the number of items in each measure. As in the pretest, dropping items to improve fit produced conceptually 
narrow to unacceptable submeasures based on the full measures' domain sampling. Since the full measures 
were unidimensional (except for opportunism) using ML EFA, they were summed to estimate the Figure 1 
structural equation model. 
The eight-item opportunism measure was not unidimensional in the pre- and the final-test (Dwyer and Oh 
1987 reported similar problems). Items 3-8 in Appendix B were unidimensional in the final test using ML EFA 
but their single construct measurement model (see Jöreskog 1993) did not adequately fit the data. As before, 
we were unable to determine how much lack of fit was due to inconsistency and how much was due to the 
number of items. Because submeasures that did fit the data were judged to be less content valid than the items 
3-8 measure, we also summed items 3-8 for opportunism in the final test. 
Relationship commitment, specified as a second order construct with its first order constructs satisfaction, 
minimal neglect, and minimal exiting, was judged to fit the data using ordered similarity coefficients7 (see 
Anderson and Gerbing 1982) (also see Bagozzi 1981 for a discussion of second-order constructs). However, 
there is no guidance for specifying a second-order construct when it is also involved in an interaction. Primarily 
to simplify the specification of the interaction, the second-order construct relationship commitment was 
specified with a single summed indicator that was the sum of the three summed indicators for satisfaction, 
minimum neglect, and minimum exiting propensity to estimate the structural coefficients in the Figure 1 model 
(see Bagozzi and Hetherton 1994 for a discussion of this approach). 
The interaction between relationship commitment and alternative unattractiveness was specified using a 
single product indicator as Ping (1995) suggested (see Figure 1). 
Reliability and Validity The measures had reliabilities ranging from .81 to .97 (see Table 2). They were judged 
to be content valid (see Appendix B). In addition, each construct was significantly correlated with other 
constructs in plausible directions, which suggested the construct validity of the study measures (see Table 2). 
The average variance extracted (AVE) for each measure were above .50 which suggested their convergent 




square of the correlation between them, which suggested their discriminant validity (Fornell and Larker 1981).8 
Measurement and Structural Models The measurement and structural models for Figure 1 were estimated 
using covariances, LISREL 8, and maximum likelihood, and the results are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Because 
the measurement and structural models for Figure 1 had latent variables each with a single indicator and were 
saturated, they each fit the data perfectly. 
 Results 
More than half of the variance in opportunism was explained (see Table 1). The hypothesized relationship 
commitment and alternative unattractiveness interaction was significant. However, opportunism's associations 
with the relationship costs were checkered. Opportunism was positively associated with two of the future costs 
(relationship ending cost and incentives lost), but it was not associated with relationship investments, irretriev-
able investments, new relationship startup cost, risks, or relationship duration. In addition, opportunism's 
associations with loyal behavior and voice were positive instead of negative. These unanticipated results will 
require considerable discussion and interpretation, which begin in the next section. 
Estimating the interaction between relationship commitment and alternative unattractiveness required 
specifying relationship commitment and alternative unattractiveness in the structural model. However, because 
they were not hypothesized to be directly associated with opportunism, their opportunism path coefficients 
were constrained to equal zero in estimating the Figure 1 model. This in turn assumed these associations were 
zero in the population model of Figure 1. To probe this assumption, the Figure 1 model was re-estimated with 
the opportunism path coefficients from RCOM and ALTU not constrained to equal zero. The alternative 
unattractiveness-opportunism path was not significant, but the relationship commitment-opportunism path was, 
and these two associations are also shown in Table 1. 
 Discussion 
The Structure of Relationship Commitment and Relationship Dependency Commitment in an interfirm 
relationship was argued to be characterized by relationship commitment and relationship dependency. Each of 
these concepts was argued to have facets that are themselves concepts. This research specified relationship 
commitment as a second-order construct, which was judged to be psychometrically adequate (i.e., unidimen-




cation of the RCxALTU interaction. However, RCOM's second-order specification fitting the data suggests 
that one operationalization or structure of relationship commitment may be as a second order construct com-
posed of satisfaction, willingness to exert effort on behalf of the relationship, and desire to remain in the 
relationship. In different words, these concepts appear to work together (i.e., are consistent) to create relation-
ship commitment in the present context. 
The structure of relationship dependence was unspecified in the Figure 1 model so that associations with 
opportunism could be observed. However, relationship dependence was multidimensional in the pre- and final 
tests using maximum likelihood exploratory (common) factor analysis and the indicators (constructs) ALTU, 
INV, IRINV, START, END, INCENT, RISK, YRS. Nevertheless, a second order construct composed of the 
costs (INV, IRINV, START, END, INCENT and RISK) was unidimensional, had reliability of .85, and had an 
average variance extracted of .51. This (second order) construct COST produced a positive association with 
opportunism (βCOST = .14, t = 2.21) in a respecification of Figure 1 that combined INV, IRINV, START, END, 
INCENT and RISK into the second order variable COST. This suggests that relationship dependency may be a 
complex construct in this context that is characterized by alternative unattractiveness, COST, and relationship 
duration. In different words, its facets did not vary together in the present study (i.e., they were inconsistent as 
a second order construct). 
Costs and Opportunism Opportunism was positively associated with two of the interfirm relationship mobility 
barriers proposed by this research, the cost to end the relationship and the incentives that would be lost in 
ending the relationship, and COST was positively associated with opportunism . These results suggest the 
study firms may have compensated for these costs using the balancing mechanism of opportunism. Together 
this suggests relationship costs increased opportunism in the present study, but not by much. The association 
between opportunism and COST was weak when compared to relationship commitment (RCOM) and alterna-
tive unattractiveness (ALTU) (see Tables 1 and 3). In addition, because they were not significantly associated 
with opportunism in the present study, the importance of irretrievable investments, new relationship startup 
cost and risks, relationship investments, and relationship duration may not matter when it comes to opportun-
ism (i.e., at best their effect on opportunism may depend upon the study context). 




opportunism should be low when relationship commitment (RCOM) and alternative unattractiveness (ALTU) 
are high, and relationship ending cost (END) and incentives lost (INCENT) are low. Indeed as shown in 
Column 2 of Table 3, opportunism was lowest when relationship commitment, and alternative unattractiveness 
were above their study averages, and relationship ending cost and incentives lost were below average. How-
ever, because of the interaction between relationship commitment and alternative unattractiveness, the opposite 
was not true. Opportunism was highest when relationship commitment was below average, but alternative 
unattractiveness were above average, and relationship ending cost and incentives lost were below average (see 
Column 2 of Table 3). 
Increased relationship commitment was linked with decreased opportunism for all levels of alternative 
attractiveness in the study except when alternative attractiveness was at its minimum (see Columns 5 and 8 of 
Table 4). Similarly, reduced alternative unattractiveness was likely to be accompanied by reduced opportunism 
when relationship commitment was lower (see Columns 1 and 4 of Table 4). These results suggest that 
opportunism in the study firms was likely to be increased by lack of relationship commitment (see Column 8 of 
Table 4), and aggravated by high alternative unattractiveness (see the bottom of Columns 4 in Table 4). 
Having said that, this research also suggests that relationship quality may not always hold opportunism at 
bay. The relationship quality variable relationship commitment was negatively associated with opportunism 
only when alternative unattractiveness was not extremely low (see Column 8 of Table 4). When alternative 
unattractiveness was extremely low, the relationship quality variable relationship commitment had no associa-
tion with opportunism (see Column 8 of Table 4) 
The interaction between relationship commitment and alternative unattractiveness makes it difficult to say 
with precision which had the greater effect on opportunism in the study, relationship commitment or variables 
that characterize relationship dependence. Nevertheless, the Table 1 standardized coefficient of RCOM is 
much larger than ALTU; but based on Column 8 of Table 4 ALTU should not be ignored. Together relation-
ship commitment and alternative unattractiveness explained 34% of the variance in opportunism while the 
other variables that characterize relationship dependency explained 7%. Thus, relationship commitment and 
alternative unattractiveness may jointly matter when it comes to holding interfirm opportunism at bay, but 




Previous Inconsistent Results The interaction between relationship commitment and alternative unattrac-
tiveness may explain the inconsistent reported opportunism associations between satisfaction and alternatives. 
In the present study when alternative unattractiveness was higher, relationship commitment, and by implica-
tion, satisfaction, was negatively associated with opportunism as John (1984) observed (see Columns 5 and 8 
of Table 4). However, when alternative unattractiveness was low this association was non significant as Ping 
(1993) observed (see the bottom of Column 8 in Table 4). Thus, an explanation for the inconsistent associa-
tions between opportunism and variables related to satisfaction is that alternative unattractiveness may have 
been high in John's (1984) study, while it may have been low in Ping's (1993) study. 
Similarly, when relationship commitment was very high in the present study, alternative unattractiveness 
may have been negatively associated with opportunism as Ping (1993) observed (see the top of Columns 1 and 
4 of Table 4). When relationship commitment was near the study average, alternative unattractiveness was not 
associated with opportunism as Provan and Skinner (1989) observed (see Columns 1 and 4 of Table 4). Thus, 
an explanation for the inconsistent associations between alternative attractiveness and opportunism is satisfac-
tion may have been very high in Ping's (1993) study but lower in Provan and Skinner's (1989) study. 
Voice Loyal Behavior and Opportunism The above discussion of variable relationships across studies suggests 
an interaction (or quadratic) might be responsible for an unanticipated association between two variables (also 
see Ping 1998 for a summary of arguments for post hoc probing associations using interactions and quadratics). 
Thus, to probe the unexpectedly positive voice and loyal behavior associations with opportunism, an interac-
tion between relationship commitment and voice (RCxVOI in Table 1), and a quadratic in loyal behavior (LxL 
in Table 1) were added to the Figure 1 model, to see if nonlinearity in these associations was responsible for 
the unexpected results. The results were significant, and the coefficients are shown in Table 1. 
The voice interaction with relationship commitment suggests the voice association with opportunism was 
dependent on the level of relationship commitment in the study. The voice opportunism association was 
positive for most levels of relationship commitment, except for very high relationship commitment, where the 
opportunism-voice association was negative as hypothesized. This hints that voice may also have been a type 
of balancing mechanism in the study context, when relationship commitment was very high, but that it is 




The significant quadratic in loyal behavior suggested the opportunism-loyal behavior association was also 
variable. This association was positive across most of the levels of existing loyal behavior, except when 
existing loyal behavior was very high, where small changes in loyalty were negatively associated with oppor-
tunism. This suggests that most of the retailers in the study that were silent when there were problems in the 
relationship were also likely to have been opportunistic. Together with the voice-opportunism association these 
results suggest that for all but the most committed retailers in the study context increases in silence or voice 
when there were relationship problems were likely to also be accompanied by opportunistic behavior. In turn 
this suggests that neither voice not loyal behavior can be used to detect the possibility of opportunism in the 
study context, and a prudent channel manager is left with maximizing relationship commitment and alternative 
unattractiveness as the most likely strategy for dealing with opportunism in this context. In addition, because 
on average, relationship commitment had the larger association with opportunism, and because alternative 
unattractiveness and relationship commitment were positively correlated in the study (see Table 2), it may be 
sufficient for the prudent channel manager in this context to maximize relationship commitment. 
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 Appendix A- Summed Indicators and Structural Equation Analysis 
 
Kenny (1979) suggested an approach that uses reliabilities to determine the loading and measurement 
error of an indicator that is the sum of items in structural equation analysis. Variations of this approach have 
been used in the social sciences with established measures that have many items and larger models (e.g., Heise 
and Smith-Lovin 1982; James, Mulaik and Brett 1982; and Williams and Hazer 1986), but the procedure is 
generally unfamiliar to researchers in Marketing. This approach has several merits. When averaged, a summed 
indicator produces more nearly continuous observed data which reduces the (unknown amount of) bias that 
attends the much criticized use of structural equation analysis with ordinal data (such as that produced by 
rating scales) (see Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996:239). Summed indicators substantially reduce the size of the 
input covariance matrix, and thus its asymptotic incorrectness for a given sample size. In different words, this 
enables the proper use of the smaller samples typical in marketing studies (e.g., 200-300) with larger structural 
models by improving the ratio of the sample size to the size of the covariance matrix (at 5 items per latent 
variable, the Figure 1 model would have required over 2500 completed questionnaires to produce at least one 
case per input covariance matrix element). The use of summed indicators eliminates interpretational confound-
ing by separating measurement issues from model structure in structural equation models (see Anderson and 
Gerbing 1988 for a consistency-based approach to separating measurement from model structure).9 Thus, for 
unsaturated structural models, lack of fit in a summed indicator model unambiguously suggests structural 
model misspecification, rather than a combination of measurement model difficulties and structural model 
misspecification. On the negative side, summed indicators are non traditional and not particularly elegant in 
structural equation analysis. It is assumed that indicators must be tau equivalent to be summed (however, 
Bagozzi and Heatherton's (1994) results suggest that structural equation analysis used with reliable measures 
and survey data is robust to violations of the assumption that items be tau equivalent before summing them); 
and it is believed that reliability underestimates the loading of the summed item when the factor analytic 
loadings of the individual items vary widely in size (however, for unidimensional measures with reliabilities of 
.70 or above and survey data, individual loadings typically vary only a few points). 
The present research used summed (then averaged) indicators to specify the Figure 1 model in order to 
avoid omitting items from unidimensional measures and thus to preserve their content or face validity; to 
produce at least 2 cases per input covariance element and thus reduce the asymptotic incorrectness of the input 
covariance matrix; and to provide more nearly continuous indicators that better approximate the assumptions 
underlying structural equation analysis. 
Authors have defined the reliability of an indicator as the square of the coefficient on the path between 
the indicator and its latent variable (see Bollen 1989). Thus, the loading of an indicator is the square root of its 
reliability. It is also well known that the measurement error variance, θX, of an indicator X is given by 
θX = Var(X)(1 - ρX) , 
where Var(X) is the variance of X and ρX is the latent variable reliability of X.10 
Anderson and Gerbing (1988) pointed out that for unidimensional measures there is little practical 
difference between coefficient alpha (α) and latent variable reliability ρ. 
Thus, for a single indicator specification of an unobserved construct, its loading is estimated by the 
square root of its coefficient alpha reliability, and its measurement error variance is estimated by Var(X)(1 - 




 Appendix B- Final Test Measures 
ALTERNATIVE UNATTRACTIVENESS (ALTU) (All items were reverse coded) 
 1. All in all, the alternative wholesaler would be ______ fair than/as the current wholesaler is. 
a. Much more  b. Slightly more  c. As  d. Slightly less  e. Much less 
 2.  Overall, the alternative wholesaler's policies would benefit my company than/as the current wholesaler's policies. 
a. Much more  b. Slightly more  c. As much  d. Slightly less  e. Much less 
 3. I would be _____ satisfied with the product and service available from the alternative wholesaler than/as the 
product and service provided by the current wholesaler. 
a. Much more  b. Slightly more  c. As  d. Slightly less  e. Much less 
 4. In general, I would be _____ satisfied with the alternative wholesaler than/as I am with the current wholesaler.  a. 
Much more   b. Slightly more  c. As  d. Slightly less  e. Much less 
 5. Overall, the alternative wholesaler would be a/an _____ company to do business with than/as the current 
wholesaler. a. Much better  b. Slightly better  c. As good a  d. Slightly worse 
e. Much worse 
INCENTIVES LOST (INCENT) 
 1. Switching to the alternative wholesaler would mean I would lose the current wholesalers rewards for continuing 
the relationship. 
 2. There are many current wholesaler provided incentives to continue the relationship that I would lose in switching 
to the alternative wholesaler. 
 3. The company would forfeit the current wholesalers inducements to continue a relationship if I changed to the 
alternative wholesaler. 
 4. Changing to the alternative wholesaler would mean that I would lose the incentives the current wholesaler 
provides for continuing the relationship. 
 5. If the company changed to be alternative there are many rewards that the current wholesaler 
provides to continue the relationship that would be lost. 
IRRETRIEVABLE INVESTMENTS (IRINV) 
 1. The companys investment in the current wholesaler relationship is unique to the relationship. 
 2.  A lot of our investment in the current wholesaler relationship would be lost by changing primary wholesalers. 
 3. All things considered, the company would lose a lot of our investment by changing primary wholesalers. 
 4. Much of my investment with the current wholesaler is unique to the relationship. 
 5. Overall, I would lose a lot of our investment if I changed primary wholesalers. 
LOYAL BEHAVIOR (LOY) 
 1. I will not say anything to my primary wholesaler about mutual problems because they seem to go away by 
themselves. 
 2. I disregard problems with my primary wholesaler because they just seem to work themselves out. 
 3. Problems with my primary wholesaler will often fix themselves. 
 4. Sometimes I ignore problems with my primary wholesaler. 
 5. I often overlook problems with my primary wholesaler because they frequently fix themselves. 
MINIMAL EXITING PROPENSITY (MINEXP) (All items were reverse coded) 
  1. Occasionally I will think about ending the business relationship with my primary wholesaler. 
  2. I am not likely to continue the business relationship with my primary wholesaler. 
  3. I will probably consider a replacement primary wholesaler in the near future. 
  4. I am looking at replacement wholesalers. 
  5. I will consider a replacement wholesaler soon. 
  6. I will probably stop doing business with my primary wholesaler in the near future. 
 MINIMAL NEGLECT (MINNEG) (All items were reverse coded) 
 1. I won't plan to do anything to improve relations with my primary wholesaler and will expect things will become 
worse. 
 2. At times I care very little about what happens to my primary wholesaler as long as I get what I need from them.  
 3. I have quit caring about my primary wholesaler and will let conditions get worse and worse. 
 4. I will passively let the relationship with my primary wholesaler slowly deteriorate. 
 5. If things are not right with my primary wholesaler I sometimes consider letting the 
relationship die a slow death.  
NEW RELATIONSHIP RISK (RISK) 
 1. In switching to the alternative wholesaler there would be a risk of their poor service. 
 2. There would be a lot of risk to the company to in switching to the alternative wholesaler. 




 Appendix B- Final Test Measures in Alphabetical Order (Continued) 
 4. There is a chance that the alternative wholesaler would turn out to be a poor company to do business with. 
 5. I am not certain that the alternative wholesaler would perform consistently with my 
expectations. 
NEW RELATIONSHIP STARTUP COST (START) 
 1. If I changed primary wholesaler I would spend a lot of effort converting the store to use alternative wholesaler. 
 2. Changing primary wholesalers would require changing many displays. 
 3. The costs of getting ready to use the alternative wholesaler would probably be high. 
 4. I would probably have to spend a lot of time and money to negotiate an agreement with the alternative wholesaler. 
 5. If we changed primary wholesalers we would have to change a lot of our displays. 
 6. The amount of time, money and effort required to set up for the alternative wholesaler may be considerable. 
 7. If we changed primary wholesalers there would be many costs involved in getting ready to 
use them. 
OPPORTUNISM (OPP) 
*1. I will not volunteer much information regarding my business to my primary wholesaler. 
*2. There will be some things I will do only if my primary wholesaler checks up and insists on it. 
 3. At times I may have to overstate my difficulties in order to get primary wholesaler assistances. 
 4. Sometimes, I will have to alter the facts slightly in order to get what I need from my primary wholesaler. 
 5. I may purposefully exaggerate the sales opportunities in my market in order to get additional allowances or 
assistance from my primary wholesaler. 
 6. Occasionally I may shrink certain contractual obligations to my primary wholesaler when I see profit 
opportunities from doing so. 
 7. I may neglect my program responsibilities when my primary wholesaler is not likely to notice 
my noncompliance. 
 8. I may slightly exaggerate the extent of my problems to get what I need from my primary wholesaler. 
* Omitted for Figure 1 model estimation because items 1-8 were multidimensional (items 3-8 composed F1). 
OVERALL RELATIONSHIP SATISFACTION (SAT) 
 1. All in all, my primary wholesaler is very fair with me. 
 2. Overall, my primary wholesaler is a good company to do business with. 
 3. In general am pretty satisfied with my relationship with my primary wholesaler. 
 4. Overall, my primary wholesaler treats me very fairly. 
 5. All in all, my relationship with my primary wholesaler is very satisfactory. 
RELATIONSHIP DURATION (YRS) 
1. How many years have you done business with your primary wholesaler? _________ 
RELATIONSHIP ENDING COST (END) 
 1. Canceling the current wholesaler relationship would involve considerable expense. 
 2. Terminating the current wholesaler relationship would probably cost the company time, money and customer 
goodwill. 
 3. My costs to stop doing business with the current wholesaler would probably be high. 
 4. I would probably lose a lot of goodwill in terminating the current wholesaler relationship. 
 5. The costs involved in exiting the current wholesaler relationship would probably be 
considerable. 
RELATIONSHIP INVESTMENTS (INV) 
 1. Overall I have invested a lot in the relationship with the current wholesaler. 
 2. A lot of energy, time and effort have gone into building and maintaining the relationship with the current 
wholesaler. 
 3. All things considered the company has put a lot into the relationship with the current wholesaler. 
 4. I have put a considerable amount of time, effort and energy into building the relationship with the current 
wholesaler. 
 5.  All things considered the company has invested a lot in the relationship with the current wholesaler. 
VOICE (VOI) 
 1. Occasionally I will suggest changes to my primary wholesaler if there is a mutual problem. 
 2. If there are problems with my primary wholesaler I will work jointly with them to help improve the situation. 
 3. I will work with my primary wholesaler to correct any mutual problems. 
 4. I will try to discuss any primary wholesaler related problems with them. 




 Figure 1- Structural Modela 
                                      
a  The signs on the paths connecting the variables are both the hypothesized and observed associations, unless 
otherwise indicated by parentheses. NS denotes Not Significant. V indicates the association was nonlinear and 
thus it was variable. RCOM, ALTU, etc. (see Appendix B) were specified each with a single averaged 
indicator except for INV, IRINV, and VOI which were specified with multiple indicators. All exogenous 
variables were intercorrelated, and the measurement errors (εs) were uncorrelated. 
b rc:au = [(SAT+MINNEG+MINEXP)/3][(a1+a2+a3+a4+a5)/5], where a's are the indicators of ALTU (see 
Appendix B). λrc:au = ρRCOM1/2ρALTU1/2 and θεrc:au = ρRCOMVar(RCOM) θεALTU + ρALTUVar(ALTU)θεRCOM + 
θεRCOMθεALTU , where ρ denotes reliability, θ denotes variance of an error term, and Var() is the variance of . 
c  Including RCOM and ALTU (see Appendix B) in the model is required in order to estimate the loading and 
error variance of RCxALTU. Because RCOM and ALTU were not hypothesized to be directly associated with 
OPP, their paths to OPP were initially constrained to be zero. 
d RCOM was specified as a second order construct (see p. 12). 
 
 
                         Table 1 - Standardized Structural Model Resultsa                   
 
OPPb =  -.98 RCOM -.32 RCxALTU + .16 ALTU - .04 INV -.20 IRINV + .03 START + .28 END 
            (-4.72)          (-2.51)                  (1.22)          (-.33)      (-1.20)           (0.21)             (2.09)      (t-value) 
 
           + .25 INCENT - .02 RISK + .39 LOY -.18 LxL + .22 VOI - .20 RCxVOI + .001 YRS + ζ (= .15) 
             (2.98)              (-.17)          (3.99)       (-2.18)       (2.10)     (-2.39)               (0.02)                (5.07) 
 
OPP 
Squared Multiple Correlation:       .591 
 
                                      
a Final Figure 1 model using maximum likelihood and LISREL 8. 





































                       Table 2 - Measurement Model Resultsa                       
 
Latent Variable Covariances and Correlations:b  
                                      
a  Maximum likelihood using LISREL 8. 
b  Covariances on and below the diagonal, correlations above. 





 Table 3- Percentages of Study Firms Reporting They Intended to Be Opportunistic  
 
END and INCENT     END and INCENT 
below the              below the       
study average:       study average: 
 
                            ALTU                                                        ALTU       
                        Lowa   Higha                                               Lowa   Higha 
 
            Lowa    50%b    
63%
                                   Lowa    54%    
 61%
  
RCOM                                                      RCOM  
            Higha   40%     
20%
                                    Higha  35%    
 25%
   
 
          (1)        (2)                             (3)       (4)    (Column Number) 
 
                                      
a Below or above the study average for the variable. 
b The table is read as follows: 50% of the firms with low (below average) ALTU and RCOM were 
neutral, agreed, or strongly agreed they intended to be opportunistic, 63% of the firms with high 
(above average) ALTU and low RCOM reported the same thing, etc. 
LATENT VARIABLE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Reliab. AVE
1 ALTU .65 .25 .22 .28 .41 .72 -.44 .33 .39 .16 -.01 .16 -.04 -.01 -.33 .60 .49 .62 .93 .69
2 START .19 .90 .75 .36 .37 .23 -.03 .56 .76 .02 -.03 .19 .09 .07 -.03 .18 .20 .17 .93 .65
3 END .16 .64 .81 .38 .44 .19 .07 .56 .77 .04 -.04 .18 .09 .07 .03 .16 .15 .16 .90 .65
4 INCENT .19 .29 .29 .72 .27 .30 -.02 .46 .48 -.03 -.09 .14 -.01 -.02 .00 .28 .22 .22 .92 .68
5 RISK .30 .32 .36 .21 .83 .24 -.10 .36 .61 .01 .04 .13 -.04 .05 -.05 .20 .23 .17 .93 .72
6 RCOM .35 .13 .10 .15 .13 .36 -.59 .42 .30 .14 -.04 .40 -.02 .10 -.56 .94 .95 .99 .81 .62
7 RCxAU -.25 -.02 .04 -.01 -.06 -.25 .51 .03 -.01 -.10 -.10 -.01 -.03 .23 .12 -.50 -.38 -.52 .86 .72
8 INV .20 .40 .38 .29 .24 .19 .01 .55 .62 .12 .02 .32 .20 .09 -.23 .41 .34 .28 .92 .65
9 IRINV .30 .70 .67 .40 .54 .17 -.01 .45 .94 .09 .10 .20 .11 .08 -.06 .28 .22 .21 .95 .79
10 YRS 1.59 .27 .46 -.30 .14 1.05 -.85 1.12 1.02 148.24 .08 .01 .03 -.01 -.07 .10 .12 .12 --- ---
11 LOY -.01 -.02 -.03 -.05 .02 -.02 -.05 .01 .07 .68 .51 -.38 .44 -.16 .27 .00 -.14 .01 .86 .57
12 VOI .05 .07 .06 .04 .05 .09 .00 .09 .07 .04 -.10 .15 -.06 .46 -.33 .32 .43 .23 .91 .62
13 LXL -.03 .07 .07 -.01 -.03 -.01 -.02 .12 .09 .34 .26 -.02 .69 .00 -.01 -.04 .06 -.05 .87 .74
14 RCxVOI .00 .02 .01 .00 .01 .01 .04 .01 .02 -.02 -.03 .04 .00 .05 -.34 .00 .10 .12 .89 .61
15 OPP -.16 -.02 .01 .00 -.03 -.21 .05 -.10 -.04 -.53 .12 -.08 .00 -.05 .37 -.29 -.59 -.48 .88 .57
16 SAT .31 .11 .09 .15 .12 .36 -.23 .19 .18 .78 .00 .08 -.02 .00 -.11 .41 .54 .68 .94 .70
17 MINNEG .23 .11 .08 .11 .13 .34 -.16 .15 .13 .90 -.06 .10 .03 .01 -.22 .21 .36 .70 .92 .63
18 MINEXP .44 .15 .12 .17 .13 .55 -.33 .18 .18 1.30 .01 .08 -.04 .03 -.26 .38 .37 .78 .97 .76









 Table 4- Unstandardized Opportunism (OPP) Associations with Relationship Commitment (RCOM) 
 and Alternative Unattractiveness (ALTU) 
 
 
          ALTU-OPP Association                RCOM-OPP Association   
           Moderated by RCOMa                     Moderated by ALTUe         
                  SE of                                            SE of   
                  ALTU    ALTU                            RCOM   RCOM              
    RCOM   Coef-     Coef-        t-       ALTU   Coef-     Coef-        t-      
     Levelb   ficientc   ficientd    value    Levelf  ficient g  ficienth   value    
       5 -0.15 0.12 -1.23         5 -1.41       0.35      -4.02  
     4.01i 0.12 0.10  1.22         4 -1.14       0.26      -4.46  
        4  0.12 0.10  1.25      3.49i -1.00       0.21      -4.73  
        3  0.40 0.17  2.37         3 -.86       0.18      -4.93 
        2  0.68 0.27  2.53         2 -.59       0.14      -4.13 
     1.29 0.87 0.34  2.56         1       -.31       0.18      -1.69  
      (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)        (5)         (6)         (7)          (8)      (Column Number) 
 
                                      
a The table displays the variable association of RCOM and ALTU with opportunism OPP. When the existing level of 
RCOM was low in column 1, small changes in ALTU were positively associated with OPP (see column 2). At higher 
levels of RCOM however, ALTU was less strongly associated with OPP, until for RCOM higher than 3, the association 
was nonsignificant as Provan and Skinner (1989) reported (see column 4). When RCOM was very high, ALTU was 
negatively associated with OPP as Ping (1993) reported (although in the present study this association was not 
significant for very high RCOM). 
b  The value of RCOM ranged from 1.29 (= low relationship commitment) to 5 in the study. 
c  The coefficient of ALTU is determined by (.121-.276RCOM)ALTU with RCOM mean centered. E.g., when RCOM = 
1.29 the coefficient of ALTU is .121-.276*(1.29 - 4.01) = .87. 
d  The Standard Error of the ALTU coefficient is given by 
     ______________________         _____________________________________________________ 
    Var(bALTU+bRCxALTURCOM)  =  Var(bALTU) + RCOM2Var(bRCxALTU) + 2RCOMCov(bALTU,bRCxALTU). 
 
e The table displays the observed joint association of RCOM and ALTU with OPP. When ALTU was low in column 5, 
the RCOM association with OPP was not significant as Ping's (1993) satisfaction-opportunism association would imply 
(see column 8). However as ALTU increased, RCOM's association with OPP strengthened, until it was negatively 
associated with OPP as John's (1984) results suggested. 
f  The value of ALTU ranged from 1 (= low alternative unattractiveness) to 5 in the study.  
g  The unstandardized coefficient of RCOM is determined by (-.996-.276ALTU)RCOM with ALTU 
     mean centered. E.g., when ALTU = 1 the coefficient of RCOM is -.996-.276*(1-3.49) = -.31. 
h  The Standard Error of the RCOM coefficient is given by 
     ______________________         ____________________________________________________ 
    Var(bRCOM+bRCxALTUALTU)  =  Var(bRCOM) + ALTU2Var(bRCxALTU) + 2ALTUCov(bRCOM,bRCxALTU), 
 
    where Var and Cov denote variance and covariance, and b denotes unstandardized structural 
    coefficient. 








1. The term opportunism has multiple meanings, even in the economic literature. In the present paper opportunism is 
used to signify covert self interest seeking at the expense of the relationship. Examples include distorting or 
withholding important information from the relationship partner firm, reinterpreting implicit or explicit contract 
provisions in the opportunistic firm's favor, or shirking important interfirm relationship obligations (Anderson and 
Weitz 1986). Other examples include misrepresenting information and intentions to the relationship partner firm, and 
over-stating unfavorable market conditions to the partner firm (see Anderson 1988). Thus it is important at the micro 
or individual relationship level because it raises economic and social costs in the interfirm exchange relationship. 
2. Johnson (1982) argued the appearance of commitment is shown by having to stay in a relationship because of what 
he termed structural commitment. In the present research we will use the term structural commitment for Johnson's 
relationship dependence because use of the term commitment in this context seems inappropriate.  
3. Specifically, a firm's opportunism is argued to be likely to increase with partner firm's declining alternative 
relationships and increasing transaction- or relationship-specific investments. 
4. Other interfirm studies have involved opportunism peripherally. Ping (1993) investigated opportunism as one of 
five responses to relationship dissatisfaction. Other such interfirm studies include Dwyer and Oh (1987), and 
Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer (1995). 
5. The average duration of the relationship between retailers and their primary wholesalers in the sample was 13.4 
years, with a standard deviation of 12.3 years. Nearly twenty percent of these firms had done business with their 
primary wholesaler for twenty years or more. 
6. Curiously, a Figure 1 model estimated using (unsummed) consistent submeasures identified by dropping items 
from the Appendix B measures produced results that were interpretationally equivalent to those shown in the tables. 
7. Because satisfaction minimum neglect and minimum exiting were specified with a single summed indicator each, 
the second order measurement model was exactly identified and thus fit the data perfectly. 
8. The squared correlations for the indicators of RCOM (i.e., SAT, MINNEG and MINEXP) exceeded the Average 
Variance Extracted for RCOM (see Table 2). While this suggests these variables were indistinct from RCOM, this is 
actually desirable for indicators (i.e., SAT, MINNEG and MINEXP) of a construct (i.e., RCOM). 
9.  Intrepretational confounding in structural equation models was defined as the effect of model structure upon the 
measurement of model constructs, and thus its effect on the empirical meaning of the constructs in a model (see Burt 
1976 and Bagozzi 1980). It can also be viewed as an effect of measurement on the coefficient estimates in a 
structural model-- changes in itemization can produce changes in coefficient estimates (see Anderson and Gerbing 
1988). 
10.  Latent variable reliability ρX of the latent variable X with n indicators xi is given by 
           2XVar(X)
          X =      --------------------         2XVar(X) + X
 
where ΛX = λx1 + λx2 + ... + λxn, θX = Var(εx1) + Var(εx2) + ... + Var(εxn), and Var(X) is the dissattenuated or 











































Robert A. Ping, Jr. 
Associate Professor of Marketing 
College of Business Administration 
Wright State University 
Dayton, OH 45435 





 This research suggests there is more to learn about salesperson organizational commitment. It 
proposes novel antecedents and consequences of organizational commitment. The empirical results shed 
additional light on the nature of organizational commitment in salespersons. The paper concludes with 
implications that may of interest to sales managers. 
 
 
 Organizational commitment has been studied extensively both in the personal selling literature 
and in the employee relations literature (see Brown and Peterson 1993, and Ko, Price and Mueller 1997). 
It has recently been the subject of renewed interest. One result has been its reconceptualization as an 
aspect of relationship commitment which is composed of affective commitment or attachment to the 
employment relationship (i.e., liking the relationship and wanting to remain in it), normative commitment 
to the relationship (i.e., remaining in it because one ought to), and structural commitment (e.g., remaining 
in the relationship because there is no alternative, etc.) (see Allen and Mayer 1990). This research focuses 
on affective commitment, termed affective organizational commitment or simply organizational 
commitment in this research to be consistent with its historic label (e.g., Porter, Steers, Mowday and 
Boulian 1974), but the research will return to relationship commitment (i.e., organizational or affective 
commitment, plus structural commitment, etc.) in the Results and Discussion section. 
 Affective organizational commitment is believed to have the relationship quality antecedent 
"overall satisfaction with the relationship." This empirical results of this research reveal the linkage 
between these two variables is more complex than previous research has suggested. The present research 
proposes that organizational commitment also has the uninvestigated relationship quality antecedents 
procedural justice (fair treatment regarding policies and procedures) and goal congruency (shared goals 
and objectives). 
 Organizational commitment has been strongly associated with the consequent employee behavior 
exiting. This research suggests that it also has the uninvestigated consequents employee perceptions of the 
attractiveness of alternative relationships, and employee voice (constructive attempts to change 
objectionable relationship conditions). The balance of the paper describes a test of these proposed 
 2 
relationships using a nationwide survey of salespersons and Kenny’s (1979) procedure for structural 
equation analysis, and it concludes with a discussion of the implications of this research. 
Hypotheses 
Satisfaction, Organizational Commitment and Exiting Consistent with previous conceptual and 
empirical research, overall relationship satisfaction should be positively associated with organizational 
commitment for salespersons, and organizational commitment should be negatively associated with 
exiting (see Brown and Peterson 1993 for a summary). 
 Although salesperson satisfaction has been observed to be negatively associated with exiting 
when organizational commitment is not measured (e.g., Netemeyer, Johnson and Burton 1990), based on 
Williams and Hazer’s 1986 and other’s studies (e.g., Davy, Kinicki and Scheck 1991) the satisfaction-
exiting association should be mediated by organizational commitment, and thus satisfaction should not be 
directly associated with exiting when organizational commitment is measured (however see Sager 1994). 
This is consistent with Rosse and Miller’s (1984) arguments that dissatisfied employees first withdraw 
emotionally before they withdraw physically. 
Goal Congruence Salespersons’ perceptions that they and their firm have similar goals and 
objectives, or congruent goals, should be positively associated with organizational commitment. Agency 
theory predicts that principals (e.g., firms) and agents (e.g., salespersons) should have divergent goals 
(e.g., the firm maximizes profit while the salesperson maximizes personal income) (see Eisenhardt 1985). 
To the extent the organization’s goals and objectives approximate those of the individual (e.g., via profit 
sharing), the individual should be attracted to the organization (Byrne 1969). Over time, sharing similar 
goals and objectives should be rewarding to the individual. These rewards should strengthen the 
individual’s identification with the organization, and they should increase an individual’s efforts to 
maintain and build the relationship, which captures Mowday, Steers and Porter’s (1979) definition of 
organizational commitment (p. 226). 
 Satisfaction should be positively associated with goal congruence. As overall satisfaction with 
the relationship increases, the relationship should become more attractive and an individual should be 
more likely to conform to the goals and objectives of the group (Festinger 1954). 
Procedural Justice Procedural justice, the overall evaluation of company policy and procedure 
fairness, their enactment, and treatment of employees, should be positively associated with organizational 
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commitment for the same reasons as goal congruence: Procedural justice is rewarding and these rewards 
should strengthen identification with the organization, including its goals and objectives. 
 Procedural justice should also be positively associated with goal congruence for the same 
reasons as satisfaction: procedural justice should make the relationship more attractive and an individual 
should be more likely to conform to the goals and objectives of the group. 
Alternative Attractiveness Alternative attractiveness should be negatively associated with 
organizational commitment. While it seems plausible that unattractive alternative employment 
relationships would increase affective organizational commitment, Rusbult and Buunk (1993) argue that 
the linkage between these two variables works in reverse: They argue affective relationship commitment 
actually decreases the attractiveness of alternative relationships, through a process they term discounting, 
which reduces cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957). 
 Consistent with previous conceptual and empirical research, alternative attractiveness should be 
negatively associated with exiting (e.g., Ko, Price and Mueller 1997). Further, switching cost should be 
negatively associated with alternative attractiveness because increased switching cost makes the 
alternative relationship more costly to attain, and thus makes it is less attractive. 
Voice Organizational commitment should be positively associated with voice, constructive attempts to 
change objectionable relationship conditions. As organizational commitment increases, the relationship 
becomes more valuable, and when the inevitable relationship problems occur, the individual should be 
more likely to take positive action to remedy the situation (see Hirschman 1970). 
 Previous conceptual and empirical research suggests that switching cost should be negatively 
associated with exiting (see Ping 1993). 
 These hypothesized relationships are summarized in Figure 1. 
Method 
Measures versus Model Fit  When using structural equation analysis, it is customary to delete items 
from measures specified as unidimensional to attain or improve measurement model-to-data fit. This 
separates measurement from structure in the structural model and thereby minimizes interpretational 
confounding (Burt 1976) (see Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Further, many substantive researchers appear 
to believe that multi-item measures that are unidimensional in exploratory factor analysis are 
psychometrically unacceptable if they do not fit the data in a confirmatory factor model. There are even 
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suggested procedures that increase the efficiency and effectiveness of this activity (e.g., Anderson and 
Gerbing 1982:454, Jöreskog 1993, Kano and Ihara 1994, and Ping 1998; see Dwyer and Oh 1987, 
Gerbing and Anderson 1988, and Kumar and Dillon 1987). 
 Nevertheless, authors have warned against deleting items to attain model-to-data fit in a 
unidimensionally specified measurement model (e.g., Cattell 1973, 1978). The resulting measure may no 
longer adequately sample the domain of the target construct (e.g., Cattell 1973 noted the items in such 
scales are often trivial restatements of each other, and termed the narrow content of these items “bloated 
specific.”  
 It is well known that lack of fit in measurement and structural models may be an artifact of the 
comparatively large sample sizes required in structural equation analysis (see Hoelter 1983). Lack of fit in 
structural equation analysis also may be an artifact of many constructs in a structural models (see 
Anderson and Gerbing 1984). Lack of fit in measurement models may be an artifact of having more than 
6 items in a measure (rather than an indication of lack of unidimensionality in the Anderson and Gerbing 
1988 sense-- see Bagozzi and Heatherton 1994:43; also see Anderson and Gerbing 1984). Thus for 
measures that are unidimensional in an exploratory (common) factor analysis, deleting items to attain 
confirmatory model-to-data fit may not be more desirable than using the full measure, especially an older 
well-established measure developed before structural equation analysis became popular.  
 Fortunately, there is an alternative to deleting items to be able to use structural equation analysis. 
Kenny (1979) suggested a structural equation analysis procedure that rigidly separates measurement from 
structure without the potential for measurement model fit limiting the number of items in a measure. His 
procedure uses reliability to specify the loading,  (i.e.,  = , where  denotes reliability), and the 
measurement error variance, , (i.e.,  = Variance(X)(1 - ) of a single summed indicator of a 
unidimensional construct X. Variations of this procedure have been used elsewhere in the social sciences 
(see for example Heise and Smith-Lovin 1982; James, Mulaik and Brett 1982; and Williams and Hazer 
1986), but the procedure is unfamiliar to marketers. Thus, this research breaks with convention by arguing 
that unidimensional scales should not always have items deleted at the expense of content validity simply 
to improve model-data fit when Kenny (1979) has provided a reasonable alternative. 
Measures Satisfaction, the global evaluation of relationship fulfillment, was initially measured 
using several scales (one due to Bagozzi 1980a, and one adapted from a measure developed by Ping 
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1993). Based on results from pretests using scenario analysis the Ping 1993 measure was selected for the 
final test (see Table 4 for an example item).i ii While this measure was unidimensional using exploratory 
(common) factor analysis and the final test data, its single construct measurement model did not fit the 
data acceptably because the measure had 8 items (2/df/p-value = 104/20/0, GFI = .82, AGFI = .69, CFI 
= .92, and RMSEA = .17). The customary approach of deleting items to obtain acceptable model-to-data 
fit required removing three items. However, the resulting 5-item measure was judged to be substantially 
less content valid than the full eight item measure. As a result, the full 8 item Satisfaction measure and the 
above Kenny procedure were used to estimate the Figure 1 model. 
 Procedural justice, the overall evaluation of company policy and procedure fairness, their 
enactment, and treatment of employees, was measured using a scale developed for this research. Measure 
development was guided by the procedural justice literature (e.g., Tyler and Bies 1990). It was developed 
using focus groups of salespersons and a jury of academic experts to judge the resulting items using the 
conceptual definition, and resulted in thirty-eight items. Subsequently, scenario analyses suggested that 
the 38-item measure was multidimensional, and items were omitted using exploratory maximum 
likelihood common factor analysis (EML-CFA) to produce a unidimensional final-test measure 
containing eighteen items. With the final-test data the procedural justice measure was unidimensional 
using EML-CFA, but because the measure contained eighteen items confirmatory model fit was 
impossible. The largest subset of items that did fit the data omitted 13 items and produced a measure that 
was judged to no longer content valid. Thus, the full eighteen item Procedural Justice measure was used 
with the Kenny (1979) procedure to estimate the Figure 1 model. 
 Other study measures required item deletion to attain model fit, but the submeasures that fit the 
data were judged less content valid than the original full measures. As a result, other study measures 
utilized the Kenny procedure to estimate Figure 1. 
 For example, goal congruency, the perception that the company and salespeople have the same 
goals and objectives, was measured using a scale developed by Anderson (1988). While unidimensional 
using EML-CFA, it did not fit the data in a single construct measurement model, and the full measure was 
used. 
 Organizational commitment, an individual’s organizational identification and involvement, was 
measured using a scale developed by Mowday, Steers and Porter (1979). It was multidimensional using 
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EML-CFA in the final test.iii However, because it is an established measure and we wished to preserve its 
content validity, it was specified as a second-order construct in Figure 1 as Gerbing, Hamilton and 
Freeman (1994:574) suggested. 
 Measures for alternative attractiveness, the global evaluation of the relationship fulfillment avail-
able in the best available alternative relationship, switching cost, the cost to change employers, and voice, 
constructive attempts to change objectionable relationship conditions, were adapted from measures 
developed by Ping (1993). These measures were unidimensional using EML-CFA and the final test data. 
 Exiting was measured as exit propensity, the disinclination to continue the current relationship, 
and was initially measured using two scales, one due to Bluedorn (1982), and another adapted from a 
measure developed by Ping (1993). Based on pretest results only the second measure was unidimensional 
using EML-CFA and it was included in the final test were it was also unidimensional using EML-CFA.iv 
 Example items for these measures are shown in Table 4. 
Sampling 
 The study population was U.S. salespersons who represent a single firm which employs them 
(i.e., excluding independent agents and brokers). The sampling frame was the circulation list of a major 
sales publication, and sampling involved n-th name selections of 100 pretest salesperson names and 
addresses, then 900 final test names and addresses. The pre- and final test mailings included a cover letter 
assuring respondent anonymity, and a $2 bill as a response incentive, and the final test mailing was 
followed by two follow-up postcard mailings, a remailing of the questionnaire, and two more postcard 
follow-ups. 
Pretesting 
 As discussed earlier, the final test mailing was preceded by several scenario analyses that were 
used to preliminarily validate the measures (see Footnote 1). These were followed by a pretest mailing 
that was used primarily to gauge the response rate, and secondarily to further assess the psychometric 
properties of the measures. Minor changes were made to the letter, and questionnaire instructions and 
format, between the pre- and final test mailings. 
Final Test 
 Two hundred eighty-four responses were usable from the final-test mailing (32% usable response 
rate). These responses were used to determine the representativeness of the responses, and to reexamine 
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the psychometric properties of the measures. Based on a comparison of the demographics of the responses 
and published salespersons’ demographics, the set of responses were judged to be representative of the 
study population. 
Reliability and Validity 
 As discussed earlier, the measures were unidimensional in the final test except for organizational 
commitment, which produced three dimensions. The items in each factor were averaged to produce three 
indicators of the second order construct organizational commitment. To conserve degrees of freedom 
these three indicators were then averaged to produce a single indicator of organizational commitment to 
estimate the Figure 1 model. 
 The reliabilities of the study variables were above .88 which suggests the study measures were 
reliable (see Table 3). 
 Each measure was judged to be content valid, and each latent variable was correlated with the 
other latent variables in theoretically plausible directions (see Table 3), which suggests the construct 
validity of these measures. In addition, they each had an Average Variance Extracted (AVE) (Fornell and 
Larker 1981) above .5 which suggests their discriminant validity (see Table 3).vwhere i is the loading 
of the indicator xi on its Latent Variable X, Var is variance, ei is the measurement error of xi, and 
 indicates a sum. For unidimensional X, i
2 is approximated by the sum of squares of the 
loadings in a Maximum Likelihood exploratory common factor analysis (i.e., the sum of the 
communalities or the eigenvalue of the items). Var(X) can be set to one, and Var(ei) is 
approximated by n - i
2. Substituting these estimates into the above equation, AVE is 
approximately the explained variance of the items in a Maximum Likelihood exploratory 
common factor analysis. Further, with two exceptions, each measure’s squared correlation with the 
other study variables was less than the AVE’s of both variables involved in the correlation, which 
suggests their discriminant validity (see Fornell and Larker 1981 and Table 3). However, Satisfaction 
(SAT) and Procedural Justice (PJUST) had AVE’s that were less than the squared correlation between 
them (see Table 3). This suggests that they each had more variance in common (i.e., their squared 
correlation) than either had in error-free variance (i.e., their AVE). This in turn suggests a lack of 
discriminant validity between SAT and PJUST. Stated differently, SAT was empirically indistinct from 
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PJUST in the study. Similarly, SAT was indistinct from Organizational Commitment in the study.vi 
Nevertheless, this did not prevent estimation of the Figure 1 measurement and structural models. 
Measurement and Structural Models 
 The measurement and structural models corresponding to Figure 1, were estimated using 
covariances, LISREL 8, and maximum likelihood; and the results are shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3.vii 
 The fixed values for loadings and measurement errors of the single summed indicators suggested 
by Kenny (1979) in the measurement and structural models were specified using reliabilities. Because a 
single indicator construct is under determined, estimates of its loading and measurement error variance 
are required. Authors have defined the reliability of an indicator as the square of the correlation between 
the indicator and its construct (i.e., its loading) (see Bollen 1989). Thus the loading of a construct 
specified with a single indicator is , where  is the latent variable reliability of the measure. However, 
for unidimensional constructs there is little practical difference between coefficient alpha () and the 
latent variable reliability  (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). It is well known that the measurement error 
variance of an indicator x is Var(x)(1-), where Var(x) is the variance of x. Thus the loading and 
measurement error of a unidimensional measure X specified with a single indicator, are  and Var(X)(1-
) respectively. 
 The structural model for Figure 1 was judged to fit the data using several popular fit criteria, such 
as Comparative Fit Index (CFI) (Bentler 1990) and Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) (Steiger 1990, see Jöreskog 1993).viii ix 
  Results and Discussion 
 The study hypotheses were supported, except Procedural Justice (PJUST) was not directly 
associated with affective organizational commitment (ORGCOM) (see Table 1). Based on the Table 2 
total effects (i.e., direct- plus indirect effects) implied by the paths in Figure 1, the hypothesized 
relationships were also supported except PJUST was not associated with ORGCOM. 
 In probing the Figure 1 model, the direct path between Satisfaction (SAT) and Exiting 
(EXITING) was non significant when it was freed (ORGCOM, PJUST = .15, t = .75). This is consistent with 
other satisfaction-organizational commitment-exiting studies, and together such results add to the growing 
evidence that there may be no direct relationship between satisfaction and exiting.x 
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 The significant negative direct and total effects of ORGCOM on Alternative Attractiveness 
(ALT) in the study, and the non significant direct and total effects in the other direction, suggest that 
salesperson alternative attractiveness was likely to be increased by declining affective organizational 
commitment as Rusbult and Buunk (1993) predicted, but that increased alternative attractiveness was not 
likely to have an effect on affective organizational commitment.xi While generalizing from a single study 
is risky, this suggests that salespersons are likely to devalue alternatives as their affective organizational 
commitment increases. Unfortunately however, this also means that as affective organizational 
commitment declines for salespersons the attractiveness of their alternatives is likely to increase. 
 ORGCOM and Voice (VOICE) were positively associated in the study. Further, modification 
indices and first derivatives (not reported) suggest that the direction of the effect was from ORGCOM to 
VOICE and not from VOICE to ORGCOM in the study.xii This suggests that as salespersons became 
more affectively committed to their organizations, they were more likely to be vocal when the inevitable 
relationship problems occurred. In different words, salespersons who were not vocal were likely to be less 
affectively committed to their organizations. While the association was only moderate, this is consistent 
with Napoleon’s statement that his only fear was the silence of his army. 
 ORGCOM was negatively associated with EXITING in the study. Based on modification indices 
and first derivatives (not reported), it is likely that the direction of this effect was from ORGCOM to 
EXITING and not from EXITING to ORGCOM.xiii However in this case it is not necessarily true that not 
exiting implies affective commitment. Based on the significant positive association between ALT and 
EXITING, unattractive alternatives may also hold exiting at bay. In fact, this is the central argument that 
Allen and Meyer 1990, among others (see Levinger 1979), appear to make regarding relationship 
commitment: individuals stay in (i.e., appear to be committed to) a relationship either because they want 
to (i.e., relationship quality is high) or because they have to (e.g., the alternatives are not attractive, etc.). 
 The relationship between PJUST and ORGCOM has not been tested to our knowledge. Possible 
explanations for the observed lack of association between the two variables in salespersons include too 
small a sample (the indirect PJUST-GOALCON-ORGCOM effect approached significance-- 
IndirectORGCOM,PJUST-GOALCON = .08, t = 1.85), invalidity in procedural justice (or organizational 
commitment) (which the final test psychometrics seemed to rule out), and lack of variance (however, 
Var(PJUST) = .73, VAR(ORGCOM) = 1.21, which compare favorably to the variances of the other 
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variables that ranged from .34 to 1.41). Other possibilities include that salespersons in the sample simply 
were not likely to be sensitive to procedural justice when forming or modifying their organizational 
commitment, or that SAT accounted for most the PJUST-ORGCOM variance because PJUST was 
empirically indistinct from SAT. 
 To test this last possibility, items were omitted from SAT to increase its AVE and thereby make it 
distinct from PJUST and ORGCOM. While the correlations of SAT with PJUST and ORGCOM 
remained high (rSAT,PJUST = .83, rSAT,ORGCOM = .84) and the content validity of SAT was degraded, the 
resulting PJUST-ORGCOM indirect and total effects were significant (IndirectORGCOM,PJUST-GOALCON = .22, t 
= 3.33; TotalORGCOM,PJUST-GOALCON = .27, t = 2.61), but the direct effect was not (ORGCOM,PJUST = .04, t = 
.45). Thus SAT may have accounted for most the PJUST-ORGCOM variance. 
 These results have several implications. First, the significant PJUST-GOALCON-ORGCOM 
association and the nonsignificant PJUST-ORGCOM association suggest the procedural justice 
relationship with affective organizational commitment is mediated by goal congruence for salespersons: 
procedural justice is likely to increase affective commitment by first increasing goal congruence, rather 
than directly. 
 The historically high observed correlations between satisfaction and affective organizational 
commitment when coupled with the difficulty measuring satisfaction so that it was empirically distinct 
from affective organizational commitment in the present study (and possibly other studies-- AVE’s and 
discriminant validity are not routinely reported) suggest they may be quite similar as mental constructs, 
and there may be little practical difference between the two. Thus, it may be pointless to continue to try to 
distinguish between satisfaction and affective commitment. 
 Similarly,  procedural justice and goal congruency were quite empirically similar to each other, 
and they were quite similar to satisfaction and affective commitment in the present study (see Table 3). 
These strong empirical similarities suggest these variables may be facets of a higher order construct, 
Relationship Quality (RQ), as Allen and Meyer (1990) seem to imply. For example, SAT, PJUST, 
GOALCON, and ORGCOM were respecified in the present study as a second order construct that fit the 
data (2/df/p-value = 2.6/2/.27, GFI = .99, AGFI = .95, CFI = .99, and RMSEA = .04). In addition, they 
were all about equally correlated with RQ (rRQ,ORGCOM [= StandardizedRQ,ORGCOM2] = .57, rRQ,SAT = .58, 
rRQ,GOALCON = .52, rRQ,PJUST = .63). Thus an alternative Figure 1 model would specify satisfaction, 
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procedural justice, goal congruency, and affective organizational commitment as first-order “indicators” 
of the second-order construct RQ. 
 However, Allen and Meyer’s (1990) arguments that relationship commitment is composed of 
affective commitment, normative commitment, and structural commitment suggest there may be another 
Figure 1 model that involves a higher order construct Relationship Commitment (RC) and is composed of 
Relationship Quality and Structural Commitment variables such as alternative attractiveness and 
switching cost. Indeed respecifying Figure 1 by combining SAT, PJUST, GOALCON, ORGCOM, ALT 
and SWITCH into a second order construct, RC, nearly fit the data (2/df/p-value = 20/9/.01, GFI = .95, 
AGFI = .89, CFI = .97, and RMSEA = .09). Specifying RC without PJUST fit the data almost perfectly 
(2/df/p-value = 4.1/5/.52, GFI = .98, AGFI = .96, CFI = 1.00, and RMSEA = .00). The correlations of 
RC with these “indicators” were rRC,ORGCOM = .76, rRC,ALT = .39, rRC,SAT = .61, rRC,GOALCON = .42, and 
rRC,SWITCH = .13. 
 This result has several implications. In this study Relationship Commitment could be specified 
with Relationship Quality variables such as affective commitment, satisfaction, and goal congruency, plus 
Structural Commitment variables such as alternative attractiveness and switching cost, which supports 
Allen and Meyer (1990) arguments concerning the facets of person-organization commitment. Further, 
because Relationship Quality variables such as ORGCOM and SAT were the most highly correlated with 
RC, and Structural Commitment variables such as ALT and SWITCH were less so, relationship 
commitment was driven primarily by relationship quality in this context. The EXITING associations with 
ORGCOM and ALT in the original Figure 1 model suggest the same thing: the opposite of relationship 
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Table 1- Standardized Direct Effect Estimates for the Figure 1 Modela 
 
Model Fit: 2/df/p=20/13/.05, GFI=.96, AGFI=.89, CFI=.98, RMSEA=.07b 
 
                 SAT      PJUST    GOALCON        ALT     SWITCH     ORGCOM    R2 
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   --- 
      SAT       - -        - -        - -        - -        - -        - -    - - 
    PJUST       - -        - -        - -        - -        - -        - -    - - 
  GOALCON      0.435      0.404       - -        - -        - -        - -    .65 
              (3.404)c   (3.175) 
      ALT       - -        - -        - -        - -      -0.174     -0.691   .66 
                                                         (-2.694)  (-10.366) 
    VOICE       - -        - -        - -        - -        - -       0.377   .14 
              (4.499) 
  EXITING       - -        - -        - -       0.232     -0.176     -0.553   .68 
                                               (2.223)   (-2.871)   (-5.496) 
   ORGCOM      0.763     -0.123      0.210     -0.157       - -        - -    .91 
              (6.593)   (-1.255)    (2.593)   (-1.946) 
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__________ 
a The table is read from column to row. For example the direct effect of SAT on GOALCON is 
.435. 
b CFI = Comparative Fit Index (.90 or higher indicates acceptable fit), and RMSEA = Root Mean 
Squared Error of Approximation (0-.05 suggests close model-to-data fit, .051-.08 suggests 
acceptable model-to-data fit) (Steiger 1990). 
c T-value. 
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Table 2- Standardized Total Effect Estimates for the Figure 1 Modela 
 
                SAT       PJUST    GOALCON        ALT     SWITCH      
ORGCOM 
            --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   ----
---- 
      SAT       - -        - -        - -        - -        - -       
    PJUST       - -        - -        - -        - -        - -       
  GOALCON      0.435      0.404       - -        - -        - -       
              (3.404)b   (3.175)        
      ALT     -0.663      0.029     -0.163      0.122     -0.195     
-0.776 
             (-6.677)    (0.390)   (-2.557)    (1.771)   (-2.698)   
(-8.812) 
   SWITCH       - -        - -        - -        - -        - -       
    VOICE      0.361     -0.016      0.089     -0.066      0.011      
0.423 
              (4.066)   (-0.392)    (2.224)   (-1.614)    (1.404)    
(4.309) 
  EXITING     -0.685      0.030     -0.169      0.358     -0.239      -
.801 
             (-7.231)    (0.390)   (-2.581)    (3.199)   (-3.750)   
(-9.185) 
   ORGCOM      0.959     -0.042      0.236     -0.176      0.030      
0.122 
              (8.625)   (-0.390)    (2.625)   (-1.174)    (1.488)    
(1.771) 
__________ 














 SAT PJUST GOALCON ALT SWITCH VOICE EXITING  ORGCOM Reliability 
SAT  1         .956 
PJUST  0.868  1        .979 
GOALCON  0.786  0.782  1       .912 
ALT -0.696 -0.589 -0.597  1      .951 
SWITCH  0.295  0.216  0.216 -0.385  1     .895 
VOICE  0.351  0.300  0.305 -0.303  0.115  1    .967 
EXITING -0.729 -0.616 -0.624  0.745 -0.435 -0.299  1   .978 
ORGCOM  0.931  0.797  0.808 -0.804  0.304  0.377 -0.794    1  .886 
 
(Disattenuated) Squared Correlations:b  
 
AVEc --> 0.733 0.726 0.677 0.723 0.740 0.618 0.769   
0.731 
   SAT PJUST GOALCON ALT SWITCH VOICE EXITING  
ORGCOM 
0.733 SAT 1        
0.726 PJUST 0.753 1       
0.677 GOALCON 0.618 0.612 1      
0.723 ALT 0.484 0.347 0.356 1     
0.740 SWITCH 0.087 0.047 0.047 0.148 1    
0.618 VOICE 0.123 0.090 0.093 0.092 0.013 1   
0.769 EXITING 0.531 0.379 0.389 0.555 0.189 0.089 1 
0.731 ORGCOM 0.867 0.635 0.653 0.646 0.092 0.142 0.630   1 
__________ 
a From the measurement model corresponding to Figure 1. 
b An italic indicates a squared correlation that is greater than the AVE of one or both variables involved in 
the correlation. This suggests lack of discriminant validity between the two variables involved in the 
correlation (see Fornell and Larker 1981). 
c Average Variance Extracted. 
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Table 4- Example Items in the Study Measures 
 
Measurea   Example Item 
 
SAT (8 items) All in all, my relationship with my company is very satisfactory (5 point Likert scale). 
PJUST (18) The company's policies are very fair (5 point Likert scale). 
GOALCON (5) Our salespeople strongly feel that they and the company work for common goals and 
objectives (7 point rating scale- agree to disagree). 
ALT (7) In general, I would be _____ satisfied with the alternative company than/as I am with my 
company.  
  a. Much more       b. More       c. As       d. Less       e. Much less     (5 point rating scale) 
SWITCH (6) Generally speaking, the costs in time, money, effort and grief to switch employers would 
be high (5 point Likert scale). 
VOICE (9) I will cooperatively try to change things in my company to correct problems I may have 
with them (5 point Likert scale). 
EXITING (8) I will probably stop working for my company in the near future (5 point Likert scale). 
ORGCOM (15) I am extremely glad I chose this organization to work for over others I was considering at 
the time I joined (7 point Likert scale). 
 
__________ 

























a Each construct was specified with a single indicator using the Kenny (1979) procedure 
described on p. 8. The nonrecursive relationship between ALT and ORGCOM was 
specified to test the hypothesized direction of that association and the model is identified 
using a procedure suggested by Berry (1984). The signs indicate the hypothesized 
























                                                 
i Scenario analysis can be used for measure evaluation (see Ping 1996). It involves an 
experiment in which subjects, typically students, read written scenarios that ask them to 
imagine they are the subjects of an experiment, then they complete a questionnaire 
containing the study measures. The results, when compared with other research designs 
such as surveys, are reported to be similar enough (e.g., Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and 
Mainous 1988) to suggest that scenario analysis may be useful in new measure 
development and the verification of existing measures. 
ii The Bagozzi (1980a) measure exhibited low convergent validity in the pretests 
(Average Variance Extracted = .37-- see Footnote 5). It was actually included in the final 
test to compare the results with the scenario analyses, and it performed similarly (e.g., 
Average Variance Extracted = .45). 
iii While organizational commitment was unidimensional when it was proposed (i.e., in 
Mowday, Steers and Porter 1979), it has been multidimensional when used with 
salespersons (e.g., Sager 1994). 
iv In addition to being multidimensional in the pretests, the Bluedorn (1982) measure 
exhibited implausible correlations with other study measures (e.g., it was either not 
correlated or positively correlated with the satisfaction measures-- Michaels and Spector 
1982 reported similar results). 
v AVE can be estimated using estimates available in SPSS, SAS, etc. AVE is given by, 
             (i
2)Var(X) 
   AVEX  =  ---------------------------- , 
         (i
2)Var(X)+Var(ei) 
 
vi The Bagozzi (1980a) measure fared even worse. Because its AVE was so low, it was 
indistinct from JUST, GOALCON, ORGCOM, and EXITING. 
vii The Figure 1 model was identified using a procedure suggested by Berry (1984). 
viii The measurement model for Figure 1 had zero degrees of freedom and fit the data 
perfectly. 
ix Model fit using chi square, GFI and AGFI, were slightly low for the Figure 1 structural 
model (see Table 1). However, chi square, GFI and AGFI may not be adequate for fit 
assessment in larger samples or models-- see Anderson and Gerbing 1984. 
x Sager (1994) observed a direct SAT-EXITING association in the presence of 
organizational commitment. However, the study associations did not account for 
measurement error which can bias coefficient estimates in unknown directions. 
xi Such evidence should be considered as merely suggestive. Directionality can only be 
disproved by a longitudinal research design. 
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xii See Footnote 11. 
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Despite its importance in interfirm relationship maintenance, relatively little is known of exiting in 
marketing channels. In relationship marketing exiting is assumed to be the result of relationship failure, and 
research there has focused on the formation of economic exchange relationships. While authors have argued 
there are forces that attenuate exiting in these relationships, there have been surprisingly few empirical studies 
of exiting in Marketing. Moreover, channel studies investigating exiting and its predictors have produced 
mixed and counter-intuitive results. This research proposes exiting can be predicted by other relationship 
behaviors including voice, and relationship constraints, specifically satisfaction and structural constraint (the 
mobility barrier between the present and alternative relationships). The study results support these proposals, 




Much research involving firms in long-term buyer-seller relationships such as strategic alliances, just-in-
time/quick response relationships, inter-firm partnerships, joint ventures, and marketing channels, has 
concentrated on their formation (see Wilson 1995; also see Anderson and Narus 1984, 1990; Anderson and 
Weitz 1989, 1992; Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Ford 1980; Frazier 1983; Frazier and Rody 1991; Frazier, 
Spekman, ONeil 1988; Gadde and Mattsson 1987; Håkansson 1982; Hallén, Johanson and Seyed-Mohamed 
1991; Heide and John 1988, 1990, 1992; Skinner, Gassenheimer and Kelly 1992; Stern and Scheer 1991; 
Webster 1979; Weitz and Jap 1995). Less is known of the maintenance of these relationships, and relatively 
little is known of their dissolution. Perhaps as a result authors have called for research on these matters (Dwyer, 
Schurr and Oh 1987; Ping and Dwyer 1991; Ping 1993; Weitz and Jap 1995; Wilson 1995). Additional 
knowledge of the dissolution of economic exchange relationships, in particular predictors of exiting, should be 
useful to relationship managers in the maintenance of these relationships. 
Relationship Dissolution 
Relationship dissolution has received attention in several literatures. These include some that appear 
unrelated to inter-firm relationships, such as employee adaptation-to-work and romantic relationships. In the 
marketing literature for example, Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) proposed long-term buyer-seller relationships 
develop in five phases: awareness of a potential economic exchange partner, then relationship exploration, 
expansion, commitment, and dissolution. Paralleling Ducks (1982) proposal for romantic relationships, they 




evaluation), interactive (relationship discussion with the partner firm), social (public announcement), and grave 
dressing (social and psychological recovery) stages (also see Ping and Dwyer 1991). 
In the employee adaptation-to-work literature, employment relationship dissolution or employee exiting is 
argued to consist of several stages: thoughts of quitting, cost-benefit analysis of quitting, identification and 
evaluation of alternatives, intention to quit, and quitting (see Mobley 1977). While useful, this and the Dwyer, 
Schurr and Oh (1987) frameworks seem incomplete. They do not include alternatives to exiting for dissatisfied 
subjects that cannot exit the relationship (because there is no alternative relationship), or will not exit (because 
the cost is unacceptable). 
However in the economics literature, Hirschman (1970) proposed alternatives to exiting a dissatisfactory 
relationship: loyalty and voice (loyalty is remaining silent, confident things will get better, and voice is 
constructive attempts by the subject to change objectionable relationship conditions). In the romantic 
relationships literature Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982) proposed neglect as an additional alternative to 
exiting (neglect is allowing the relationship to deteriorate). Alternatives to exiting a dissatisfactory employment 
relationship that are similar to loyalty; voice and neglect have also been proposed. They include attempts to 
change undesired aspects of work, aggressive/retaliatory responses, psychological withdrawal and avoidance 
(e.g., lateness and absenteeism), and cognitive readjustment (Rosse and Miller 1984). 
Hirschman (1970:86) proposed loyalty, voice, and exit are linked. Loyalty should be followed by voice 
then exiting, with exiting also a possibility after loyalty. Similarly Rosse (1988) argued employee exiting 
should be preceded by relationship neglectful activities that include lateness and absenteeism. These proposals 
suggest relationship dissolution may have predictors that include loyalty, voice, and neglect. 
Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982) proposed that loyalty, voice, neglect, and exiting had the predictors 
relationship satisfaction, the attractiveness of the alternative relationship, and relationship investments. In the 
marketing literature Ping (1993) argued that loyalty, voice, neglect and exiting were responses to problems in 
channel relationships. He also proposed these responses to relationship problems should have as predictors the 
Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn variables, and the cost to switch to the alternative relationship. These 
associations have been tested (see for example Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers 
and Mainous 1988; Ping 1993). However, the results have been mixed and counter-intuitive (e.g., the 
associations have been inconsistently observed, and alternative attractiveness typically was positively 
associated with voice contrary to Hirschmans 1970 predictions). 




The present research investigates predictors of exiting in long-tem buyer-seller relationships between firms. 
Specifically it tests linkages among exiting operationalized as exit-propensity, and the other responses to 
relationship problems, loyalty, voice, neglect (exit-propensity is the disinclination to continue the current 
relationship).1 The proposed model (see Figure 2) also includes the Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn/Ping 
predictors of relationship problems: satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, investment, and switching cost. 
However alternative attractiveness, relationship investment, and switching cost are argued to be instances or 
indicators of a second-order construct, the cost to exit a relationship, which is linked to exiting. 
The paper begins by discussing the Hirschman/Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn responses to relationship 
problems.2 Using theory from several literatures, including some that seem unrelated to inter-firm relationships 
such as employee adaptation-to-work, the paper then proposes associations between exit-propensity and 
loyalty, voice, neglect, satisfaction, and cost-of-exit in committed buyer-seller relationships between firms. The 
results of a test of these proposals involving survey data and structural equation analysis in a marketing channel 
context is then presented. 
At first glance this topic may seem less important than other aspects of buyer-seller relationships between 
firms, such as knowledge of how and why these relationships develop. However, knowledge of responses to 
the inevitable problems in buyer-seller relationships, and their connection to relationship dissolution, should 
help firms maintain these relationships once they develop so they are likely to become long-term relationships. 
                                                 
1 We will distinguish between exit-propensity, the disinclination to continue the relationship, and exit, leaving the 
relationship. Exit-propensity involves planning to leave. It is comprised of activities that precede physically leaving such as 
thinking of exiting, intending to search for alternatives, evaluation of alternatives, and intention to exit (see Mobley 1977). Exit 
involves physically leaving. It includes activities such as breaking contract with the partner firm, contracting with an alternative 
partner firm, disposing of relationship specific assets, acquiring assets specific to the alternative relationship, etc. 
Exit-propensity and exit have been strongly and positively linked (see the literature summary in Bluedorn 1982).  In 
this paper exit is operationalized as exit-propensity because exit is a dichotomous variable, and such variables can produce 
estimation problems with structural equation analysis. Specifically, dichotomous variables require Asymptotic Distribution Free 
(ADF) estimation (see Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996), but ADF estimates may not be appropriate for methodologically small 
samples (i.e., 200-300 cases) (see Hu, Bentler and Kano 1992). 
2 Relationship problems are viewed from the subject firms perspective. They are actions or inactions by their partner 
firm that violate relational norms-- see Kaufmann and Stern (1988). 
The study contributes to several literatures, including inter-firm relationship marketing. It fills a gap in the 
responses-to-dissatisfaction literature; it proposes the Hirschman/Rusbult responses to relationship problems 
may be coping strategies, and investigates the associations among these responses in an inter-firm context. 
Authors have observed that knowledge of relationship dissolution provides closure in the relationship 




Hirschmans (1970) proposed associations among loyalty, voice and exit. In addition, it contributes new theory 
to inter-firm relationships regarding the relationship of neglect with voice and exit-propensity. The study 
contributes to the emerging relationship marketing literature (see the Fall 1995 issue of the Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science); it proposes alternative attractiveness, investment and switching cost are facets 
of a higher-order predictor of exiting, cost-of-exit. Further, it illuminates the likely role of cost-of-exit, as well 
as satisfaction, in relationship maintenance. Finally, the study provides a first empirical test in an inter-firm 
context of Hirschmans (1970) and others arguments that voice may be negatively associated with exit (see for 
example Spencer 1986, Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987). 
 Responses to Relationship Problems 
Hirschman (1970) noted economic progress is negatively correlated with societys tolerance for 
performance deterioration in firms and organizations. However he believed slack, as he defined it, the gap 
between potential and actual firm or organization performance, is generated all the time. He conceived the 
performance of firms and organizations to be permanently subject to this slack; to decline and decay, and a 
gradual loss of rationality, efficiency, and surplus producing energy, no matter how well the institutional 
framework within which the firm or organization functioned was designed. Yet he maintained declined firms 
and organizations do recover from their performance lapses; and concerned himself with these recoveries. 
In particular, Hirschman (1970) proposed dissatisfied members or clients of declined firms or 
organizations have three behavioral options available to them: remain loyal, use voice, or leave the relationship 
(exit). 
Voice 
Hirschman (1970) characterized Voice as, ...any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an 
objectionable state of affairs" (p. 30). He pointed out customer voice alerts a firm or organization to its failings. 
Hirschman (1970) observed that firm losses from customer exiting will be small for a firm with demand 
that is highly inelastic with respect to performance lapses in their product or service. As a result, a firm may not 
be made aware something is wrong with its products or services, and repair of performance lapses may not take 
place. But if this demand is highly elastic, repair of performance lapses may not take place then either, this time 
because the firm will cease to exist because of customer exiting. 
For repair to be possible, a firm's product or service elasticity of demand with respect to performance 
lapses should be neither very large nor very small. In order for a firm to be able to repair its performance 




its failings (via exit and voice). Inert (i.e., loyal) and vocal customers give it the time and dollar cushion needed 
for repair efforts to come to fruition. 
In the romantic relationships literature Rusbult, Johnson and Morrow (1986a,b) operationalized voice as 
Hirschmans (1970) original notion of alerting the relationship partner, but added the notion of compromise 
and working out relationship problems. This focused notion of voice includes constructive actions aimed at 
relationship improvement beyond alerting the partner, such as working with them to improve objectionable 
relationship conditions; and it more fully accounts for attempts to change an objectionable state of affairs" in 
committed relationships. The Rusbult, Johnson and Morrow (1986a,b) notion of voice is consistent with 
Hirschmans (1970) characterization of voice. However, it excludes other more negative operationalizations of 
voice (i.e., less relationship-maintenance oriented) such as simply complaining or negative word-of-mouth 
(Diener and Grayser 1978). Voice in this paper involves constructive (i.e., relationship maintenance oriented) 
behavior aimed at the partner firm and intended to change an objectionable state of affairs; including but not 
limited to alerting the partner firm to relationship problems. 
Loyalty 
Hirschman (1970) proposed inert customers included those who expected the efforts of others, combined 
with their own faithfulness, to be successful in improving relationship conditions. He characterized this group 
as loyal and described them as those who remain silent with confidence things will get better. He argued the 
decision to be loyal was based on: i) an evaluation of the chances of getting the firm back on track, through the 
actions of others or something that will improve matters; and ii) a judgement that it is worthwhile to trade the 
certainty or uncertainty of the alternative relationship against those chances. 
There has been some confusion in the conceptualization and operationalization of Hirschmans (1970) 
notion of loyalty. Early in his monograph he characterized loyalty as remaining silent, confident things will get 
better. However he subsequently described loyalty as simply refusing to exit, and stated his earlier depiction of 
loyalty described non-exiters who do not wish to be influential. Perhaps as a result, studies have conceptualized 
loyalty as Hirschman (1970) did, but have operationalized it variously. Some studies have operationalized 
loyalty as remaining silent, confident things will get better (e.g., Farrell 1983, Ping 1993). Other studies have 
operationalized loyalty by including items that appear to tap relationship commitment (see for example 
Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988). In this paper loyalty is conceptualized as Hirschmans (1970) 




consistent with that conceptualization. 
Neglect 
Paralleling Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982), Ping (1993) argued a firm could react to relationship 
problems by neglecting the relationship (i.e., allowing the relationship to deteriorate) as an alternative to 
exiting. He stated neglect involved not caring about the relationship, expending no effort to maintain it, and a 
willingness to let the relationship deteriorate. Ping (1993) suggested it was emotional, as opposed to physical, 
exiting. He maintained neglect was marked by impersonal, possibly reluctant, even grudging, exchanges with 
the partner firm. Ping (1993) observed neglect involved reduced contact with the partner firm (but not 
necessarily reduced economic exchanges with them); ordering in writing not over the phone, and delegating 
contacts with the partner firm to low-level staff. Rusbult and Zembrodt (1983) characterized neglect in 
romantic relationships as inattentive behavior, such as lack of caring and staying away. Farrell (1983) 
characterized employee neglect as lax and disregardful behavior, and suggested it included lateness and 
absenteeism (also see Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988). 
 Predictors of Responses to Relationship Problems 
Ping (1993) also proposed overall satisfaction with the relationship, alternative attractiveness, investment 
in the relationship, and the cost to switch relationships were predictors of exit-propensity and the other 
responses in marketing channels (also see Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982). He proposed the existence of 
two types of satisfaction in inter-firm relationships, event and overall satisfaction. He maintained that, while 
dissatisfaction with some relationship event triggers a response (e.g., loyalty, voice, neglect, or exit-propensity), 
the level of overall relationship satisfaction, along with alternative attractiveness, investment, and switching 
cost, helps determine which response will be triggered. 
Authors have noted individuals remain in a relationship because they want to, or they have to (see for 
example Hirschman 1970; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous  1988). Several authors have used the term 
structural commitment with having to remain in a relationship. They argue the dimensions of structural 
commitment or the cost to exit a relationship include available alternatives, irretrievable investments, 
termination procedures, and social pressures (see Johnson 1982, Levinger 1979). This and Pings (1993) 
proposal that alternative attractiveness, investment, and switching cost were predictors of loyalty, voice and 
neglect, suggest the cost to exit a relationship also should be a predictor of the responses to relationship 
problems, in particular exiting. 




We will propose that exit propensity has the other responses to relationship problems as predictors, along 
with satisfaction and cost-of-exit. We will also propose that the other responses are associated with each other 
(see Figure 2). 
Theoretical Foundations 
Hirschman (1970) did not provide theoretical justification for his arguments. Nevertheless, that subjects 
exhibit various responses to relationship problems has been proposed in several literatures. These include 
marketing channels (see Ping 1993), consumer behavior (see Andreasen 1985), adaptation-to-work (see 
Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous  1988), and romantic relationships (see Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 
1982). For example, Staw (1980) proposed employees initially attempt to exert control over their work 
environment. If that is impossible they attempt to make it more predictable, and if that fails, they engage in 
various psychological or physical withdrawal behaviors. 
That individuals respond to stimuli such as relationship problems is also well established in the 
psychological literature (for a summary see Berkowitz 1962). That cognitive intervention occurs between 
stimulus and response is widely held or implied in psychology and organizational behavior (for individuals), 
and micro economics (for firms) (see Machlup 1967; however, see Nagel 1963 for a dissenting view). For 
example, Rosse and Miller (1984) proposed a stimulus that produces relative dissatisfaction (i.e., 
dissatisfaction with an event or outcome as opposed to dissatisfaction with the relationship) produces an 
evaluation of alternative responses; then it produces behavior (also see French, Rogers and Cogg 1974; Ping 
and Dwyer 1991). The evaluation of response alternatives is also consistent with a cognitive orientation, 
specifically theories of choice. For example, Steiner (1980) proposed options are more desirable or less so 
depending on their (cognitively determined) expected payoffs versus their expected costs (also see Homans 
1974, Vroom 1964). 
Thus relationship problems should produce relative dissatisfaction that in turn produces a cognitive 
evaluation of alternative responses (i.e., loyalty, voice, neglect and exit), and a behavioral response (i.e., 
loyalty, voice, neglect or exit) (Rosse and Miller 1984; also see Frazier 1983). Evaluation of alternative 
responses should be influenced by the expected payoffs and costs associated with each alternative, and 
experience (Steiner 1980). Costs should include activity costs (e.g., effort), and economic, psychic and 
opportunity costs; and payoffs should include the perceived likelihood of remedying the problem. 
It is plausible Hirschmans (1970) assertions for individuals are also true for firms. It is plausible firms 




and evaluation (Frazier 1983), and a response would be observed. Specifically, it is plausible firms would 
behave as if they assess the payoffs and costs associated with the responses to relationship problems. Then they 
should either exit the inter-firm relationship, or stay and optimistically remain silent (i.e., be loyal) or attempt 
to be influential and work to change things (i.e., use voice). In the balance of the paper we will use the rational 
firm or as if assumption (see Machlup 1967 for a discussion of the as if assumption for firms), and will 
implicitly justify firm-level theory by citing individual-level theory from psychology and social psychology 
(including employees adapting to work). 
 Loyalty and Voice 
Hirschman (1970:88) proposed subjects respond to relationship problems first with loyalty, then voice, and 
finally exit; with exit also a possibility after a (possibly brief) period of loyalty. Hirschmans (1970) arguments 
are plausible for firms based on firm rationality and the expected payoffs and costs of each response. However, 
while some subjects might exit when relationship problems first occur, in committed buyer-seller relationships 
between firms it is likely when relationship problems first occur, firms would remain loyal or use voice. 
Specifically, the activity (i.e., effort), economic, psychic and opportunity costs of exiting a committed and 
satisfactory relationship should initially appear higher than the cost of a loyalty or voice response. For example, 
being in a committed and satisfactory buyer-seller relationship should reduce the attractiveness of alternative 
relationships (see Johnson and Rusbult 1989). There also may be relationship-specific investments (i.e., 
economic, activity, and opportunity costs that helped ensure future exchanges-- see Macneil 1980) which 
would be lost by exiting. Further, switching costs (i.e., economic, opportunity, activity and psychic costs to 
terminate the current relationship, and startup a new one) also may be high (see Ping 1993). 
Loyalty involves optimistically doing nothing about a relationship problem; voice involves activity and 
opportunity cost to remedy a relationship problem. Both involve the performance risk of others and/or the 
partner (i.e., the risk loyalty or voice will not remedy the problem). However in buyer-seller relationships 
between firms neither involves the costs of dismantling the current relationship and putting another in its place 
(i.e., exiting). Nor do they involve the performance risk of the alternative relationship (i.e., the risk the 
alternative relationship would be the same or worse than the incumbent relationship). Thus, when problems 
first occur in these relationships, they should produce a loyalty or a voice response, because they are less costly 
than exiting. 
However when problems first occur in these relationships, loyalty should be perceived as less costly than 




relationship problem. Voice, on the other hand, requires taking action to remedy a relationship problem 
(Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982). It involves activity and opportunity cost, and possibly economic cost. In 
addition, when problems first occur, there may be little to suggest the actions of others, including partners 
own unprompted actions, would not remedy a relationship problem. Voice may also appear costly if the subject 
is concerned that it might be ignored or resisted by partner, or partner might retaliate instead of solving the 
problem. Finally, authors have commented on firms penchant for inaction (e.g., loyalty), even when there are 
powerful incentives to take action (e.g., voice) (see Yasai-Ardekani 1986). 
If loyalty is not an effective response to problems in these relationships (i.e., problems remain 
unremedied), and the subject grows suspicious that more relationship problems will occur and loyalty will 
continue to be ineffective (i.e., it will have no payoff), the next more costly response, voice, should become 
more likely. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed the certain outcome (i.e., the efficacy of loyalty) should 
be undervalued when compared with a probabilistic outcome (i.e., the efficacy of voice). Although the cost of 
voice is higher, its probabilistic outcome or payoff (i.e., problem remedy) should appear more attractive than 
the increasingly certain outcome of loyalty (i.e., problems remain unremedied). Thus a loyalty response should 
become less likely, and a voice response should be more likely, and 
  H1: Loyalty is negatively associated with voice. 
Voice and Exit-Propensity 
Hirschman (1970:87) predicted if voice were unsuccessful, the subject would become unhappy about 
continuing the relationship, and the subject would have thoughts of exiting. It is possible that voice, 
unhappiness about continuing the relationship, and thoughts of exiting it could briefly coexist. However, it is 
more likely that constructive attempts to change objectionable relationship conditions so the subject can remain 
in the relationship (i.e., voice), and unhappiness about continuing the relationship and thoughts of exiting it are 
dissonant (Festinger 1954). Thus thoughts of exiting should extinguish constructive attempts to change 
objectionable relationship conditions (i.e., voice); or, thoughts of exiting should cease and the subject should 
continue to constructively attempt to change objectionable relationship conditions (i.e., be vocal). 
As a result, if the subjects attempts to change relationship conditions (i.e., voice) are not effective (i.e., 
problems remain un-remedied), and the subject grows suspicious that voice will continue to be ineffective (i.e., 
it will have no payoff), exit-propensity should become more likely. Although exit-propensity would be more 




(i.e., problems remain unremedied) (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). A voice response should now become less 
likely, and exit-propensity should be more likely. Consequently, 
  H2: Voice is negatively associated with exit-propensity. 
Neglect 
Staws (1980) and others arguments regarding withdrawal behaviors (see page 7) suggest neglect also 
precedes exiting. Rosse and Miller (1984), for example, argued dissatisfied employees attempt to cope with 
chronic problems (i.e., remedy their dissatisfaction) by using the least costly form of relationship withdrawal. If 
this proves unsatisfactory, progressively more costly forms of withdrawal are attempted until one is found that 
provides sufficient coping (also see Rosse and Hulin 1985). Subsequently Rosse (1988) found employee 
exiting was preceded by relationship withdrawal (i.e., coping) activities that included lateness and absenteeism 
(also see Farrell 1983). 
Operationalizing exit as exit-propensity however, it might be argued that exit-propensity should precede 
neglect, because neglect is the result of inability or unwillingness to exit a relationship. Nevertheless, it is more 
likely in committed buyer-seller relationships between firms, neglect precedes exit-propensity because it is less 
costly than exit-propensity.3 Neglect involves not maintaining the relationship, and letting it deteriorate (i.e., 
inaction). However, exit-propensity involves actions that precede leaving the relationship. This includes 
searching for and evaluating alternatives (Mobley 1977), which involves activity, opportunity, and possibly 
economic costs. In addition, firms are again likely to prefer inaction (e.g., neglect) over action (e.g., exit-
propensity) (see Yasai-Ardekani 1986). 
Thus, in committed buyer-seller relationships between firms the subject should attempt to cope with 
chronic relationship problems by neglecting the relationship before exiting it. If neglect fails to produce 
sufficient coping, the subject should also have thoughts of exiting and the other activities associated with exit-
propensity should follow. However, relationship neglect should not cease when exiting activities begin. It is 
likely that not caring about the relationship, not maintaining it, and allowing it to deteriorate (i.e., neglect) is 
not dissonant with activities that precede physically leaving the relationship (i.e., exit-propensity). 
Therefore neglect should precede exit-propensity in these relationships because it is less costly. However, 
                                                 
3 However, exit-propensity could subsequently (i.e., non-recursively or bi-directionally) affect neglect as proximity to 
physically exiting the relationship increases, or if the subject is unable to exit. These matters were investigated using a 
nonrecursive specification of the neglect-exit-propensity association in Figure 2 (see page 19) but the results were inconclusive 




neglect should continue during activities that precede physically exiting the relationship (i.e., exit-propensity) 
because neglect and exit-propensity are consonant. As a result, 
  H3: Neglect is positively associated with exit-propensity. 
In committed buyer-seller relationships between firms, neglect should intervene between voice and exit-
propensity as a stronger form of coping with chronic relationship problems than voice, that is less costly than 
exit-propensity. Neglect is a stronger form of coping with chronic relationship problems than voice because it 
involves no longer caring about the relationship, and thus is a form of (emotional) exiting. But, it is less costly 
than exit-propensity because it involves inaction. 
Farrell (1983) characterized voice as constructive and positive in its potential effects on the relationship, 
and neglect as destructive and negative. For example, voice involves constructively attempting to change 
objectionable relationship conditions, while neglect involves doing nothing to improve objectionable 
relationship conditions. Further, Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982) characterized voice as active, because it 
involves attempts to change objectionable relationship conditions. They also characterized neglect as passive 
because it involves doing nothing to improve objectionable relationship conditions. Thus, voice is likely to be 
dissonant with neglect. Attempts to change relationship conditions should extinguish not caring about the 
relationship. Or, attempts to change relationship conditions should cease; the subject should stop caring about 
the relationship, expend no more effort to maintain it, and allow it to deteriorate. 
Therefore if the subjects attempts to change relationship conditions (i.e., voice) are not effective in 
committed buyer-seller relationships between firms (i.e., problems remain unremedied), and the subject 
becomes suspicious relationship problems will continue to occur and voice will continue to be ineffective (i.e., 
it will have no payoff), the next more costly response, neglect, should become more likely. Thus as voice 
becomes less likely, neglect should become more likely, and 
  H4: Voice is negatively associated with neglect. 
Satisfaction 
Ping (1993) proposed that satisfaction was related to the responses to relationship problems, and we will 
do likewise to avoid model misspecification.4 Increased satisfaction with the relationship makes economic 
exchanges with the partner firm more valuable (Thibaut and Kelley 1959). As their satisfaction increases, firms 
                                                 
4Omitting important antecedents that may be correlated with other model antecedents creates the missing variables 
problem (see James 1980). This can bias structural coefficients, because model antecedents could then be correlated with 




should be likely to respond positively to relationship problems, help maintain the relationship, and safeguard 
future satisfaction. Thus they should also likely to avoid negative responses that might jeopardize the 
relationship. Because they are unlikely to damage the relationship, positive responses include voice and loyalty 
(Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982). Because they jeopardize the relationship, negative responses include 
neglect and exit-propensity. Therefore as relationship satisfaction increases, loyalty and voice become more 
likely, and neglect and exit-propensity become less likely. Thus, 
  H5: Overall relationship satisfaction is positively associated with loyalty and voice, and negatively 
associated with neglect and exit-propensity. 
Cost-of-Exit 
Authors have argued the facets or dimensions of structural commitment, or the cost to exit a relationship, 
include available alternatives, irretrievable investments, termination procedures, and social pressures (see 
Johnson 1982, Levinger 1979). This suggests the existence of a second-order construct, which we will term 
cost-of-exit.5 This construct should have first-order latent variable indicators" that include a) the 
attractiveness of alternative exchange relationships; b) economic, activity, and opportunity costs that might be 
lost or obsoleted by exiting the current relationship (i.e., relationship investments); and c) economic, 
opportunity, activity and psychic termination costs, and startup costs for the new relationship (e.g., switching 
cost) (see Figure 1). 
Cost-of-exit should affect the responses to relationship problems. As their cost-of-exit increases, firms 
should become more dependent on their partner firms (Emerson 1962). The perceived risk accompanying their 
responses that are relationship negative (i.e., jeopardize the relationship) also should increase because there 
may be much to lose (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Thus, as their cost-of-exit increases they should be more 
likely to respond positively to relationship problems (i.e., with loyalty or voice), and less likely to respond 
negatively (i.e., with neglect or exit-propensity). Thus 
  H6: Cost-of-exit is positively associated with loyalty and voice, and negatively associated with neglect 
and exit-propensity. 
Moderation 
                                                 
5 Jöreskog (1970) introduced a second-order construct as a latent variable with no observed variables as indicators. 
Instead, it has other latent variables for indicators," hence the term second-order." Each of the indicator latent variables 





Johnson (1982) argued that when one is no longer satisfied with a relationship, the consequences of 
structural commitment (i.e., cost-of-exit) must be faced (see Hom and Griffeth and Sellaro 1984 for a summary 
of similar arguments and supportive evidence). On the other hand, Johnson and Rusbult (1989) argued 
satisfied subjects in committed relationships devalue alternatives, a facet of cost-of-exit. Thus when 
relationship satisfaction is high in these relationships, the subject may be less aware of alternatives. In 
committed buyer-seller relationships between firms they may also be less aware of the investment that may be 
lost in switching to an alternative relationship, and the other costs involved in switching relationships. Thus 
satisfied subjects in committed relationships may devalue or be less aware of cost-of-exit. But, when 
satisfaction is lower in these relationships they may become more aware of these costs to exit the relationship. 
In addition, being loyal because of relationship satisfaction may be dissonant with being loyal because of 
high exiting costs. When satisfaction is high, cost-of-exit may be devalued (i.e., the subject is loyal because 
they want to be, not because they have to be). However when satisfaction is lower in committed buyer-seller 
relationships between firms, continued loyalty may be attributed to the cost to exit the relationship (i.e., the 
subject is loyal because they have to be). Thus, satisfaction should moderate the relationship between cost-of-
exit and loyalty in committed buyer-seller relationships between firms. Specifically, high satisfaction should 
attenuate this relationship, and it should be weaker at higher levels of satisfaction. Hence, 
  H7: Satisfaction attenuates the association between cost-of-exit and loyalty. 
These relationships are summarized in Figure 2. 
 Method 
Measurement 
Cost-of-exit To assess its psychometric properties as a second-order construct, cost-of-exit was specified using 
the indicator" latent variables alternative attractiveness (reverse coded), investment, and switching cost (see 
Figure 1). Cost-of-exit was then respecified in the full measurement and structural models corresponding to 
Figure 2 by averaging the observed indicators of each indicator" latent variable (i.e., alternative attractiveness 
(reverse coded), investment and switching cost-- see Figure 2), and using the resulting three (observed) 
indicators to itemize cost-of-exit. This approach has been used before (see for example Dwyer and Oh 1987). It 
avoids difficulties in specifying the moderation of cost-of-exit by satisfaction, which will be explained next. 
Moderation The moderation of the loyalty-cost-of-exit association by satisfaction was operationalized as the 




strength of the moderation (i.e., its coefficient size) to be assessed.6 The respecification of cost-of-exit with 
averaged indicators produced a first-order cost-of-exit latent variable. This enabled the specification of a first-
order-by-first-order interaction variable (SATxCOE).7 The SATxCOE latent variable was itemized using a 
technique provided by Ping (1995) that uses a single composite indicator. This has desirable properties in this 
application. They include reducing the nonnormality introduced in the full measurement and structural models 
corresponding to Figure 2 by the indicators of an interaction, so maximum likelihood estimation can be used 
(see Appendix A and Ping 1995 for details). 
                                                 
6 The customary latent variable interaction approach of dividing cases into high and low satisfaction groups, and then 
comparing covariance matrices or coefficients does not enable the assessment of the strength of any moderation. 
7 There is no available guidance for the specification of an interaction between a first-order latent variable and a 
second-order latent variable such as cost-of-exit as it was specified in Figure 1. 
Study Measures Satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, investment, switching cost, loyalty, voice, neglect, and 
exit-propensity were measured based on scales developed by Ping (1993). Alternative attractiveness was 
measured with five-point rating scaled items, and the other study concepts were measured with balanced five-
point Likert-scaled items.  The study concepts, a description of their conceptual domains, their 





These measures were placed on a questionnaire and mailed to a sample of U.S. hardware retailers 
(Note: hardware retailers have been studied previously in Dwyer and Oh 1988, and Ping 1993-- the data sets 
used in these studies were not used in the present study). Hardware retailing was selected because hardware 
retailers buyer-seller relationship with their primary wholesaler is typically long-term (Ping 1993), which 
suggests these are committed relationships where the full range of responses to relationship problems should be 
more likely.8 
The sampling frame was the subscription list of a widely read industry publication. It contained names and 
addresses of senior key informants such as storeowners and managers, or senior executives. Interviews with 
multiple informants in a small and convenient sample from the study population revealed that hardware 
retailers buy from a limited set of wholesalers (typically one primary wholesaler). Although Phillips (1981) has 
cautioned against using single informants in general, the senior key informants in this nonrepresentative sample 
were judged quite knowledgeable of their primary wholesaler relationship. In addition their sentiments and 
perceptions were judged to be mirrored by the other informants in the firm. 
Sampling involved systematic random (n-th name) selections of 100 pretest store names, and 600 final test 
names (with one key informant per store). The pre- and final test included a cover letter assuring informant 
anonymity, a $2 bill as a response incentive, and a business reply envelope, and were followed up by three 
postcard mailings. Minor changes to the letter, and questionnaire instructions and format (but not to the 
measures), were made between the pre- and final test mailings. 
Pretest 
The pretest responses (32) were used to assess the response rate of the survey protocol and the 
psychometric properties of the measures. Internal consistency of the study measures was gauged using these 
responses and ordered similarity coefficients (Hunter 1973) (see Gerbing and Anderson 1984b), item-to-total 
correlations, and coefficient alphas. The measures had coefficient alphas of .70 or above in the pretest. 
                                                 
8 In the present research 44% of the final test sample had done business with their primary wholesaler for 10 or more 
years. Eighteen percent of the sample had done business with their primary wholesaler for 21 years or more, 25% had done 





Two hundred twenty responses were usable from the final test mailing (a 36% usable response rate). The 
pretest responses were not combined with those from the final test because the number of pretest responses was 
too small to allow reliable statistical testing for equivalent samples. The psychometric properties of the 
measures were re-examined using the final-test responses and ordered similarity coefficients, single and 
multiple factor measurement models (Jöreskog 1993), and latent variable reliabilities. 
Reliability and Validity 
The latent variable reliabilities for satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, investment, switching cost, 
loyalty, voice, neglect and exit-propensity were above .82 (see Table 2). The latent variable reliabilities of cost-
of-exit and the interaction were lower (.700 and .707 respectively), but within acceptable limits for our 
tentative inference purposes. Each latent variable was plausibly correlated with one or more other latent 
variables (see Table 2), which suggests construct validity, and the measures were judged to be content valid. 
Most of the correlations in Table 2 were less than |.6|, which suggests discriminant validity for the latent 
variables involved. For latent variables with correlations above |.6|, single degree of freedom tests were 
performed (see Bagozzi and Phillips 1982). The results (not shown) suggested the discriminant validity of 
these latent variables (e.g., the largest p-value of the χ2 differences with df=1 for H0: |Correlation| = 1 was 
1.2E-09). 
Measurement and Structural Model Results 
The second-order measurement model for cost-of-exit (see Figure 1), and the full measurement and 
structural models corresponding to Figure 2, were estimated using covariances, LISREL, maximum likelihood, 
and an interaction estimation technique suggested by Ping (1995) (see Appendix A for details).9 The results are 
shown in Tables 2 and 3. 
                                                 
9 Maximum likelihood estimates are robust to departures from normality, and their model fit and significance statistics 
may be robust to the use of a single nonnormal interaction indicator (Ping 1995, see Appendix A). 
The Figure 1 specification of cost-of-exit as a second-order construct fit the data (not shown) (χ2 = 110/df = 
51/p = .000, GFI = .935, AGFI = .902, CFI = .975, RMSEA = .072). In addition, alternative attractiveness, 
investment and switching cost were judged sufficiently unidimensional based on their single construct 
measurement models (not shown) (e.g., χ2ALT = 2.73/df = 2/p = .25, χ2INV = 2.47/df = 2/p = .29, χ2SWC = 0.72/df = 2/p 




propensity (not shown) (e.g., CFI = .949, RMSEA = .055). As a result the indicators for each of the variables 
alternative attractiveness, investment and switching cost were averaged. Cost-of-exit was then respecified in 
the full measurement and structural models corresponding to Figure 2 as a first-order construct using these 
averaged alternative attractiveness(reverse coded), investment, and switching cost indicators. The psychometric 
equivalence of the Figures 1 and 2 specifications for cost-of-exit was investigated by respecifying cost-of-exit 
in the Figure 1 measurement model with these averaged indicators. The Figure 1 measurement model with this 
averaged specification of cost-of-exit suggested this and the original Figure 1 specification were 
psychometrically equivalent (not shown) (i.e., the measurement parameters were similar-- λaltr = 0.449, γALTR,COE 
= 0.498, λinv = 0.562, γINV,COE = 0.559, λswc = 1.000, γSWC,COE = 1.000, εaltr = 0.587, ζALT = 0.667, εinv = 0.371, ζINV = 
0.371, εswc = 0.208 ζSCT = 0.233, φFig 1 COE = 0.735, φFig 2 COE = 0.748). 
Although the GFI and AGFI values were low for the full measurement and structural models 
corresponding to Figure 2, GFI and AGFI may not be adequate for fit assessment in larger models (see 
Anderson and Gerbing 1984). The full measurement and structural models were judged to fit the data 
acceptably using other popular fit criteria (see Tables 2 and 3). For example, the Figure 2 structural model 
exhibited a Comparative Fit Index (Bentler 1990) of .933 (.90 or better suggests acceptable model-to-data fit-- 
see McClelland and Judd 1993) (see Table 3). It also exhibited a Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation 
(Steiger 1990) of .068 (values up to .08 suggest acceptable fit-- Brown and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog 1993). 
Using the same criteria, the full measurement model corresponding to Figure 2 was also judged to fit the data 
(see Table 2). 
  Results 
Hypotheses 
In summary, exit-propensity was directly or indirectly associated with the other responses to relationship 
problems (see Tables 3 and 4), and satisfaction and cost-of-exit were associated with all the responses to 
relationship problems, although not always unconditionally (see Tables 3 and 5). Of the direct paths in Figure 2 
involving the associations among loyalty, voice, neglect, and exit-propensity, all but the direct voice-exit-
propensity association were significant. Similarly, of the paths involving satisfaction and cost-of-exit, all but 
the loyalty associations between satisfaction and cost-of-exit, and the cost-of-exit association with voice were 
significant. In addition, satisfaction moderated the cost-of-exit-loyalty association (see Table 3 and 5), and 
there were several indirect associations (see Table 4). As a result, all of the hypothesized associations were 





Cost-of-exit was a second-order construct in the study context (i.e., it fit the data). However, the loadings 
for cost-of-exit were different between the Figure 2 full measurement and structural models (see Tables 2 and 
3), as can be expected with an exactly determined latent variable (see Anderson and Gerbing 1988, Burt 1976). 
Nevertheless, a Figure 2 structural model with cost-of-exit specified with indicators fixed at the Table 2 
measurement model values (not shown) fit the data (e.g., CFI = .933, RMSEA = .068) and suggested the Tables 2 
and 3 cost-of-exit parameterizations were interpretationally equivalent (i.e., the constrained structural model 
produced structural parameter estimates that were similar in direction and significance to the Table 3 results-- 
βVOI,LOY = -0.173/t = -4.54, βNEGL,VOI = -0.377/t = -3.65, βEX_P,VOI = 0.132/t = 1.31, βEX_P,NEG = 0.551/t = 6.84, βLOY,SAT = -
0.108/t = -0.83, βLOY,COE = 0.118/t = 0.74, βLOY,SATxCOE = -0.371/t = -2.61, βVOI,SAT = 0.156/t = 2.64, βVOI,COE = 0.077/t = 
0.99, βNEG,SAT = -0.284/t = -3.18, βNEG,COE = -0.368/t = -3.12, βEXI_PSAT = -0.411/t = -4.82, βEXI_PCOE = -0.238/t = -2.01 for 
the constrained model). 
Unmodeled Paths 
To further investigate the significant indirect paths not specified as direct paths in Figure 2 (see Table 4), 
direct paths from loyalty to neglect, loyalty to exit-propensity, and the interaction to voice, were specified in the 
Figure 2 structural model. The results (not shown) suggested there were no significant direct paths from loyalty 
to neglect, loyalty to exit-propensity, or the interaction to voice. 
Alternative Models 
To evaluate the direction of the direct paths between loyalty, voice, neglect, and exit-propensity in Figure 2 
further, several nonrecursive or bi-directional models were estimated. The Figure 2 model with bi-directional 
paths between loyalty and voice, voice and neglect, and neglect and exit-propensity specified all in one model 
was not identified. However, models estimating one bidirectional path at a time (not shown) suggested the 
Figure 2 model path directions were as shown except for the NEG-EX_P path which could not be verified 
because that model was not identified. 
 Discussion 
Holding Exit at Bay 
These results are consistent with Hirschmans (1970) and others predictions that increased voice is 
associated with reduced exiting (see Spencer 1986, Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987). However the lack of 
significance in the direct voice-exit-propensity association (see Table 3) and the significant indirect association 




reduced exit-propensity only via reduced neglect. Thus voice may have held exit at bay in the study only when 
it was less costly to use voice than to neglect the relationship. Had wholesalers made voice more costly (e.g., by 
ignoring complaints), and/or neglect less costly (e.g., by decreasing cost-of-exit), retailers may have been more 
likely to skip voice on their way to exiting.. 
Associations Among the Responses 
These results are also consistent with Hirschmans (1970) predictions concerning the associations among 
the responses to relationship problems. The negative signs on these relationships suggest as loyalty declined, 
voice was likely to increase, and as voice declined neglect and exit-propensity were likely to increase. The lack 
of significance in the direct loyalty-to-neglect, loyalty-to-exit-propensity, and voice-to-exit-propensity 
associations suggest as subject firms loyalty declined, their use of voice was more likely to increase than their 
neglect or exit-propensity. It also suggests as their use of voice declined, their neglect was more likely to 
increase than their exit-propensity.10 
Inter-firm Relationship Development 
Firms remain in a relationship either because they want to, or because they have to (Johnson 1982, Thibaut 
and Kelly 1959). The sample contained dissatisfied firms in committed relationships that were willing to 
neglect their relationships (i.e., not care about the relationship, expend no effort to maintain the relationship, 
and let the relationship deteriorate). They also suggest others were planning to exit their relationships, rather 
than maintain and build them in anticipation of future exchanges (see Footnote 10). Such relationships may not 
belong in the committed phase of Dwyer, Schurr and Ohs (1987) framework. These relationships are in 
decline because the subject firms do not care about their relationships and are unwilling to maintain them (i.e., 
neglect), and/or they are planning to leave their relationships (i.e., exit-propensity). As a result, these 
relationships should be classified as in either the dissolution phase of Dwyer, Schurr and Ohs (1987) 
framework, or a phase between relationship commitment and dissolution. 
                                                 
10 45% of the firms in the study agreed or strongly agreed they were loyal, 98% agreed or strongly agreed they use 
voice, 7% were neutral or agreed to strongly agreed they neglect the relationship, and 19% were neutral or agreed to strongly 
agreed they were planning to exit their relationship. The percentages add to more than 100% because many firms appeared to be 
in transition from loyalty to voice, or voice to neglect and exit-propensity. 
It could be argued these relationships should be in the intrapsychic stage of relationship dissolution (see p. 
2). However, dissatisfied firms that cannot leave their relationships will not go on to the other stages in 




relationships, the other stages of dissolution may take some time, or these relationships may not dissolve at all. 
Thus to emphasize the possibility these declined relationships do not belong in the committed stage, yet some 
may not dissolve, and for others dissolution may take considerable time, we propose there may be an additional 
phase between Dwyer, Schurr and Ohs (1987) relationship commitment and relationship dissolution phases in 
the study context, relationship decline. 
Relationship Decline Johnson (1982), among others (see Levinger 1976), proposed relationship 
commitment consisted of satisfaction and structural commitment (i.e., cost-of-exit). He also argued that 
understanding the implications of both components of relationship commitment was essential to understanding 
why individuals stay in relationships (also see Rusbult and Buunk 1993). However Johnsons (1982) view of 
relationship commitment is different from the prevailing view of commitment in buyer-seller relationships (see 
for example Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer 1995). Commitment in buyer-seller relationships has been defined 
as a stated or implied pledge of relationship continuity between partners (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). It has 
been conceptualized as the desire to continue a relationship and work to ensure its continuance (Wilson 1995). 
Further, its conceptual domain is invariably described implicitly or explicitly assuming a positive evaluation of 
the relationship (i.e., satisfaction). However Johnson (1982) argued the benefits derived from a relationship 
produce satisfaction, and thus one form of relationship commitment, but exit barriers produce structural 
commitment (as in we cannot back out now, the cost would be too great), another form of relationship 
commitment. As a result, a firms commitment to a relationship may be the result of satisfaction or structural 
commitment. 
Because firms that were no longer satisfied, and hence no longer committed to their buyer-seller 
relationships in the sense Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) and others intend (see Weitz and Jap 1995, Wilson 
1995), may also have been unable or unwilling to exit these relationships, buyer-seller relationship 
development in the study context may have consisted of six phases: awareness, exploration, expansion, 
commitment, then relationship decline, and finally dissolution. Firms with relationships in the commitment 
phase were satisfied, and may have been loyal or vocal when there were relationship problems. Firms in 
relationship decline were no longer satisfied with their relationships. These firms should have been aware of 
their structural commitment (i.e., cost-of-exit) (Johnson 1982); they were unwilling or as yet unable to exit 
their relationships, and may have responded to relationship problems with neglect and exit-propensity. Firms in 




viewed structural commitment as a barrier to exiting. 
Interactions 
Several observed associations were contingent or dependent on the levels of interacting variables. For 
example satisfaction attenuated the cost-of-exit association with loyalty (see Table 5). At low levels of 
satisfaction the cost-of-exit association with loyalty was positive (see the COE-LOY associations in Table 5). 
However, as satisfaction increased to the study average, this association was weaker, and it became non 
significant at higher levels of satisfaction. 
Satisfaction also indirectly attenuated the cost-of-exit association with voice. At low levels of satisfaction 
the indirect association of cost-of-exit with voice was negative rather than positive as hypothesized (see the 
COE-VOI associations in Table 5). As satisfaction increased to the study average and higher this association 
was non significant. Since increased cost-of-exit should increase dependence and decrease power (Emerson 
1962), it is possible increased cost-of-exit could have reduced the likelihood of voice because it was viewed as 
risky (i.e., the costs outweighed the benefits). Specifically, attempts to change objectionable relationship 
conditions (voice) under these circumstances (i.e., lower satisfaction) might have been ignored or resisted by 
partner, or partner might have retaliated. 
Cost-of-exit moderated the association between satisfaction and loyalty (see the SAT-LOY associations in 
Table 5).11 At low levels of cost-of-exit the satisfaction association with loyalty was positive, and as it 
approached the study average it became nonsignificant. However, when cost-of-exit was high this association 
was negative. It is possible when cost-of-exit was high, increased satisfaction decreased loyalty because the 
subject firms were likely to become more vocal at that point (when cost-of-exit was high increased satisfaction 
also increased voice-- see the SAT-VOI associations in Table 5). 
 Future Research 
Relationship Exiting 
                                                 
11 In the equation Y = b1X + b2Z + b3XZ + ζ (with X, Z and Y mean centered), the association of Z with Y is 
determined by b2 + b3X. Similarly, the association of X with Y is determined by b1 + b3Z. 
The study results were equivocal on the likelihood of the responses to relationship problems forming a 
sequence or process of relationship exiting as Hirschman (1970:86) proposed (see p. 18). Additional surveys 
with more predictors of the responses to relationship problems, longitudinal research, experiments, and case 




progress through voice to neglect and exiting. For example, additional surveys with more predictors of the 
responses (see the suggestions below) should be aimed at providing an identified jointly bi-directional or 
nonrecursive Figure 2 model of these responses. This in turn would suggest or disconfirm the possibility of an 
exiting process involving the responses to relationship problems. 
Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer (1995) provide an example of a longitudinal experiment involving inter-
firm simulations and knowledgeable students. Similarly Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous (1988) reported 
several studies that included an experiment involving scenario analysis. Students were instructed to read 
written scenarios in which they were to imagine they were the subjects of the experiment. The results from this 
scenario analysis and the other reported designs (with much more internal and external validity) were generally 
similar. While they used single subjects, it is likely meetings of groups of subjects could also be used.  
Additional Predictors 
Investigating additional predictors of the responses may be useful in several ways. Approaches to 
identifying exiting and neglectful firms by name should be helpful to inter-firm relationship managers. At first 
glance surveys might appear to be effective. However, identifying firms that may be neglectful or exiting by 
measuring their neglect or exit-propensity (or, any other study variable) may be difficult because of their desire 
for confidentiality when sensitive constructs such as these are measured. Thus predictors of neglect and exiting 
are needed that are publicly available and/or not sensitive so that confidentiality is not an issue, and the 
responding firm can be identified. 
For example, firm and relationship contingency variables may be associated with neglect and exiting (or 
other responses). Structural contingency theory has enjoyed a central position in the organizational behavior 
literature (see Pfeffer 1982). There, firm behavior, and in particular its structure, is argued to be a result of 
contextual factors such as firm size, technology and the environment. Thus contingencies such as the number 
of employees in a firm and the number of competitors it faces should cause variations in that firms behavior 
(e.g., exiting, neglect, loyalty, or voice). These variables may also include the number of employees a firm has, 
their revenue, the number of years they have been in business, the number of years they have done business 
with their partner firm, and productivity measures (see Ingene 1982). 
Variables such as those used in organizational demography could also be efficacious (e.g., average 
employee age, education, length of service, etc.) (see Pfeffer 1983). If it turned out, for example, that number 




and customers number of employees and target the comparatively smaller firms for neglect reduction. 
Little is known about loyalty in inter-firm relationships, and its predictors are largely unknown. Hirschman 
(1970) mentioned there were differences in sensitivity to relationship problems. As a result, loyalty may also 
have predictors that include the magnitude, frequency and relevance of relationship problems, and the partner 
firms history of solving problems without the subject firms involvement. 
Similarly, much work remains to be done in understanding voice in these relationships. Hirschman (1970) 
argued voice was affected by the expectation of its success. He proposed this involved the subject's evaluation 
of the prospects of the declined firm getting back on track through that firm's actions, the subjects actions, or 
the actions of others. Hirschman (1970) also argued voice was affected by the advantage to be gained by using 
voice. Singh (1990) conceptualized this advantage in a consumer context as the worthwhileness of complaint, 
the costs versus the benefits to the subject. Hirschman (1970) also argued industry structure should affect 
voice. Specifically he proposed that in what he termed loose monopolies there should be little voice. Andreasen 
(1985) characterized loose monopolies as industries in which a near-monopoly exists, and he proposed 
physicians, for example, are a loose monopoly. Finally, Hirschman (1970) proposed the importance of the 
purchase would also increase voice. This suggests the importance of the relationship to the subject firm may 
also increase their voice. 
Exit-Propensity 
It is plausible exit-propensity is itself a process in inter-firm relationships, as Mobley (1977) argued for 
employees, and there may be one or more feedback loops within an exit-propensity process that nonrecursively 
(i.e., bi-directionally) affect neglect. For example, it is plausible that after planning to exit begins, neglect could 
increase as the subject firm draws nearer to physically exiting a relationship. It is also plausible neglect may be 
affected by the subjects discontinuing the exiting process (e.g., for lack of an acceptable alternative). This 
level of detail was beyond the scope of the present research, but there may be more to learn about exit-
propensity as a series of interrelated stages with plausible feedback loops to neglect. 
Exit was operationalized as exit-propensity in the study because exit is a dichotomous variable, and such 
variables can produce estimation problems in covariant structure analysis (see Footnote 1). Thus the 
relationships between the study variables and exit may be smaller than those observed with exit-propensity. 
Longitudinal studies linking the Figure 2 model with exit it would therefore be useful to observe the study 





As it turned out, the present study missed the full extent of the role of cost-of-exit (COE) in the study 
context. The results of investigating additional interactions suggested there were other cost-of-exit interactions 
in the Figure 2 model.12 For example we found while COE did not affect the association between satisfaction 
and voice (t= -.06) or exit (t= 1.39), it attenuated the satisfaction-neglect association (t= 2.04). Specifically as 
COE increased, the satisfaction-neglect association became weaker until at high cost-of-exit satisfaction was 
not associated with neglect. 
COE also attenuated the voice-exit-propensity relationship (t= -2.34) (it did not significantly affect the 
other relationships among the responses). As COE increased the association between voice and exit-propensity 
became weaker. At low cost-of-exit the voice-exit association was positive and significant. As cost-of-exit 
increased this association weakened until it became nonsignificant at the study average. Then it became 
negative and significant at high cost-of-exit. Thus as voice declined, neglect was more likely at all levels of 
cost-of-exit. Exit was less likely at low cost-of-exit (because the effort of exit-propensity was not necessary). It 
was no more or less likely near the study average (when it was nonsignificant), and more likely at high cost-of-
exit (when the effort of exit-propensity was quite necessary). Consequently, there may also be more to learn 
about the role of cost-of-exit in holding exit at bay. 
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 Table 1 
                                                                  MEASURES SUMMARY                                                              
 








Overall rating of the relationship; an 
appraisal of the attributes of the 
relationship that are rewarding, 
profitable, or instrumental. 
 




All in all, my relationship with 






 coded as 
  ALTR) 
 
A global evaluation 
of the relationship 
fulfillment available 




An overall evaluation of the most 
salient and available alternative 
relationship, and generalized percep-




believed to be avail-
able in the best alter-
native relationship, -




In general, I would be __ 
satisfied with the alternative 
wholesaler than/as I am with the 
current wholesaler. a. Much 
more   b. Slightly more  c. As 





The cost to build and 
maintain the current 
relationship in 
anticipation of future 
exchanges. 
 
Economic (e.g., money), activity 
(e.g., effort), and opportunity costs 
(e.g., time).  
 
The magnitude of the 
cost that went into 
building and 
maintaining the 
current relationship.  
 
Overall I have invested a lot in 











Economic, activity, and opportunity 
cost to end the current relationship 
and secure an alternative 
relationship, and the psychic cost to 
achieve this end.  
 
The cost and loss that 
would be required to 
terminate the current 
relationship and 
secure an alternative 
relationship.  
 
Considering everything, the 
costs to stop doing business 
with the current wholesaler and 
start up with the alternative 






magnitude of the 
mobility barrier 
between the 




The attractiveness of the alternative 
relationship, the relationship-
specific investments (i.e., economic, 
activity, and opportunity costs that 
helped ensure future exchanges) 
which might be lost or obsoleted by 
exiting, and switching costs (i.e., 
economic, opportunity, activity and 
psychic costs to terminate the 
current relationship, and startup a 
new one).  
 
The satisfaction 
believed to be avail-
able in the best alter-
native relationship, -
above that available in 
the current relation-
ship, plus the cost and 




Alternative unattractiveness (the 
construct ALTR), Investment 







problems in silence 
with confidence that 
things will get better. 
 
Viewing problems as transitory 
phenomena that fix themselves; from 
the subjects perspective, problems 
work themselves out or are fixed by 
others, so the subject ignores them. 
 
The predisposition to 
overlook problems 
because they fix them-
selves.  
 
I often overlook problems with 
my primary wholesaler because 







tempts by the subject 





Actively seeking problem removal 
by contacting the partner firm in a 
positive (i.e., relationship 
preserving) manner, and 
cooperatively discussing and 
working with the partner firm to 
improve the situation.  
 
The intention to notify 
constructively and 
work with the primary 
wholesaler to solve 
relationship problems.  
 
Occasionally I will suggest 
changes to my primary 
wholesaler if there is a mutual 









Not caring about the relationship, 
expending no effort to maintain the 
relationship, and willingness to let 
the relationship deteriorate.  
 
Planning to do 
nothing to improve 
conditions in the 
relationship.  
 
If things are not right with my 
primary wholesaler I sometimes 
consider letting the relationship 




The disinclination to 
continue the current 
relationship,  
 
Thinking of exiting, intention to 
search for alternatives, evaluating 
alternatives, and the intention to 
exit.  
 
Planning to leave the 
relationship.  
 
Occasionally I will think about 
ending the business relationship 







The moderation of 
the Cost-of-Exit 




Changes in Satisfaction increase or 






s:c = [(s1+s2+s3 +s4 + 
s5)/5][(altn  + inv + sct)/3], 
where altr = (1 + 2 + 3 + 
4)/4 (i are reverse coded 
indicator of ALT so altr would 
load positively on COE), inv = 
(i1+i2+i3 +i4)/4, swc = 
(sc1+sc2+sc3+sc4)/4. 
 
 Table 2 
                                       FIGURE 2 MEASUREMENT MODEL RESULTS                                
 
Latent Variable Covariances and Correlations:a 
    Latent                                                      Latent Variable                                       Standard 
   Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7   Reliability Meanb Deviationb 
1. LOY   .645 -.296* .057 -.038 .051 .080 -.227* .826 2.41 .74 
2. VOI   -.104 .191 -.396* -.263* .312* .253* -.053  .928 4.09 .42 
3. NEGL  .033 -.125 .523 .712* -.554* -.561* .310* .922 1.85 .62 
4. EX_P  -.027 -.101 .451 .766 -.678* -.622* .357* .946 2.13 .84 
5. SAT  .030 .098 -.290 -.429 .523 .634* -.365* .945 4.16 .67 
6. COE  .040 .068 -.252 -.338 .285 .385 -.139  .700 3.50 .68 
7. SATxCOE -.097 -.012 .119 .166 -.140 -.045 .283  .707 14.78 4.37 
 
Parameter Estimates: 
         Parameterc  Estimated  Parameterc  Estimated  Parameterc    Estimated    Parameterc    Estimated 
λl1  1.000  λe3  1.000  θεl2 0.436 θεe3 0.109 
λl2  0.832  λe4  0.994  θεl3 0.261 θεe4 0.289 
λl3  0.810  λe5  0.960  θεl4 0.648 θεe5 0.104 
λl4  0.695  λe6  0.915  θεv1 0.032 θεe6 0.130 
λv1  0.974  λs1  0.939  θεv2 0.061 θεs1 0.104 
λv2  0.864  λs2  0.884  θεv3 0.042 θεs2 0.120 
λv3  1.000  λs3  1.000  θεv4 0.067 θεs3 0.098 
λv4  0.877  λs4  0.798  θεn1 0.125 θεs4 0.167 
λn1  1.000  λs5  0.896  θεn2 0.103 θεs5 0.126 
λn2  0.735  λaltr  0.971  θεn3 0.189 θεaltr 0.381 
λn3  0.699  λinv  0.725  θεn4 0.062 θεinv 0.409 
λn4  0.876  λswc  1.000  θεe1 0.522 θεswc 0.590 
λe1  0.866  λs:c  0.812  θεe2 0.188 θεs:c 0.077 
λe2  0.842  θεl1  0.165 
 
Fit Statistics: 
Chi-Square Statistic Value        625 
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom        305 
p-Value of Chi-Square Value      .000 
Steiger (1990) RMS Error of Approximation (RMSEA)e  .069  
Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Index    .933 
GFIf           .835 
AGFIf           .795 
RMS Residual          .048 
 
COE Indicator" Latent Variable Covariances and Correlations:g 
    Latent                             Latent Variable                  Standard 
   Variable 1 2 3       Reliability Meanb Deviationb 
1. ALT   .849  .286* .404* .929  2.54 .86 
2. INV    .204 .601  .538* .922  3.80 .78 
3. SWC   .366  .410 .968 .941  3.25 .98 
 
─────────────────────── 
a Covariances on and below the diagonal, correlations above. 
b Attenuated values (estimating latent variable means with an interaction creates  severe estimation problems- see Jöreskog and Yang 1996) 
(attenuated standard deviations are presented for completeness- disattenuated values can be computed from the disattenuated variances shown to 
the left). 
c λli = indicators of LOY (Loyalty), etc. (see Table 1 and Figure 2). 
d Maximum likelihood. 
e .05 suggests close fit, .051-.08 suggests acceptable fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog 1993). 
f Shown for completeness only-- GFI and AGFI may be inadequate for fit assessment in larger models (see Anderson and Gerbing 1984). 
g From Figure 1 Measurement Model. 
* t-value > 2. 
 
 Table 3 
                         FIGURE 2 STRUCTURAL MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTS                  
 
 Parametera  Estimateb  Parametera  Estimateb   Parametera   Estimateb    Parametera    Estimateb   t-value 
 
λl1  1.000 λs2 0.881 θεn4 0.061 φSAT,COE 0.352* 
λl2  0.831 λs3 1.000         θεe1 0.521 φSAT,SATxCOE -0.175* 
λl3  0.808 λs4 0.795      θεe2 0.187 φCOE,SATxCOE -0.128* 
λl4  0.693 λs5 0.893    θεe3 0.109 ζLOY 0.610* 
λv1  0.974 λaltr 1.000       θεe4 0.291 ζVOI  0.153* 
λv2  0.864 λinv 0.711       θεe5 0.104 ζNEG 0.293* 
λv3  1.000 λswc 0.805 θεe6 0.129 ζEX_P  0.255* 
λv4  0.877 λs:c  0.668 θεs1 0.103 βVOI,LOYc -0.170  -4.48 
λn1  1.000 θεl1 0.164 θεs2 0.120 βNEGL,VOI -0.413  -4.02 
λn2  0.736 θεl2 0.436 θεs3 0.098 βEX_P,VOI 0.089  0.87 
λn3  0.698 θεl3 0.262 θεs4 0.167 βEX_P,NEG 0.505  6.19 
λn4  0.877 θεl4 0.649 θεs5 0.126 βLOY,SAT -0.067   -0.52 
λe1  0.867 θεv1 0.032 θεaltr 0.260 βLOY,COE 0.036  0.25 
λe2  0.843 θεv2 0.061 θεinv 0.482 βLOY,SATxCOE -0.309   -2.53 
λe3  1.000 θεv3 0.042 θεswc 0.592 βVOI,SAT  0.197  3.22 
λe4  0.993 θεv4 0.067 θεs:c 0.081 βVOI,COE 0.001  0.01 
λe5  0.960 θεn1 0.125 φSAT 0.540* βNEG,SAT -0.235  -2.44 
λe6  0.916 θεn2 0.103 φCOE 0.510* βNEG,COE  -0.373  -3.31 
λs1  0.936 θεn3 0.190 φSATxCOE 0.400*    βEX_P,SAT -0.334  -3.72 
                                                                                                      βEX_P,COE -0.345  -2.98 
 
Fit Statistics: 
Chi-Squared Statistic Value       633 
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom      310 
p-Value of Chi-Squared Value     .000 
Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Index       .933 
Steiger (1990) RMS Error of Approximation (RMSEA)d   .068 
GFIe           .833 
AGFIe          .797 
RMS Residual        .045 
 
   LOY  VOI  NEGL  EX_P 
 




a λli = indicators of LOY (Loyalty), etc. (see Table 1 and Figure 2). 
b Maximum likelihood. 
c βVOI,LOY is the effect of LOY on VOI. 
d .05 suggests close fit, .051-.08 suggests acceptable fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog 1993). 
e Shown for completeness only-- GFI and AGFI may be inadequate for fit assessment in larger models (see Anderson and Gerbing 1984). 
* t-value > 2. 
 
 Table 4 
 TRIMMEDa FIGURE 2 MODEL STANDARDIZED INDIRECT AND TOTAL EFFECTS (ASSOCIATIONSb c 
 
 
STANDARDIZED INDIRECT EFFECTS (ASSOCIATIONS)d e: 
 
          LOY    VOI      NEGL   EX_P    SAT      COE   SATxCOE 
 
VOI       .019  -.010      .076 
(0.52)  (-0.26)    (2.22) 
NEGL        .078     -.091    .007     -.019 
         (3.05)     (-2.49)   (0.25)   (-1.96) 
EX_P         .031   -.099    -.129   -.143     -.007 
         (2.75)  (-3.43)    (-2.79)   (-3.15)  (-1.88) 
 
STANDARDIZED TOTAL EFFECTS (ASSOCIATIONS)e: 
 
          LOY    VOI    NEGL    EX_P     SAT     COE    SATxCOE 
 
LOY      -.061   .033    -.243 
         (-0.52)   (0.26)    (-2.52) 
VOI          -.312     . 363   -.030     .076 
                (-4.47)    (3.39) (-0.25)   (2.22) 
NEGL       .078  -.251    -.327   -.362     -.019 
        (3.05) (-4.07)    (-3.34)  (-3.19)   (-1.96) 
EX_P        .031    -.099 .396  -.394   -.439     -.007 
        (2.75)  (-3.43) (6.26)  (-4.46)  (-4.16)   (-1.88) 
 
─────────────────────── 
a The Figure 2 structural model was re-estimated with the nonsignificant (NS) VOI-EX_P path fixed at zero. With this path free 
the indirect EX_P association with LOY was NS, and the total EX_P associations with LOY and VOI were NS. 
b LOY = Loyalty, COE = Cost-of-Exit, etc. (see Table 1 and Figure 2). 
c The table is read from column to row (e.g., the indirect effect of VOI on EX_P is -.103). 
d Stability Index = .625 
e t-values are shown in parentheses. 
 
 Table 5 
 SATISFACTION (SAT)-COST-OF-EXIT (COE) INTERACTION STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
 
    COE-LOY (Loyalty) Assoc.           SAT-LOY (Loyalty) Assoc.        
              COE       SE of                                SAT        SE of                 
 SAT     Coef-   COE Coef-    t-        COE    Coef-    SAT Coef-   t-      
 Valuea  ficient b   ficientc      value  Valued  ficiente    ficientf     value    
  1.20       0.95       0.38         2.49     1.83  0.44        0.20        2.16     
    2 0.70       0.29         2.40 2  0.39        0.19        2.07     
    3 0.39       0.19         2.03 3  0.08        0.12        0.69     
    4  0.08       0.14         0.61      3.5g -0.06        0.12       -0.52    
   4.16g  0.03       0.13         0.26        4 -0.22        0.15       -1.40     
    5 -0.22       0.17        -1.26 5 -0.53        0.25       -2.10   
 
SAT-VOI (Voice) (Indirect) Assoc.  COE-VOI (Voice) (Indirect) Assoc. 
              SAT       SE of                                   COE        SE of                 
 COE     Coef-   SAT Coef-    t-           SAT    Coef-    COE Coef-   t-      
 Valued  ficienth   ficientj      valuej      Valuea  ficienti    ficientj     valuej    
  1.83       0.12       0.05         2.19        1.20 -0.16        0.06      -2.47     
    2  0.12       0.05         2.36 2 -0.11        0.05      -1.99     
    3  0.18       0.05         3.09 3 -0.06        0.06      -1.08     
   3.5g  0.20       0.06         3.24 4 -0.01        0.07      -0.19    
    4  0.23       0.07         3.29        4.16g -0.00        0.07      -0.07     
    5  0.28       0.08         3.25 5  0.03        0.08       0.45   
 
─────────────────────── 
a The values ranged from 1.2 (=low) to 5 in the study.  
b The coefficient of COE is given by (.036-.309SAT)COE with SAT mean centered.  
c The Standard Error (SE) of the COE coefficient is given by  
     ___________________        _____________________________________________  
   √Var(bCOE+bSAT*COESAT)  = √ (Var(bCOE)+SAT
2Var(bSAT*COE)+2SATCov(bCOE,bSAT*COE) 
d The values ranged from 1.83 (=low) to 5 in the study. 
e The coefficient of SAT is given by (-.067-.309COE)SAT with COE mean centered. 
f The Standard Error (SE) of the SAT coefficient is given by 
     ___________________        _____________________________________________ 
   √Var(bSAT+bSAT*COECOE)  = √Var(bSAT)+COE
2Var(bSAT*COE)+2COECov(bSAT,bSAT*COE) 
g Mean value. 
h The coefficient of SAT is given by (.208+.052COE)SAT with COE mean centered (Table 4shows standardized coefficients). 
i The coefficient of COE is given by (-.005+.052SAT)COE with SAT mean centered (Table 4shows standardized coefficients). 
j Approximate. 
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a SAT, LOY, VOI, NEG, EX_P were specified with their respective indicators. SAT, COE (Cost-of-Exit) and SATxCOE were correlated, and the 
measurement errors (εs) and structural disturbances (ζ) were uncorrelated. 
b s:c = [(s1+s2+s3+s4+s5)/5][(altr + inv + swc)/3]. 
c altr = (1+1+1+1)/4, inv = (i1+i2+i3+i4)/4, swc = (sc1+sc2+sc3+sc4)/4 (i were reverse coded to produce a positive altr loading on COE). 
 
 Appendix A  Latent Variable Interaction Specification Using a Single Indicator 
 
The following summarizes the seminal paper on these matters, Kenny and Judd (1984), then it summarizes an 
alternative technique proposed by Ping (1995) that was used in the present research. 
Kenny and Judd (1984) proposed for latent variables X and Z with multiple indicators xi and zj, the interaction XZ 
could be specified using all possible product indicators xizj. However, this technique has proven difficult for researchers 
to implement (Aiken and West 1991). While LISREL 8 reduces the effort involved using constraint equations, interaction 
specification still requires considerable effort (Jöreskog and Yang 1996). In addition, many indicator and dummy 
variables result producing large matrices that may create model estimation problems (Ping 1995). 
The resulting measurement and structural models for an interaction are per se nonnormal because products of 
indicators (i.e., xizj) are nonnormal (Kenny and Judd 1984). While maximum likelihood parameter estimates are robust to 
departures from normality (see the citations in Ping 1995), their model fit and significance statistics may not be (Bollen 
1989). However model fit and significance statistics may be robust to the addition of a few (nonnormal) product 
indicators (i.e., four or fewer) (Jaccard and Wan 1995; Ping 1995). 
The Ping (1995) technique is attractive because it requires a single (nonnormal) product indicator for an interaction. 
Under the Kenny and Judd (1984) normality assumptions, (i.e., the latent variables X and Z with indicators xi and zj are 
independent of the error terms for their indicators εxi and εzj, the error terms are independent of each other, and xi, zj, εxi 
and εzj are normally distributed) an interaction can be specified with one indicator that is the product of sums of the 
indicators of the linear latent variables. For example the indicator for XZ, comprised of X and Z with indicators x1, x2, z1, 
and z2 respectively, would be x:z = (x1+x2)(z1+z2), or, if equivalently sized elements in the resulting covariance matrix are 
desired, x:z = [(x1+x2)/2][(z1+z2)/2]. The loading and error variance of x:z are given by  
λx:z = ΓXΓZ  (A1 
and  θεx:z = ΓX2Var(X)θZ + ΓZ2Var(Z)θX + θXθZ , (A2 
where λx:z is the loading of x:z on XZ, θεx:z is the variance of the error term (εx:z) for x:z, Var(a) is the variance of a, and 
for equivalently sized elements, ΓX = (λx1 + λx2)/2, θX = (Var(εx1) + Var(εx2))/22, ΓZ = (λz1 + λz2)/2, and θZ = (Var(εz1) + 
Var(εz2))/22 (see Ping 1995). The loading and error variance of x:z could then be specified subject to the constraint 
equations A1 and A2 using LISREL 8. 
For example, the loading and error of s:c (= [(s1+s2+s3+s4+s5)/5][(altr + inv + swc)/3], see Figure 2), the single 
indicator of SATxCOE are given by 
λs:c = ΓSATΓCOE (A3 
and  θεs:c = ΓSAT2Var(SAT)θCOE + ΓCOE2Var(COE)θSAT + θSATθCOE , (A4 
where λs:c is the loading of s:c on SATxCOE, θεs:c is the variance of the error term (εs:c) for s:c, Var(a) is the variance of a, 
ΓSAT = (λs1 +...+ λs5)/5, θSAT = (Var(εs1) +...+ Var(εs5))/52, ΓCOE = (alt + inv + swc)/3], and θCOE = (Var(εalt) + Var(εinv) + 
Var(εswc))/32. 
Each indicator of the independent and dependent variables in the study was centered by subtracting the indicators 
average from its value in each case (centering independent variables is important to reduce collinearity, and centering 
dependent variables is important to compensate for not estimating intercepts-- see Jöreskog and Yang 1996). The value 
for the interactions single-indicator s:c was added to each case. Next the structural model was specified using PAR 
variables (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993b:14) and constraint equations (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993b:11) for ΓSAT, ΓCOE 
θSAT, and θCOE. Constraint equations (CO statements) were written for equations A3 and A4 using PAR variables, 
Var(SAT), and Var(COE)), and the variance of the interaction (= Var(SAT)*Var(COE) + Cov(SAT,COE)2), then the 
structural model was estimated using maximum likelihood. The use of PAR variables in this manner is sensitive to the 
sequence and location of the PAR and CO statements in the LISREL program. In general PARs should not be used 
recursively (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993b:13). In this application they are used recursively, and appeared at the end of the 
program. In addition, the PAR variables and the variables constrained in the CO statements were defined in their natural 
numerical order (e.g., PAR(1), PAR(2), etc.), and a PAR variable was used in a CO statement as soon after it was defined 
as possible. Starting values for the loading, error and variance terms of the interaction were estimated using a 
measurement model involving all the variables except the interaction. The resulting measurement parameters estimates 
were substituted into equations A3 and A4 to produce a starting value for λs:c and θεs:c (see Ping 1995). The starting values 
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VOICE IN BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS: 





Because voice may play an important role in the maintenance of business-to-business relationships, the 
paper investigates its antecedents. After summarizing what is known about voice in an inter-firm context, the 
paper proposes that a firm's voice is affected by their cost to exit the relationship, their overall relationship 
satisfaction, and demographic variables. These proposals are tested in a field survey, and while satisfaction and 
the cost to exit the relationship were stronger predictors of voice than the demographic variables, the results 
suggest that several partner firm demographic variables could be useful to relationship managers interested in 
the maintenance of business-to-business relationships via partner firm voice cultivation. Because these 
demographic variables are less sensitive (i.e., partner firms are likely to provide this information without 
insisting on their anonymity), they could be used to identify partner firms by name that are likely to be non-




Ping (1993) proposed that alternatives to exiting committed business-to-business relationships when there 
are relationship problems included loyalty (remaining silent, confident that things will get better), voice 
(constructive attempts by the subject to change objectionable relationship conditions), and neglect (allowing 
the relationship to deteriorate) (also see Hirschman 1970; Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982). This suggests 
that partner firms may or may not use voice when they are experiencing relationship problems. Thus in the 
management of important buyer-seller relationships (e.g., JIT relationships, strategic alliances, and other 
relationships in which high levels of partner cooperation is desired), voice cultivation and maintenance, and the 
identification of nonvocal partner firms (by name) that are experiencing relationship problems, should be 
important relationship maintenance tasks. It bears emphasizing that exchange relationship problems are known 
to the offended firm but not necessarily to the offending firm (Hirschman 1970). In the absence of their voice 
or some other means of identifying them, offended customers remain unidentified, remediation of their 
problem(s) is therefore less likely, and the likelihood of their exiting the relationship is increased (Fornell and 
Wernerfelt 1987; Hirschman 1970). 
Hirschman (1970) proposed that when there are relationship problems, the subject should become more 
vocal when overall relationship satisfaction or the cost to exit the relationship is high (e.g., the alternative 




article addressing voice in a business-to-business context, Ping (1993) reported that firm voice was increased 
by their overall relationship satisfaction and their investment in the relationship. However, the voice 
relationship with the attractiveness of the alternative relationship approached positive significance (i.e., as 
alternative attractiveness increased voice increased, rather than decreased), and the voice relationship with 
switching cost was not significant (also see Rusbult et al. 1982 and Rusbult et al.1988 for similar results). 
While loyal firms are believed likely to eventually respond to relationship problems with voice (Hirschman 
1970), they should be identified for remediation of any relationship problems because some may simply exit 
the relationship when they experience chronic relationship problems (i.e., they may never respond to 
relationship problems with voice) (Hirschman 1970). Firms that are neglecting their relationship should also be 
identified for problem remediation because they may be taking from their relationship, rather than investing in 
it and giving to the relationship in anticipation of future exchanges (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). 
However, the problem of identifying nonvocal partner firms with relationship problems (by name) is not 
solved efficiently by assuming all nonvocal firms have problems (the number of nonvocal relationships could 
be large-- see page 14). Neither is it solved by conducting partner firm surveys that measure sensitive variables 
such as their satisfaction, their cost to exit the relationship, relationship problems, loyalty, neglect, etc. (partner 
firms are likely either to not respond to surveys involving variables they deem sensitive unless their anonymity 
is assured, or they are likely to provide inaccurate information). As a result, relationship managers cannot 
easily separate partner firms without relationship problems from those that are likely to be experiencing 
relationship problems because of the sensitivity of the information required to do so. 
 Objectives and Contribution 
Thus the empirical picture of voice as a response to satisfaction and the dimensions of the cost to exit in 
business-to-business relationships is murky at best. In addition, business-to-business relationship managers 
cannot easily separate nonvocal relationships without relationship problems from those that may have 
relationship problems. As a result, an objective of the present research is to help clarify the extant interfirm 
voice research. We will argue that the cost to exit an interfirm is appropriately captured in a second-order 




investment, and switching cost. We will then show that firm voice is increased by their cost-of-exit, as 
Hirschman (1970) maintained. 
A second objective of this research is to investigate less sensitive antecedents of voice (i.e., more likely to 
be reported by partner firms without insisting on their anonymity) such as partner firm demographic variables 
(e.g., partner firm revenue and number of employees). Assuming firms experience relationship problems that 
are unknown to their partners, and that it is possible for partners to remediate these problems, these variables 
should be useful in relationship maintenance because they have the potential of identifying firms by name that 
are likely to be persistently nonvocal when there are relationship problems. 
The study contributes to several literatures, including interfirm relationship marketing and marketing 
practice. For example, the study fills a gap in the reactions-to-dissatisfaction literature by providing a clearer 
understanding of several voice antecedents. The study also contributes to the emerging relationship marketing 
literature by identifying demographic antecedents of voice that should be useful in determining individual 
partner firms likely to be nonvocal when there are relationship problems. Finally, authors have called for 
research such as this on reactions to problems in buyer-seller relationships (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Ping 
and Dwyer 1988). 
 VOICE 
Hirschman (1970) pointed out that customer voice and exit alert a firm to its failings. In business-to-
business relationships voice may also signal the importance the vocal firm attaches to the relationship 
(Hirschman 1970). Partner firm voice may also signal that they want remediation of their relationship 
problems, they believe this is possible (Hirschman 1970), and they are willing to work to effect this end (Ping 
1993). Hirschman (1970) argued that voice should be likely for customers that view the current relationship as 
superior to the alternative relationship, and this likelihood should increase as the gap between the alternative 
and the current relationship as it was widens. 
Not surprisingly authors have recommended that firms should provide mechanisms to increase customer 
voice. Hirschman (1970) argued this can be done by reducing the cost and increasing the rewards of voice, and 




argued deterministicly that complaints should be encouraged; they can be used to increase market share and 
lower the cost of obtaining new customers (see Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987, p. 345). 
Voice Research 
Voice has been investigated in the interpersonal relationships literature (Rusbult, Johnson and Morrow 
1986; Rusbult et al. 1982), and the employment relations literature (Farrell 1983; Rosse and Hulin 1985; 
Rusbult et al. 1988; Rusbult and Lowery 1985; Spencer 1986). 
Voice has also been investigated in the Marketing literature (Andreasen 1985; Fornell and Didow 1980; 
Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987; Fornell and Westbrook 1984; Ping 1993; Singh 1990a, 1990b). For example, 
Ping (1993) reported that in channel relationships, firm voice was positively associated with their overall 
satisfaction with the relationship and their investment in that relationship. In that study the attractiveness of 
their alternative relationship approached positive significance in its association with voice (t=1.92), and their 
switching cost was not associated with their voice (t=.59). 
The Present Research 
Given its potential for relationship maintenance, the voice research streams in other literatures, and the 
single study of voice in a business-to-business context, with its unexpected results in light of Hirschman's 
(1970) predictions, our empirical knowledge of interfirm voice seems limited. In the balance of the paper we 
will argue that the cost to exit an interfirm relationship is a second-order concept that has as its indicators" the 
latent variables alternative attractiveness, relationship investment, and switching cost. We will also propose 
that this cost-of-exit should be positively associated with voice, as Hirschman (1970) argued. In addition, we 
will replicate the positive voice association with satisfaction reported by Ping (1993) and others (see Rusbult et 
al. 1982; Rusbult 1988). Further, because relationship managers interested in relationship maintenance have no 
predictors of voice that can be used to identify individual partner firms likely to be nonvocal when there are 
relationship problems, we will propose several firm demographic variables that should be associated with their 
voice, such as partner firm revenue, years with partner, years in business, number of employees, revenue per 
employee, competition, and return on investment. Finally we will describe and interpret a field survey of these 






Authors have noted that parties remain in an exchange relationship because they either want to, or have to 
(see Hirschman 1970; Johnson 1982; Levinger 1979; Ping 1993; Rusbult 1980; Rusbult et al. 1982; Rusbult et 
al. 1988). Authors have used the term structural commitment in connection with having to remain in a 
relationship, and argued that the dimensions of structural commitment included alternative attractiveness, 
investment, and switching cost (see Ping 1993; Johnson 1982; Levinger 1979). This suggests the existence of a 
second-order structural commitment construct which we will term cost-of-exit, with indicators" alternative 
attractiveness, investment and switching cost. 
Jöreskog (1970) introduced the notion of a (confirmatory) second-order construct, which can be 
conceptualized as a latent or unobserved variable with no observed variables as indicators (see COST-OF-
EXIT in Figure 1). Instead, a second-order construct has other latent variables for indicators," hence the term 
second-order." Each of these indicator" latent variables has observed variables for indicators, and as a result 
these latent variables are termed first-order constructs in this situation (see Gerbing and Anderson 1984a; 
Rindskopf and Rose 1988). In particular cost-of-exit should have the indicators" alternative attractiveness, 
investment and switching cost, which in turn have their respective observed indicators. 
Hirschman (1970) argued that voice should substitute for exiting when the cost of exiting a relationship is 
high. He and others (see Rosse 1988) have proposed that subjects should choose the least costly option in 
response to relationship problems. When the cost of exiting is high (i.e., the subject firm lacks an attractive 
alternative, and there are high relationship investment and switching cost), a less costly reaction to relationship 
problems such as voice should appear more attractive than exit. High levels of cost-of-exit should make 
economic exchanges with the partner firm more valuable (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Frazier 1983; Thibaut 
and Kelley 1959). As a result, cost-of-exit should make the firm less likely to be passive when there are 
relationship problems, and it should increase voice because there is much to lose if the unresolved problems 
lead to relationship dissolution. 
In summary, 






H1b: Increasing cost-of-exit fosters an increased likelihood of voice. 
Satisfaction 
In business-to-business relationships, overall relationship satisfaction should also make an exchange 
relationship more valuable, and thereby increase the likelihood of voice when there are relationship problems. 
To explain, Ping (1993) proposed the existence of two types of satisfaction in interfirm relationships, event and 
overall satisfaction. He maintained that, while it is dissatisfaction with a relationship event that triggers a 
reaction, it is the level of overall relationship satisfaction that determines which reaction will be emitted (e.g., 
exit, voice, etc.). He proposed that increases in the level of overall satisfaction with the exchange relationship 
should also make economic exchanges with the partner firm more valuable (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; 
Frazier 1983; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). As overall relationship satisfaction increases, the firm should respond 
positively to relationship problems by preferring to work with the partner firms to resolve problems (voice) 
(Hirschman 1970, Rosse and Hulin 1985, Rusbult et al. 1982, Rusbult et al. 1988), to help preserve the 
relationship. Thus, we hypothesize that, 
H2: As satisfaction increases voice is more likely. 
Revenue 
Besides variables such as overall satisfaction and cost-of-exit, firm and relationship demographic variables 
should also be associated with voice. In particular the revenue a firm derives from economic exchanges with its 
partner firm should make economic exchanges with this partner firm more valuable (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 
1987; Frazier 1983; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). As their revenue increases, the firm should respond positively 
to relationship problems by preferring to work with the partner firms to resolve problems (voice) and thereby 
help ensure their future revenue because there is much to lose if unresolved relationship problems lead to 
relationship termination. Hence we hypothesize that, 
H3: Increasing revenue makes voice more likely. 
Competition 
The number of competitors in a firm's market is plausibly related to that firm's revenues and return on 
investment. Economic theory predicts that in maturing markets, as the number of competitors increases, each 




In addition, because we have also proposed that revenue and return on investment are likely to increase 
voice, the effect of competitors should indirectly affect voice. In particular, the number of competitors should 
negatively affect voice via revenue and return on investment. Thus, we hypothesize that, 
H4a: An increase in the number of competitors promotes lower revenue and return on investment, 
and 
H4b: An increase in the number of competitors indirectly produces a decreased likelihood of voice. 
ROI and Revenue per Employee 
In interviews conducted with a convenient sample of distributors and retailers regarding their business-to-
business relationships we noticed that several firms were quick to bring relationship problems to the attention 
of their exchange partner. Many of these firms also focused on efficiency in their business, and were very 
aware of productivity measures such as revenue per employee and return on investment (see Ingene 1982). For 
these reasons, we expected that more productive firms would be more inclined to use voice when there were 
problems in the exchange relationship. As a result, 
H5: With increasing return on investment and revenue per employee voice becomes more likely. 
Number of Employees 
In the interviews we also noticed that firms with many employees were more involved with their primary 
business-to-business partner firm, and were more likely to be vocal when there were relationship problems. 
This result is predicted by perspective theory (Ostrom and Upshaw 1968), which proposes that subjects should 
be influenced to be more extreme in their opinions when the range or perspective (Upshaw 1969) of opinions 
to which they are exposed is wide (see Ostrom 1970). With many employees, higher cost responses to 
relationship problems (than doing nothing) such as voice and exit should be more likely to be discussed, and 
the likelihood of a voice or exit response to relationship problems should therefore be increased. However 
because voice is less costly than exit and has a probabilistic reward (Kahneman and Teversky 1979), it should 
be more likely than exit. For this reason, we anticipated that the number of employees should positively affect 
voice, and firms with many employees would be more inclined to exercise the voice option when there were 
problems in the exchange relationship. Formally, 
H6: An increase in the number of retailer employees makes voice more likely. 




Voice should also be affected by how long the firm has been in business. Firms that have been in business 
for many years should be more knowledgeable of alternative exchange partners, and more experienced in 
dealing with the category of firms represented by their exchange partner (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). 
Because this knowledge may be a source of countervailing power (Dwyer 1980), these firms should be less 
dependent on their exchange partner (Emerson 1962). This in turn should make them more willing to change 
exchange partners, and therefore less willing to expend the effort involved in using voice (Hirschman 1970). 
As a result, 
H7: As the number of years the firm has been in business increases voice is less likely. 
Years with Partner 
On the other hand, the length of time the firm has done business with an exchange partner should make 
future business together likely. In long-lived economic exchange relationships, relationship specific 
investments should have increased, commitment should have grown, and there should be a pressure to adjust 
rather than dissolve the exchange relationship (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Macneil 1980), which should 
increase the likelihood of voice. Formally, 
H8: As the number of years the firm has done business with their exchange partner increases voice 
becomes more likely. 
These associations are summarized in Figure 1. The balance of this article presents the results of a test of 
these associations involving hardware retailers and their primary wholesalers. 
 MEASURES 
Voice, satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, investment, and switching cost were measured using the 
balanced five-point Likert measures developed by Ping (1993). The conceptual and operational definitions plus 
sample items from the scales for these variables are shown in Table 1. 
The firm and relationship demographic variables in the study were measured primarily with open-ended 
questions. For example retailer revenue was measured with an item asking for the retailer's prior year revenue 
(see Table 1). Revenue per employee for each retailer was computed by dividing their revenue by the number 






 The study population was U. S. hardware retailers. The sampling frame chosen for this population was the 
subscription list of a popular hardware retailing trade publication that was representative of the study 
population. The key informant within the hardware retailer sampling unit was the store owner, manager or 
executive. Although Phillips (1981) has cautioned against using single informants in general, the interviews 
indicated hardware retailers typically buy from one primary wholesaler, and senior key informants were very 
knowledgeable of that relationship. In addition, their sentiments and perceptions were strongly mirrored by the 
other informants in the firm. 
The pre-test and final test samples were selected using systematic random (n-th name) sampling and 
resulted in one hundred pretest retailer addresses, and six hundred final test addresses. The survey 
questionnaire was mailed to these pretest and final test samples, and three post card follow-ups in the final test 
produced two hundred four usable questionnaires (34%). 
 RESULTS 
Reliability and Validity 
The psychometric properties of the latent variable measures were examined using the final test responses 
and coefficient alpha calculations, ordered similarity coefficients (Hunter 1973), multiple group analysis 
(Anderson, Gerbing and Hunter 1987), and single factor analysis (Jöreskog 1993). The final test measures were 
judged to be unidimensional, and internally and externally consistent. For example, they displayed latent 
variable reliabilities greater than .80, and average extracted variances of .58 or above (Fornell and Larker 
1981) (see Tables 2 and 3). 
The measures for the latent variables were judged to be content valid. In addition, the Average Variance 
Extracted for the latent variables suggested convergent and discriminant validity for these measures  (Fornell 
and Larker 1981) (see Tables 2 and 3). The latent variables also were judged to be construct valid; they were 




Measurement and Structural Model Results 
 The measurement and structural models corresponding to Figure 1 were estimated using LISREL 8 and 
maximum likelihood estimation. These measurement and structural models appeared to fit the data, based on 
the Comparative Fit Index (Bentler 1990) and the Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (Steiger 1990) 
(see Tables 3 and 4). In addition, the second-order measurement model for cost-of-exit appeared to fit the data 
based on the same criteria (see Table 2). 
Hypotheses Tests 
The study hypotheses received mixed support (see Table 4). The cost-of-exit hypotheses, the hypothesized 
voice relationships with satisfaction and number of employees, and the indirect revenue-voice effect were as 
hypothesized. However, the revenue-voice effect, the number of competitors-revenue effect, and the number of 
competitors-voice effect were significant but opposite in sign from that which was hypothesized; and the 
balance of the hypothesized effects were not significant. 
In particular, the number of competitors positively affected revenue, instead of negatively. As a result 
revenue negatively affected voice rather than positively. 
 DISCUSSION 
Cost-of-Exit 
Retailers with a high perceived cost to exit the incumbent wholesaler relationship were also likely to use 
voice when there were relationship problems. The direct cost-of-exit effect on voice was almost the same as the 
satisfaction-voice effect in this context (see Table 4). This suggests that satisfaction and cost-of-exit may play 
equal roles in encouraging voice in the study context (however see the total effect of cost-of-exit in the next 
paragraph). 
Alternative Attractiveness, Investment and Switching Cost 
In previous research alternative attractiveness, investment and switching cost have been specified as 
directly affecting voice (see Ping 1993; Rusbult et al. 1982; Rusbult et al. 1988). Unfortunately a 
respecification of the Figure 1 model that included the Figure 1 paths plus paths to voice from alternative 
attractiveness, investment, and switching cost was not identified. However, the results from a respecification of 
Figure 1 that added a single path to voice from alternative attractiveness (not reported) suggested that 




1993; Rusbult et al. 1982; Rusbult et al. 1988). Nevertheless, Hirschman (1970) argued that those with 
diminished alternatives were likely to use voice (p. 52 and 53), as previously mentioned. To explain these 
apparently inconsistent results, decreased alternative attractiveness may have increased the subject firms' 
perception of dependence on their partner firm (Emerson 1962), and increased their perception that there 
would be more to lose by complaining than there would be to gain. However reduced alternative attractiveness 
was also likely to have been the result of increased cost-of-exit, and increased cost-of-exit was likely to 
increase voice. The resulting total effect of cost-of-exit (i.e., the positive direct effect of cost-of-exit on voice 
plus the negative indirect cost-of-exit effect via alternative attractiveness) was positive and significant (see the 
next paragraph), which suggests that although alternative attractiveness and cost-of-exit appear to affect voice 
in opposite directions, decreased alternative attractiveness because of increased cost-of-exit was likely to 
increase voice. 
Parenthetically, the standardized total effect of cost-of-exit on voice was smaller than the standardized 
satisfaction-voice effect (γVOI,SAT = .28, TotalγVOI,COE = .18). While the direct effects of satisfaction and cost-of-
exit were similar (see Table 4), this suggests that satisfaction may have a larger overall effect on voice than 
cost-of-exit. In addition, using the single path specification approach just described, voice was not directly 
associated with investment or switching cost (not reported). 
Number of Retailer Employees 
Retailers with more employees were also more likely to use voice. As discussed previously this result could 
be explained by perspective theory, which predicts that when the range of opinions to which they are exposed 
is wide, subjects should be more extreme in their opinions. For firms with many employees, higher cost 
responses to relationship problems (than doing nothing) such as voice and exit may have been discussed, and, 
because voice is less costly than exit and has a probabilistic reward, voice responses may have been the result. 
Retailer Revenue 
Retailers with higher revenue were also more likely to use voice. It is plausible that higher revenue retailers 
were more valuable to wholesalers in the study. As a result, these retailers may have received more unsolicited 
consideration and attention, and experienced better problem resolution efforts, and they may not have needed 
to resort to voice often. 




The number of competitive stores positively affected revenue. One explanation for this result might be that 
increased competition may have increased the level of promotion in the study retailers' service areas. This in 
turn may have increased primary demand for hardware in these service areas. This could have lead to increased 
revenue for all the retailers in these areas, and in particular the study retailers. However, it is also plausible that 
in competitive markets, only the larger hardware retailers may have survived. 
Combining the paths between the number of competitive stores and voice (the competitive stores-revenue-
voice path) produced the hypothesized indirect negative effect on voice. This indirect effect of the number of 
competitive stores on voice was significant, and suggests that as the number of competitive stores increased, 
voice declined. As we have already speculated, an explanation for this result could be that competitive markets 
contain larger retailers, and these larger retailers may have been less likely to use voice. 
Years with the Wholesaler 
Years with the wholesaler was positively correlated with satisfaction and cost-of-exit. This suggests that 
long-lived wholesaler-retailer relationships were associated with increased satisfaction and higher cost-of-exit 
as Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) and others predict. Because satisfied firms and those with high cost-of-exit in 
turn were likely to be more vocal, this implies that years with the wholesaler was positively (but indirectly) 
associated with voice. This in turn suggests that longer-lived retailer-wholesaler relationships were associated 
with higher levels of voice via satisfaction and cost-of-exit. However because this relationship involves 
correlations, it is not the case that longer-lived relationships (indirectly) make voice more likely, only that they 
somehow positively covary. 
 IMPLICATIONS 
While generalizing from a single study is risky, assuming the cultivation of voice is as desirable as it 
appears, the study results suggest that wholesalers interested in relationship maintenance may want to maintain 
or increase retailer satisfaction and retailer cost-of-exit, and encourage voice from their newer retailer 
relationships, retailers with higher revenue, and retailers with fewer employees. These retailers were either less 
likely to use voice, or they were associated with reduced voice in the study. 
Satisfaction 
Overall satisfaction had the largest overall effect on voice in the study. For relationship managers 




satisfaction maintenance and its improvement may be the best defensive strategy to cultivate retailer voice. 
In addition, it is likely that favorable resolution of relationship problems would increase the overall 
satisfaction of the retailers involved (Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987, Frazier 1983, Thibaut and Kelly 1959), and 
in turn should increase the likelihood of their voice in the future (see Ping 1993). This plausible circle of 
overall satisfaction, problem recognition, voice, problem resolution, and increased overall satisfaction may also 
reduce relationship neglect and exiting (Ping 1993), and should help strengthen the relationship (Dwyer, 
Schurr and Oh 1987; Frazier 1983). 
Cost-of-Exit 
The study results suggest that increasing retailer cost-of-exit is likely to increase their voice. While the 
direct effect of cost-of-exit on voice was equivalent to that of satisfaction, its total effect was less than 
satisfaction because alternative attractiveness positively affected voice. Nevertheless, wholesalers interested in 
relationship maintenance may wish to increase retailer cost-of-exit to help stimulate retailer voice. Wholesaler-
sponsored proposals that increase mobility barriers, such as retailer investment in such areas as employee 
training, and switching costs, such as contracts and pledges (Anderson and Weitz 1992), and incentives such as 
cumulative discounts (i.e., discounts calculated on year-to-date orders), may produce the additional benefit of 
increasing retailer voice. 
Encouraging Voice 
Recalling Ping's (1993) remarks regarding satisfaction with a relationship event versus overall relationship 
satisfaction, increased overall retailer satisfaction may be accomplished one event at a time, and to increase 
overall relationship satisfaction, the percentage of satisfactory relationship events should be increased so that it 
is noticed by the retailer. To increase retailer cost-of-exit in the study context, alternative attractiveness could 
be manipulated by for example publicity involving the return of unhappy defectors (as AT&T is currently 
doing), additional retailer investments in the relationship could be actively merchandized, and switching costs 
could be increased with cumulative discounts for example. 
Authors have also suggested directly soliciting complaints and working to resolve them (e.g., providing 
800 numbers, and quick and competent complaint processing) (Hirschman 1970, 1974; Fornell and Wernerfelt 
1987). Further, authors have argued that  voice is affected by the expectation of the success of voice, the 




relationship to the subject firm, and voice response style (e.g., no response to an irate response-- see Singh 
1990b). For these reasons, wholesalers interested in relationship maintenance may wish to consider additional 
means of increasing retailer voice such as publicizing successful retailer outcomes resulting from their use of 
voice, and having wholesaler sales reps actively solicit retailer voice in retailing firms that might be likely to be 
persistently non-vocal (i.e., newer relationships, retailers in competitive areas, and those with higher revenue or 
fewer employees) (For example in subsequent contact with the interview firms, one supplier had assumed that 
all non-vocal customers had relationship problems by instructing sales reps to solicit relationship problems 
from all nonvocal customers. Because most of their customers were non-vocal, we suggested they experiment 
with encouraging voice in their newer customers, and customers in competitive markets, with higher revenue, 
or fewer employees. Some of the ideas resulting from their internal contest to identify voice generating ideas 
included supplier executives visiting customer executives to identify and solicit relationship problems, 
customer-council board meetings at non-vocal customer locations with an invitation to the non-vocal customer 
host to participate in the board meetings, and lotteries involving problems submitted by nonvocal customers). 
 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Much work remains to be done in understanding voice. The squared multiple correlation (R2= .27) for 
voice observed in this study suggests that it has other antecedents in the study context. As previously 
mentioned Hirschman (1970) argued that voice should be affected by the expectation of the success of voice, 
the advantage to be gained by using voice (see Banfield 1961, Singh 1990a), the importance of the relationship 
to the subject firm, and the availability of mechanisms to communicate complaints inexpensively and 
effectively should increase voice. 
There may also be other firm demographic variables that are related to their voice (see Pfeffer 1983 for a 
summary of organizational demographic variables). Hirschman (1970) also argued that industry structure 
should affect voice (we thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this plausible antecedent of voice). 
Specifically he proposed that in what he termed loose monopolies there should be little voice. Andreasen 
(1985) characterized loose monopolies as industries in which a near-monopoly exists, and he proposed that 
physicians, for example, are a loose monopoly. Based on Hirschman's (1970) argument, it is plausible that 
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 Table 1 
 MEASURE SUMMARY 
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ 
Construct  Conceptual Definition Operational Definition Items Sample Item  
Voice  Constructive attempts Intention to notify construc-    4 I will try to discuss any primary-wholesaler 
(VOI)  to change objection- tively and work with the  related problems with them. 
able relationship primary wholesaler to solve 
conditions. relationship problems. 
 
Satisfaction Global evaluation of Belief that the relationship     5 All in all, my relationship with my 
 (SAT)  relationship fulfillment. is satisfactory.   primary wholesaler is very satisfactory. 
 
Alternative Global evaluation of the Satisfaction believed to be      4 Overall the alternative wholesaler 
 Attractiveness relationship fulfillment available in the best   would be a much better company to do 




Investment Cost to build and main- Magnitude of the cost that     4* A lot of energy, time and effort have 
 (INV)  tain the current relation- went into building and main-  gone into building and maintaining the 
ship in anticipation of taining the current   relationship with the current wholesaler. 
future exchanges. relationship. 
 
Switching Costs to change to an Cost and loss required to term-     4      Generally speaking the costs in time, 
 Cost  alternative relationship. inate the current relationship  money, effort and grief to switch 
 (SWC)    and secure an alternative  primary wholesalers would be high. 
relationship. 
 
Years with Number of years How many years have you     1 
 Wholesaler the retailer has done business with your 
  (YRS)  done business primary wholesaler? 
with the supplier. 
 
Years in  Number of years How many years has your     1 
 Business  the retailer has store been open? 
 (OPN)  been in business. 
 
Employees Retailer's number The number of employees     1 
 (EMP)  of employees. at your store? 
 
Revenue  Retailer's revenue. Your last year's sales?     1 
 (REV) 
 
Competitors Number of competitive The number of competing     1 
 (CMP)  stores in retailer's  stores in your service area? 
service area. 
 
ROI  Retailer return on Last year's return on investment     1 
investment.  was (circle one) 
a. negative 
b. 0-4 percent 
: 
j. 50 percent or more 
 
Revenue/ Revenue per employee. Revenue divided by number 




* The uniqueness item in Ping's (1993) scale was deleted to attain internal consistency. The deletion was based on an examination of the fit statistics available 




 Table 2 
              COST-OF-EXIT MEASUREMENT MODEL RESULTS                 
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ 
 
           Parameter  Estimatea  Parameterb Estimatea  Parameter    Estimatea 
λa1 0.92 λsc3 0.96  εi2 0.12 
λa2 0.90 λsc4 1.00  εi3 0.08  
λa3 1.00 γALT,COE       -0.61*  εi4 0.12  
λa4 0.77  γINV,COE 0.89  εsc1 0.29  
λi1 0.85  γSCT,COE 0.86 εsc2 0.20 
λi2 0.94  εa1  0.27  εsc3 0.17 
λi3 1.00  εa2  0.24 εsc4 0.20 
λi4 0.94  εa3  0.07 ζALT 0.67 
λsc1 0.89  εa4  0.24 ζINV 0.23 
λsc2 0.97  εi1  0.45 ζSCT 0.48 
                     φCOE 1.00  
 
Fit Indicesa: 
Chi-Square Statistic Value                                                          143 
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom                                                  57 
p-Value of Chi-Square Value                                                      .00 
Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Indexc                                        .96 
GFI                                     .90 
AGFI                                     .86 
Steiger (1990) RMS Error of Approximation (RMSEA)d            .08 
p-value RMSEA < .05                                                                  .00  
 
Average Variance Extracted                                                         .58 
 







a Maximum likelihood. 
b COE = Cost-of-Exit, etc. (see the definitions in Table 1). 
c .90 or better indicates acceptable model-to-data fit (see McClelland and Judd 1993). 
d Values up through .08 indicate acceptable model-to-data fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog 
1993). 
* While it is customary to reverse code an indicator that loads negatively on a concept (see for 




 Table 3 
 MEASUREMENT MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTSa 
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ 
 
Latent Variable Covariancesb c (φ's): 
 
    Latent                                                                    Latent Variable                                                                     
   Variable                 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12     13   
 
1.  Satisfaction .51* (not specified) .30* .11 .06 .02 -.00 -.00 -.08 .04 .59*  
2.  Alt. Attract. d .85*  d     d          d 
3.  Investment  d     d .60*     d     (not specified)      d 
4.  Switching Cost  d     d     d .96*          d  
5.  Voice   .09    .18* -.00 .00 .10 -.07 -.04 -.01 -.06 .33* 
6.  Years With .98    -.02 148.09* .40* .09 .09 .14* .00 .01 .20* 
7.  Open   1.29    .03 132.40 726.83* .06 .06 .05 -.01 -.06 -.08 
8.  Employees .23    .61 14.81 24.03 173.58* .51* .39* -.02 .00 .22* 
9.  Revenue -.09 (not specified) -.50 19.22 26.99 109.41 263.81* .19* .01 -.07 .05 
10. Competitors -.08    -.22 22.11 18.47 65.51 40.44 157.25* -.00 .05 -.13 
11. ROI  -.16    -.01 .05 -1.16 -.80 .80 -.19 6.57* -.01 -.15* 
12. Revenue/ .19    -.19 1.04 -11.94 .00 -8.61 4.79 -.17 48.01* .02 
Employee  




Chi-Squared Statistic Value                                485 
Chi-Squared Degrees of Freedom                               309 
p-Value of Chi-Squared Value                                .00 
Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Indexe                               .96 
GFIf                                                                               .86 
AGFIf                                                                              .82 
Steiger (1990) RMS Error of Approximation (RMSEA)g           .05 
p-value RMSEA < .05                                                                 .47 
 
Average Variance Extracted: 
               Variables                   
1 2 3 4 5   
Average Vari- 
 ance Extracted .77 .77 .74 .80 .75 
 
Latent Variable Reliabilities: 
                      Variables                  
           1       2        3        4        5   
Latent Vari- 




a See Table 4 for the loadings and error variances. 
b Covariances on and below the diagonal, correlations above. 
c Maximum likelihood. 
d Not specified. 
e .90 or better indicates acceptable model-to-data fit (see McClelland and Judd 1993). 
f Shown for completeness only-- GFI and AGFI may be inadequate for fit assessment in larger models (see Anderson and 
Gerbing 1984). 
g Values up through .08 indicate acceptable model-to-data fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog 1993).  




 Table 4 
 STRUCTURAL MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTSa 
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ 
 
  Parameter  Estimate  Parameterb  Estimate   Parameterb       Estimatec  t-value 
 
λs1  0.79  λv4   1.00 εsc4      0.21 
λs2  0.88  γALT,COE -0.61 εv1      0.06 
λs3  1.00  γINV,COE  0.89 εv2      0.03 
λs4  0.88  γSCT,COE  0.86 εv3     0.06 
λs5  0.93  εs1   0.16 εv4     0.04 
λa1  0.92  εs2   0.13 φ's       d 
λa2  0.90  εs3   0.10 ζVOI     0.15 
λa3  1.00  εs4   0.11 ζREV    253.40 
λa4  0.78  εs5   0.10 ζROI     6.57 
λi1  0.85  εa1   0.26 γVOI,SAT     0.28  3.26 
λi2  0.94  εa2   0.24 γVOI,COE      0.31  2.58 
λi3  1.00  εa3   0.07 γVOI,YRS   -0.05 -0.79 
λi4  0.93  εa4   0.24 γVOI,EMP    0.15  2.37 
λsc1  0.89  εi1   0.45 γVOI,OPN     0.02  0.38 
λsc2  0.97  εi2   0.12 βVOI,REV   -0.14 -2.43 
λsc3  0.95  εi3   0.08 βVOI, ROI    0.04  0.70 
λsc4  1.00  εi4   0.12 γVOI,R/E   -0.09 -1.49 
λv1  0.86  εsc1   0.29 γREV,CMP    0.19  3.02 
λv2  0.97  εsc2   0.21 γROI,CMP   -0.00 -0.08 






Chi-Square Statistic Value                                                           546 
Chi-Squared Degrees of Freedom                                328 
p-Value of Chi-Square Value                                                       .00 
Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Indexe                                         .95 
GFIf                                                                           .85 
AGFIf                                                                   .82 
Steiger (1990) RMS Error of Approximation (RMSEA)g             .05 
p-value RMSEA < .05                                                                  .13  
 





a Maximum likelihood. 
b COE = Cost-of-Exit, etc. (see the definitions in Table 1). 
c Structural coefficients (e.g., γ's and β's) are standardized. 
d See the Table 3 values. 
e .90 or better indicates acceptable model-to-data fit (see McClelland and Judd 1993). 
f Shown for completeness only-- GFI and AGFI may be inadequate for fit assessment in larger models (see Anderson 
and Gerbing 1984). 
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 Because voice (attempts to change rather than escape from objectionable relationship conditions) may 
play an important role in relationship maintenance, the paper investigated antecedents of interfirm voice, 
including the cost to exit the relationship, overall relationship satisfaction, and firm demographic variables. 
 After summarizing what is known about interfirm voice, including the confusing empirical results 
involving voice (e.g., alternative attractiveness typically has had a positive association with voice, rather 
than negative as theory predicts), the paper proposes that a firm’s voice is affected by their cost to exit (a 
second-order latent variable, with the latent variable “indicators” alternative attractiveness, relationship 
investment, and switching cost), plus their overall relationship satisfaction and firm demographic variables 
(e.g., their revenue and number of employees). These proposals are tested in a field survey of hardware 
retailer voice involving their primary wholesalers. Using structural equation analysis, the results provide 
support for the proposed voice associations with satisfaction, cost to exit, and several firm demographic 
variables. The results suggest a firm’s voice was likely to be increased by their overall relationship 
satisfaction and cost to exit; newer customers, and subject firms with many competitors, higher revenue, or 
few employees, were either less likely to be vocal, or associated with reduced voice in the study context. 
Further, the results suggested that because voice may reduce relationship exit, interfirm relationship 
managers interested in relationship maintenance may wish to increase partner firm voice by increasing 
their satisfaction and their cost-of-exit. 
The results also suggested that several firm demographic variables might be useful to relationship managers 
interested in the maintenance of important relationships. Relationship problems are known to the offended firm 
but not necessarily to the offending firm. In absence of their voice or some other means of identifying them, 
offended firms are likely to remain unidentified, remediation of their problem(s) is therefore less likely, and the 
likelihood of their exiting the relationship is increased. Hence relationship managers interested in relationship 
maintenance may wish to use several firm demographic variables to identify individual firms by name that may 
be likely to be persistently non-vocal when there are interfirm relationship problems (newer relationships, and 




reduced voice in the study). 





 The article reports a study of the effects on exit intention of 
retailer revenue and productivity, in a wholesaler-retailer context. 
The study involved hardware retailers and their primary wholesalers, 
and some associations were hypothesized to be nonrecursive (bidirec-
tional). The analysis involved structural equations, and the results 
included that the retailer's intention to exit the relationship with 
their primary wholesaler was negatively affected by retailer revenue, 
revenue-per-employee, and the number of competitive stores in the 
retailer's service area. In addition, the retailer's exit intention was 
positively affected by return on investment. Finally, the number of 
competitive stores was positively associated with retailer revenue, and 
negatively associated with their return on investment. These results 
and their implications are discussed. 
 
 
 In addition to recognizing the existence of long term buyer seller 
relationships in channel relationships (Arndt 1979, Wind 1970) (see 
Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; and Ford 1980), researchers and 
practitioners have recognized the benefits of these relationships (see 
Frazier, Spekman, O'Neil 1988; Turnbull and Valla 1986; and Webster 
1979). Despite implications that the development and maintenance of 
long term relationships is a recent phenomenon, (see Business Week 
1987), these relationships have existed for years, especially in 
retailing: a hardware retailer reported to the authors that they have 
done business with their primary wholesaler for 76 years. 
 Yet these relationships are terminated. Except for coverage of the 
legal aspects of these relationship terminations (see "Legal Develop-
ments in Marketing," in the Journal of Marketing), however, there is 
little empirical knowledge of the termination of these channel 
relationships. 
 There has been a trickle of articles lately that addresses channel 
relationship termination (e.g., Ping and Dwyer 1991, and Ping 1993). 
These articles reported investigations of response intentions such as 
intention to exit a channel relationship. They also investigated 
antecedents of these response intentions such as overall relationship 
satisfaction, the attractiveness of alternative exchange relationships, 
the perceived magnitude of relationship-specific investments, and 
switching costs. While the explanatory power of some of these variables 
was impressive, the absence of traditional economic variables such as 
revenue and return on investment is noteworthy. 
 That these variables are important in the evaluation of a channel 
relationship is hardly news to practitioners. In fact, some channel 
texts go to considerable lengths to discuss the use of these variables 
to evaluate the channel relationship (e.g., Stern and El-Ansary 1988; 
and Stern, El-Ansary and Brown 1989). However, our knowledge of how 
well these variables are tied to the actual termination of channel 
relationships is limited to anecdotal reports. 
 The purpose of this study is to expand our understanding of 
channel relationship termination by focusing on several economic 
antecedents of exit intention. The research fills a gap in the channel 
reactions-to-dissatisfaction literature, and extends Ping's (1993) 
findings by providing a broader understanding of the antecedents of 
exit intention. It also provides empirical support for the economic 
view of long term buyer-seller relationships proposed in Stern and 
Reve's (1980) political-economic framework, as a companion to the 
psycho social view of these relationships (Ping 1993; Dwyer, Schurr and 
Oh 1987). After briefly summarizing the research on channel 
relationship termination, the paper proposes that revenue and 
productivity measures such as return on investment are antecedents of 
exit intention. The results of a test this proposal using a field 
survey of retailers is reported, and managerial implications are 
discussed. 
 We begin with a summary of the research related to channel 
relationship termination. 
 Background 
 The marketing channel literature has addressed channel relation-
ship termination in several articles. Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) 
argued that the process of buyer-seller relationship development 
consists of awareness, exploration, expansion, commitment, and 
dissolution phases (see also Ford 1980). In their description of the 
dissolution phase of the relationship, they offered as a framework for 
the process of terminating an interfirm relationship, Duck's (1982) 
process of interpersonal relationship dissolution. Duck argued that 
individuals progress through four broad stages on the way to personal 
relationship termination: intrapsychic, dyadic, social, and grave 
dressing stages. 
 Ping and Dwyer (1991) subsequently proposed that the committed and 
dissolution phases of buyer-seller relationship formation consist of 
stages. They argued that firms progress through seven stages on the way 
to channel relationship termination: positive or negative affect stages 
regarding the partner firm; intrapersonal and intracompany stages; then 
intercompany, public and aftermath stages. 
 Ping (1993) studied the antecedents of responses to problems in 
channel relationships, including exit intention. He argued that 
satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, investments, and switching 
costs were associated with exit intention. He reported that satisfac-
tion and the unattractiveness of the alternative relationship were 
negatively associated with exit intention, and that investments and 
switching costs were not associated with exit intention. 
 The resulting picture of channel relationship termination is 
cloudy at best. We talked to firms that were contemplating or had 
recently completed channel relationship terminations.1 In these 
conversations we consistently heard that economic variables such as 
revenue and revenue-per-employee were important. They were either a 
deciding or justifying factor in switching to a new supplier, or 
demoting a major supplier and giving more business to a minor supplier. 
 We propose that economic variables such as revenue, return on 
investment, and revenue-per-employee also affect exit intention. The 
balance of the paper describes a field survey that tests this proposi-
tion. 
 Hypotheses 
 In addition to latent variables such as satisfaction, economic 
variables such as revenue should be associated with exit intention in a 
channel relationship. Ping (1993) argued that increases in a firm's 
overall satisfaction should make economic exchanges with its partner 
firm perceptually more valuable. The firm's revenue should have a 
similar effect on the relationship with its exchange partner. As 
satisfaction and revenue increase, the firm should be disinclined to 
exit a relationship from which these are derived, because there is much 
to lose. Thus, 
 H1: Satisfaction and revenue are negatively associated with exit 
intention.  
                                                 
 1 The six companies interviewed represented a convenient sample in 
a geographically localized area. They had estimated gross revenues of 
three million to eighty million dollars, and represented distributors 
and retailers in diverse markets such as tires, hardware, and 
electrical supplies. We contacted at least one key informant in each 
company who was responsible for one or more "up-channel" or "down-
channel" relationships, and was directly involved in the target 
relationship termination. These informants had various titles including 
president, owner, and general manager. 
 Previous studies lend some support to these assertions. Ping 
(1993) observed that satisfaction was negatively associated with exit 
intention. In romantic relationships, Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982) 
reported that prior satisfaction was negatively associated with 
exiting. Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, and Mainous (1988) reported similar 
findings in the employment relations literature. 
 However, the interviews mentioned earlier suggested that revenue 
was affected by the decision to exit the current exchange relationship. 
The firms generally reported that their intention to exit an existing 
relationship and secure or increase business with an alternative was 
accompanied by or resulted in improved revenue. It seems plausible that 
as firms become more concerned about their relationship with a major 
exchange partner they become more concerned about their business. The 
interview informants reported activities aimed at increasing revenue 
ranging from increased promotion to adding new merchandise lines. 
Hence, 
 H2: Exit intention positively affects revenue. 
 In the interviews we also noticed that better managed firms seemed 
to be over represented. Many of these firms focused on efficiency in 
their business, and appeared to be very aware of productivity measures 
such as revenue-per-employee and return on investment. For this reason, 
we propose that productivity is negatively associated with exit 
intention, and that less productive firms should be more inclined to 
exit an exchange relationship when there are problems. In particular, 
productivity measures such as return on investment and revenue-per-
employee should be negatively associated with exit intention. Formally, 
 H3: Return on investment negatively affects exit intention, 
and 
 H4: Revenue-per-employee is negatively associated with exit 
intention. 
 However, exit intention should in turn be associated with return 
on investment. Intending to change exchange partners should increase 
the subject firm's investments in non-revenue producing areas of the 
business, and reduce return on investment. The interview informants 
reported non-revenue producing activities ranging from attending trade 
shows to meet prospective wholesalers, to hiring a marketing research 
firm to do competitive research. Specifically, exit intention should 
increase the firm's search, evaluation and negotiating costs, and 
return on investment should decrease as a result. Hence, 
 H5: Exit intention negatively affects return on investment. 
 In retailing, the number of competitors in a retailer's market 
area is plausibly related to the retailer's revenues and return on 
investment. In mature retailing categories, as the number of 
competitors increases in the subject retailer's service area, an 
established firm's revenue and return on investment should decrease. It 
could be argued that competition weeds out the poor performers, and in 
effect only the strong survive. Thus, for established retailers 
 H6: The number of competitors negatively affects retailer revenue 
and return on investment. 
 How long the retailing firm has been in business, and the number 
of years the firm has done business with their primary wholesaler 
should also affect exit intention. Retailers that have been in business 
for many years should be more knowledgeable of the alternative 
wholesalers (Ping 1993), and experienced in dealing with their 
wholesaler (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). Because these may be sources of 
countervailing power (Dwyer 1980), these retailers should be less 
dependent on the wholesaler (Emerson 1962).2 This in turn should make 
them more willing to change wholesalers. Hence, 
                                                 
 2 A reviewer suggested that established retailers may have more 
 H7: The number of years the retailer has been in business is 
positively associated with their exit intention. 
 On the other hand, the length of time the retailer and the 
wholesaler have done business together should make future business 
together likely. In long-lived exchange relationships, relationship 
specific investments have increased, commitment has grown, and there is 
a pressure to adjust rather than dissolve an exchange relationship 
(Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). Thus, 
 H8: The number of years the retailer has done business with their 
primary wholesaler is negatively associated with exit 
intention. 
 The balance of this article presents the results of a test of 
these hypotheses. 
 Method 
 We conducted a field survey of hardware retailers concerning their 
relationship with their primary wholesaler: their top full line 
wholesaler. The results were used to estimate the Figure 1 structural 
equation model using EQS. 
Measures 
 The measurement of the study variables used a combination of 
balanced five point Likert items, forced choice, and open-ended scales. 
For example satisfaction, the firm's global evaluation of relationship 
fulfillment (Dwyer and Oh, 1987), was measured using a modification of 
the Dwyer and Oh satisfaction scale inspired by Gaski and Nevin (1985). 
The domain of channel member satisfaction includes all the character-
istics of the exchange relationship that the firm deems "rewarding, 
profitable, or instrumental" (Rukert and Churchill, 1984), or costly, 
unfair or frustrating (Ping 1993). The items in the satisfaction 
                                                                                                                                                             
power in dealing with wholesalers compared to relatively new retailers. 
measure assessed the retailer's overall satisfaction with the 
wholesaler, fairness in the exchange relationship, and the degree to 
which the wholesaler was a good company with which to do business (see 
Table 1). 
 Exit intention, the intention to physically leave the exchange 
relationship, was operationalized as the propensity to terminate the 
primary wholesaler relationship (Ping 1993). This conceptualization 
taps the degree of inclination to discontinue the relationship with the 
primary wholesaler. The items in the exit intention measure concerned 
thinking of exiting the relationship, looking for a replacement primary 
wholesaler, considering a replacement primary wholesaler, and resolving 
to end the relationship with the primary wholesaler. 
 The economic variables, the retailer's annual revenue, the number 
of years the retailer has done business with the primary wholesaler, 
the number of years the retailer has been in business, the number of 
competitive stores in the retailer's service area, and a variable used 
to compute the retailer's revenue-per-employee, the retailer's number 
employees, were measured using open-ended questions. These measures 
asked for last year's revenue, the number of years the retailer has 
done business with the primary wholesaler, the number of years the 
retailer has been in business, the number of competitive stores in the 
retailer's service area, and the retailer's number of employees. 
Revenue-per-employee was computed by dividing the retailer's revenue by 
the number of employees, and return on investment was measured using a 
forced choice scale (see Table 1). 
Sample 
 The study sampled hardware retailers. The key informant within 
these sampling units was the store operator or executive. We randomly 
drew samples of these informants from the subscription list for a 
hardware retailing industry publication that appeared to be 
representative of U.S. hardware retailers in all 50 states. 
 The survey questionnaire was mailed to 100 pretest retailers and 
600 final test retailers, and a follow-up post card mailing in the 
final test produced one hundred eighty-five usable responses. 
 An analysis of the postmarks and demographics of the responding 
retailers suggested that the set of responses was generally representa-




 The pretest responses were used to assess the psychometric 
properties of the satisfaction and exit intention measures. The 
measures appeared to be unidimensional, internally and externally 
consistent (see Gerbing and Anderson, 1984), and had coefficient 
alpha's of .8 or above. The psychometric properties of the measures 
were reexamined using the final test responses and item-to-total 
correlations, coefficient alpha calculations, ordered similarity 
coefficients (Hunter, 1973), multiple group analysis (Anderson, Gerbing 
and Hunter, 1987), and single factor analysis (Jöreskog, 1993, pp. 297, 
313). The measures were unidimensional, and internally and externally 
consistent. In addition, they had latent variable reliabilities of .95, 
and an average variance extracted of .76 or above (Fornell and Larker, 
1981) (see Table 3). 
Validity 
 The satisfaction and exit intention measures appeared to be 
content valid, and the Table 4 intercorrelations of the study variables 
were below .65, which suggests discriminant validity. 
 They also appeared to be construct valid. The study variables were 
significantly and plausibly correlated with at least one other study 
variable (see Table 4), except return on investment (ROI), which was 
not correlated with any study variable. In particular, satisfaction was 
negatively correlated with exit intention as hypothesized. The number 
of years the retailer had done business with the wholesaler was 
positively correlated with the number of years the retailer had been 
open. The number of years the retailer had been open was positively 
correlated with the number of competitive stores, and revenue was 
positively correlated with revenue-per-employee. However, revenue was 
positively correlated with the number of competitive stores rather than 
negative as hypothesized. 
 The lack of at least the hypothesized correlation between ROI and 
exit intention was due to the non-recursive relationship between these 
two variables in the sample. In addition, the unexpected correlation 
between revenue and the number of competitive stores is explainable, 
and will be discussed later.  
Structural Model Estimation 
 The Figure 1 relationships between exit intention, and revenue and 
return on investment were unbiased (see the Appendix for a discussion 
of the potential for biased coefficient estimates in nonrecursive 
associations). In addition, the Figure 1 nonrecursive structural 
equation model was identified (see the Appendix for an identification 
proof). 
 The measurement and structural models corresponding to Figure 1 
appeared to fit the data, based on the Comparative Fit Index (Bentler 
1990) and the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (see Tables 4 and 5).3 
                                                 
 3 A path between revenue-per-employee and exit intention was added 
to Figure 1 to obtain admissible structural coefficient estimates 
between exit intention and revenue. Little is known about the 
sensitivity of non recursive latent variable models to structural model 
misspecification, but in the present analysis the non recursive 
coefficient estimates were biased by omitting a path that was 
significant in the measurement model.  
Table 5 shows maximum likelihood structural parameter estimates, and 
maximum likelihood-"Robust" standard error and chi-squared estimates,4 
along with two stage least squares structural parameter estimates for 
reference.5 
Hypotheses Tests 
 The hypothesized associations received mixed support (see Table 
5). Revenue and ROI affected exit intention, as hypothesized, and exit 
intention was associated with the satisfaction, also as hypothesized. 
In addition, revenue was associated with the number of competitive 
stores, as hypothesized, but ROI was positively associated with the 
number of competitive stores. Revenue-per-employee was negatively 
associated with exit intention indirectly via a significant path 
connecting it and revenue. Among the associations not observed were the 
H2 and H5 revenue- and ROI-to-exit intention associations. In addition, 
the H7 and H8 associations with exit intention for years in business, 
and years with the wholesaler were not significant. 
 Discussion 
                                                 
 4 While maximum likelihood estimates of measurement and structural 
parameters are robust to departures from normality in the data 
(Anderson and Amemiya 1985, 1986; Boomsma 1983; Browne 1987; Harlow 
1985; Sharma, Durvasula and Dillon 1989; Tanaka 1984), maximum 
likelihood standard errors and chi-squared statistics are believed to 
be sensitive to departures from normality (see Bollen 1990 p. 406; 
Jöreskog and Sörbom 1989). Because, as is frequently the case, the 
study variables were not particularly normally distributed, Table 4 
shows maximum likelihood "Robust" estimates of the standard error and 
chi-squared statistic (Satorra and Bentler 1988; see Bentler 1989, 
p.217 et seq.; and Hu, Bentler and Kano 1992). This Robust chi-squared 
estimate was also used to calculate the Comparative Fit Index shown in 
Table 4. 
 5 The Table 5 regression estimates were produced using summed 
indicators for satisfaction and exit intention, and two stage least 
squares (see Goldberger 1964 or Berry 1984 for details). The two stage 
least squares coefficient estimates were then used to verify the 
reasonableness of the EQS coefficient estimates. 
 In summary, the study found five associations with exit intention. 
Revenue had a negative effect on exit intention, as hypothesized. 
However, ROI had a positive effect on exit intention, rather than the 
hypothesized negative effect. Revenue-per-employee was negatively 
associated with exit intention through a path involving a significant 
association between revenue-per-employee and revenue, and the 
significant association between revenue and exit intention. Similarly, 
the number of competitive stores had a surprising negative association 
with exit intention. However, the number of years the retailers did 
business with their wholesalers, and the years the retailers were in 
business were not related to their exit intention. Finally, retailer 
satisfaction was negatively associated with their exit intention, as 
hypothesized. This last result is consistent with prior channel 
research (Ping 1993). 
 The positive association between exit intention and ROI was 
interesting. Based on the interviews, we expected ROI to be negatively 
associated with exit intention. However, the study results suggest that 
higher ROI retailers also had higher exit intentions. One explanation 
for this positive association would be that higher ROI retailers are 
somehow less dependent on their primary wholesaler. This should make 
such retailers more inclined to exit their primary wholesaler 
relationship when there are relationship problems. These retailers 
might invest little in relationship specific assets (Williamson 1975) 
to attain high ROI, and this in turn could make them more able to 
switch primary wholesalers. These retailers could be located in less 
competitive markets (the correlation between ROI and number of 
competitors was negative) where their own efforts to stimulate 
selective demand may be sufficient, and the primary wholesaler is 
nothing more than a source of goods. While it is risky to generalize 
from a single study, this suggests that wholesalers may want to devote 
extra attention to these retailers when there are relationship 
problems, because these retailers were more inclined to exit in this 
study. 
 Turning to the indirect effect between revenue-per-employee and 
exit intention, the non-significant direct effect between these two 
variables was unexpected. We anticipated that productivity of any type 
would be positively associated with exit intention. While ROI, a type 
of productivity, was positively associated with exit intention, the 
direct effect of revenue-per-employee on exit intention was non 
significant. However, the indirect effect on exit intention of revenue-
per-employee, through the path from revenue-per-employee to revenue, 
was negative and significant, because each of these paths was 
significant.6 This suggests that as revenue-per-employee increases, exit 
intention declines, and the high revenue-per-employee retailers in this 
study had lower exit intentions toward their wholesaler. In addition, 
revenue-per-employee was uncorrelated with ROI (see Table 4). This 
suggests that high ROI and high revenue-per-employee were different 
productivity strategies in this context, and the two strategies may 
have been independently pursued. 
 The significant associations between competitive stores and 
revenue, and between competitive stores and ROI were also interesting. 
We anticipated that increased competition would depress retailer 
revenues and ROI. In this study, the number of competitive stores was 
associated with decreased ROI and increased retailer revenues. One 
explanation for the latter association would be that more competitive 
stores may have increased the level of promotion in the local market. 
                                                 
 6 The indirect effect on exit intention of revenue-per-employee 
through revenue is determined by the coefficients on the path from 
revenue-per-employee to exit intention (see Bollen 1990). The effect is 
the product of the path coefficients for the path connecting revenue-
per-employee, revenue, and exit intention (=.61*(-.25) = -.15). 
This in turn may have increased primary demand in that market. If this 
were the case, increased promotion could have lead to increased revenue 
for all the retailers. However, it could also have been the case that 
in markets with many competitors, only the larger hardware retailers 
survived. 
 Combining the two paths between the number of competitive stores 
and exit intention (the competitive stores-revenue-exit intention path 
and the competitive stores-ROI-exit intention path) produced an 
indirect negative effect on exit intention. This indirect effect of the 
number of competitive stores on exit intention was significant, because 
each component of these paths was significant.7 This suggests that the 
association between the number of competitive stores and exit intention 
was negative, and as the number of competitive stores increased, exit 
intention declined. One explanation for this result could be that 
competitive markets in this context were populated by established 
retailers (years in business was positively correlated with competitive 
stores). This, plus the attractiveness of the market to the wholesaler, 
could have made it more likely that problems between the retailer and 
the wholesaler would be resolved to the retailer's satisfaction. 
 Turning to the negative association between the number of competi-
tive stores and ROI, as the number of competitive stores increased, 
retailer financial efficiency in terms of ROI declined. Because revenue 
also increased with the number of competitive stores, this suggests 
that competition decreased at least one type of efficiency, contrary to 
                                                 
 7 The indirect effect on exit intention of competitive stores 
through revenue and ROI is determined by the combination of the paths 
from competitive stores to exit intention. The effect is the path 
coefficient for the path connecting competitive stores, revenue, and 
exit intention, plus the path coefficient for the path connecting 
competitive stores, ROI, and exit intention (=.29*[-.25] +[-.13]*.35 = 
-.11). 
economic theory. However, in this context customer proximity to the 
smaller retailers, customer price insensitivity for smaller and 
emergency purchases, and retailers willing to accept lower ROI's may 
have combined to reduce opportunity costs for "convenience minded" 
consumers, and thereby increased another type of efficiency. This 
suggests smaller hardware stores may attract purchases related to small 
repairs and projects, emergency repairs, and special orders. The larger 
stores such as HQ and Builders Square may attract purchases for major 
projects and shopping goods such as lawn mowers and wooden decks. The 
smaller stores may in effect be operating as hardware "convenience 
stores." 
 Both the length of time the retailer had been in business and the 
length of time the retailer and the wholesaler had done business with 
each other were unrelated to exit intention. We expected newer 
retailers and longer term wholesaler relationships to be negatively 
associated with exit intention. These results suggest that retailer 
experience was no predictor of exit intention, and a long-lived 
wholesaler relationship may or may not protect the relationship when 
there are relationship problems. While these results may be due to the 
correlations between the years variables and other exogenous variables 
such as the number of competitive stores, we suspect there may be many 
attractive primary wholesalers in this context. Experienced and novice 
hardware retailers may be equally aware of them. This in turn may mean 
that exit and therefore exit intention is perceived as possible: there 
are attractive alternatives (Ping 1993). For wholesalers, this may mean 
that retailer inexperience and relationship longevity cannot be assumed 
to work in the wholesaler's favor when there are relationship problems-
- they had little to do with retailer exit intention in this study. 
 Turning to the lack of exit intention effects on revenue and ROI, 
these results suggest that for retailers that intended to exit, doing 
so was not generally related to their revenue and ROI. In other words, 
the activities, mental and physical, which attended exit intention did 
not necessarily reduce retailer revenues or make their business less 
efficient. For a retailer bent on exiting a wholesaler relationship, 
this suggests long term gains from exiting may not necessarily come at 
a cost to the retailer's revenue and ROI in the short term. 
 Several significant measurement model correlations were also 
interesting. The large positive correlation between the length of time 
the retailer had been in business and the length of time the retailer 
and the wholesaler had done business with each other (φ = .46) suggests 
that in this context the retailers did not switch wholesalers often. 
 The positive correlation between the length of time the retailer 
had been in business and the number of competitive stores in the 
retailer's service area (φ = .15) suggests that the experienced 
retailer was slightly more likely to be found in the more competitive 
markets. 
 Finally, the positive correlation between revenue-per-employee and 
revenue (φ = .61) suggests that the larger retailers were more 
productive in terms of labor productivity in this context. Curiously 
the correlation between revenue and ROI was not significant, suggesting 
that these larger retailers did not necessarily enjoy higher ROI's. 
 A comment on the estimation techniques used in the study may be of 
interest. The two stage least squares regression estimates for Figure 1 
were similar in direction and size to the structural equation estimates 
(see Table 5). However, the significance estimates for the nonrecursive 
effects were attenuated, and as a result, two stage least squares 
estimation missed the significant revenue-exit intention and ROI-exit 
intention effects (see Table 5). This suggests that while coefficient 
estimates from regression involving reliable latent variables such as 
satisfaction and exit intention are generally trustworthy (see Aiken 
and West 1991), significance estimates for non recursive effects may 
not be. For this reason, structural equation analysis may be preferred 
to two stage least squares in estimating non recursive effects for 
latent variables. 
 Much work remains to be done in this area. The study was designed 
to investigate plausible economic antecedents of exit intention, and it 
was limited by the lack of inclusion of other known antecedents such as 
alternative attractiveness, investments, or switching costs (Ping 
1993). Because of exogenous variable intercorrelations, it is possible 
that a model of exit intention that includes these known or other 
unknown antecedent variables would produce non significant effects for 
one or more of the significant effects observed in the present study. 
 In addition, exit intention may or may not be related to actual 
exiting behavior. Ping's (1993) results suggest that there is at least 
one alternative to exit intention, neglect. Ping (1993) characterizes 
neglect as emotional, rather than physical withdrawal from the exchange 
relationship. Because neglect was strongly positively correlated with 
exit intention (.70) in that study, it is possible that some of the 
present study retailers could neglect their wholesaler relationship 
rather than physically exit it. 
 Future research should attempt to determine the antecedents of 
actually exiting an exchange relationship. Because exit intention 
certainly precedes actual exiting, determining the antecedents of exit 
intention is an important first step. However, the existence of a 
neglect option observed by Ping (1993) suggests that not all who intend 
to exit may actually do so. Ping found no association between exit 
intention and relationship investments or switching costs. Perhaps 
these variables affect actual exiting rather than exit intention. 
 Summary 
 These significant exit intention associations suggest there may be 
additional factors that bear on exit intention beyond those observed in 
Ping (1993). While the negative satisfaction-exit intention association 
was observed by Ping (1993) and the present study, the present results 
suggest that increased retailer exit intention was also associated with 
higher retailer ROI, and reduced retailer revenues, revenue-per-
employee, and number of competitive stores. Retailers in this study 
with higher ROI, and lower revenue, satisfaction, competitive stores, 
and revenue-per-employee had higher exit intentions regarding their 
primary wholesaler relationship. These results suggest that a 
wholesaler's efforts to maintain retailer satisfaction, revenue, and 
revenue-per-employee may help attenuate retailer exit intention. In 
addition, higher ROI retailers, and retailers with few competitive 
stores in their service area may merit special attention from 
wholesalers when there are relationship problems: for these retailers 
in the study, as their ROI increased, or the number of competitive 
stores in their service area was lower, their exit intention increased. 
 The exit intention associations with revenue, ROI, revenue-per-
employee, and competitive stores had coefficients of -.25, .35, -.15, 
and -.11, respectively. However, the associations between satisfaction 
and exit intention were larger-- -.62 or more (see Table 4). This 
suggests that satisfaction was the most important antecedent of exit 
intention in this study. Revenue, ROI, revenue-per-employee, and 
competitive stores were about half or less as influential on exit 
intention by comparison. For wholesalers, this in turn suggests 
retailer satisfaction with the wholesaler is an important antecedent of 
exit intention, and, while not unimportant, retailer revenue, ROI, 
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 Table 1 
 SCALE ITEMS 
 ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ 
SATisfaction: (Strongly Agree  Agree  Neutral  Disagree  Strongly Disagree) 
1. All in all, my primary wholesaler is very fair with me. 
2. Overall, my primary wholesaler is a good company to do business with. 
3. In general am pretty satisfied with my relationship with my primary whole-
saler. 
4. Overall, my primary wholesaler treats me very fairly. 
5. All in all, my relationship with my primary wholesaler is very satisfac-
tory. 
 
EXIT intention:  (Strongly Agree  Agree  Neutral  Disagree  Strongly 
Disagree) 
1. Occasionally I will think about ending the business relationship with my 
primary wholesaler. 
2. I am looking for a replacement wholesaler. 
3. I am not likely to continue the business relationship with my primary 
wholesaler. 
4. I will probably consider a replacement primary wholesaler in the near 
future. 
5. I am looking at replacement wholesalers. 
6. I will probably stop doing business with my primary wholesaler in the near 
future. 
 
YRS with the current primary wholesaler: 
How many years have you done business with your primary wholesaler? _________ 
 
Number of years business has been OPEN: 
How many years has your store been open? ________ 
 
Number of employees: 
The number of employees at your store? _____ 
 
REVenue: 
Your last year's sales? _____ 
 
Number of COMPETitors: 
The number of competitive stores in your service area? _____ 
 
Return On Investment: 
Last year's return on investment was (circle one): 
a. negative 
b. 0-4 percent 
c. 5-9 percent 
d. 10-14 percent 
e. 15-19 percent 
f. 20-24 percent 
g. 25-29 percent 
h. 30-34 percent 
i. 35-49 percent 
j. 50 percent or more 
 
Revenue/EMP = REV/(Number of Employees) 
 Table 2 
 PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE 
 ══════════════════════════════════════════════════ 
 
 First Title Mentioned         Frequency 
       
 Owner, partner   98 
  President     57 
 General Manager   5 
 Chief Financial Officer   4 
 Other    15 
 Not reported    6 
 





Year's Sales Frequency 
 
>$10MM        4 
 $3-9.99MM       7 
 $1.2-2.99MM          24 
 $0.6-1.199MM                      28 
 $0.25-0.599MM                     35 
 $0.1-0.299MM                      33 
 $.01-.099MM                       20 
 $<.01MM                 0 
 Unreported                        34   
 




Primary Wholesaler Frequency 
 
   1-2                            14 
   3-5                            44 
   6-10                           42 
  11-20                           50 
  21-30                           17 
  31+                             17   
  Unreported                       1 
 
  Total                          185 
 Table 3 
 FINAL TEST SATISFACTION AND EXIT STATISTICS 
 ══════════════════════════════════════════════════ 
 
Construct         Parametera       Fit Statistics        
 
Satisfaction      Items                 5 
                  df                    5 
                  Chi-Squared           3.5 
                  p-value               .61 
                  GFI                   .98 
                  AGFI                  .96 
                  RMS Residual          .005 
                  Alpha                 .95 
 
 
Exit Intention    Items                 6 
                  df                    9 
                  Chi-Squared           21.5 
                  p-value               .01 
                  GFI                   .95 
                  AGFI                  .90 
                  RMS Residual          .016 
                  Alpha                 .95 
 
─────────────────────── 
a Items = Number of items in the scale. 
  df = LISREL Chi-squared statistic degrees of freedom. 
  Chi-Squared = LISREL Chi-squared statistic value. 
  p-value = Attained significance of the LISREL chi-squared 
statistic. 
  GFI = LISREL goodness of fit index. 
  AGFI = LISREL adjusted goodness of fit index.   
  RMS Residual = LISREL root mean squared residual. 
  Alpha = Coefficient (Cronbach) alpha value. 
 
 Table 4 
 MEASUREMENT MODEL RESULTS 
 ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ 
 
Latent Variable Covariancesa (φ's): 
 
            SAT    EXIT     YRS     OPEN      REV     COMPET     ROI   R/EMP 
  SAT       .59    -.63*     .14      .14       .02      .09     .03    -.05 
  EXIT     -.48     .95     -.14     -.06      -.05     -.13    -.08     .01 
  YRS      1.55   -1.99   185.81      .46*      .07      .06     .05     .11  
  OPEN     3.02   -1.86   175.67   757.19       .09      .15*    .02     .05 
  REV       .33    -.90    18.89    45.03    301.63      .30*   -.07     .61* 
  COMPET    .87   -1.50     9.86    48.70     60.98   134.68    -.10    -.00 
  ROI       .05    -.17     1.48     1.26     -2.66    -2.61    4.46     .05 




λs1 .86 θεs1 .17 λe1 .85 θεe1 .54 
λs2 .91 θεs2 .11 λe2 .91 θεe2 .15 
λs3 .96 θεs3 .13 λe3 .83 θεe3 .22 
λs4 .95 θεs4 .12 λe4 1.00 θεe4 .09 
λs5 1.00 θεs5 .08 λe5 .96 θεe5 .23 




Chi-Squared Degrees of Freedom        =  97 
Chi-Squared Statistic Value           = 91.98 
p-Value of Chi-Squared Value          = .625 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI)           =  .96 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) =  .94 
RMS Residual                          = .127 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
Bentler (1990)                        = 1.00 
 
Average Variance Extracted: 
                 Variables  
                  SAT  EXI  
Average Vari- 
 ance Extracted   .80  .76 
 
Latent Variable Reliabilities: 
                    Variables  
                     SAT  EXI  
Latent Vari- 
 able Reliabilities  .95  .95 
 
──────────────────────────── 
* t-value greater than 2. 
a Covariances on and below the diagonal, correlations above. 
 Table 5 
 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ 
 
Structural Equation Analysis Estimates: 
 
  Figure 1 EXI-REV Structural Model    Figure 1 EXI-ROI Structural Model  
  Parameter       Estimate  t-valuea    Parameter       Estimate  t-valuea 
 λ's b λ's b 
 ε's b ε's b 
 φ 's b φ's b 
 ζEXI .59 ζEXI .71 
 ζREV 160.75 ζROI 4.37 
 ψEXI,REV 2.67 ψEXI,ROI 2.67 
 γEXI,SAT -.62 -6.05 γEXI,SAT -.65 -6.05 
 γEXI,YRS -.08 -1.24 γEXI,YRS -.08 -1.23 
 γEXI,OPEN .06 1.18 γEXI,OPEN .06 1.15 
 γEXI,R/EMP .13 1.38 γEXI,R/EMP -.01 -.51 
 βEXI,REV -.25 -2.28 βEXI,ROI .35 4.76 
 βREV,EXI -.04 -.55 βROI,EXI -.07 -.76 
 γREV,COMPET .29 2.05 γROI,COMPET -.13 -2.15 
 γREV,R/EMPL .61  3.38 
 
 Fit Statisticsa 
 Chi-Squared               83           Chi-Squared               87 
 Degrees of Freedom        90           Degrees of Freedom        91 
 Chi-Squared p-Value     .733           Chi-Squared p-Value     .577 
 RMS Residual            .238           RMS Residual            .163 
 GFI                      .94           GFI                      .93 
 AGFI                     .91           AGFI                     .90 
 CFI                     1.00           CFI                     1.00 
 EXI Squared Mult. Corr.  .38           EXI Squared Mult. Corr.  .25 
 REV Squared Mult. Corr.  .46           REV Squared Mult. Corr.  .02 
 
Two Stage Least Squares Regressionc: 
 
 Figure 1 EXI-SLS Structural Model    Figure 1 EXI-ROI Structural Model   
Dependent  Independent                Dependent  Independent               
Variable   Variable     β     p       Variable   Variable     β     p     
 EXIT        SAT      -.59   .00       EXIT        SAT      -.62   .00     
             YRS      -.10   .13                   YRS      -.12   .20     
            OPEN       .07   .31                  OPEN       .05   .53     
            R/EMP      .14   .31                  R/EMP     -.04   .61     
           REVENUE    -.14   .23                   ROI       .65   .35     
 REVENUE    EXIT      -.04   .63       ROI        EXIT      -.06   .59     
            COMPET     .29   .00                  COMPET    -.11   .12     
            R/EMP      .61   .00 
                                     
─────────────────────── 
a ML estimate with EQS ROBUST option (Satorra and Bentler 1988) (see Bentler 
1989, p.217 et seq.; and Hu, Bentler and Kano 1992). 
b See Table 4 
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 Appendix 
 
 The next section summarizes the use of the control variables to obtain 
unbiased and identified estimates for the Figure 1 structural equation models. 
The subsequent section presents the identification proofs for Figure 1. 
 Nonrecursive Bias 
 In structural equation modeling it is assumed that the exogenous 
variables and the structural disturbance terms are uncorrelated. Violations of 
this assumption produce biased structural coefficient estimates (Goldberger 
1964, see Berry 1984). Recursive models are easily specified to accommodate 
this assumption. However in nonrecursive models this assumption requires some 
specification effort. For example, in the upper Figure 1 structural equation 
model, specifying the relationship between EXIT and REVENUE as shown in Figure 
A violates the uncorrelatedness assumption: ζE is correlated with REVENUE 
through the EXIT-to-REVENUE association, and ζR is correlated with EXIT through 
the REVENUE-to-EXIT association. For this reason antecedents of EXIT, REVENUE, 
and ROI were added as control variables to the Figure 1 structural equation 
model to change the status of EXIT, REVENUE, and ROI to that of endogenous 
variables. 
 
   Figure A 
 
                EXIT      ζE 
 
               REVENUE    ζR 
 
 These antecedents should be of theoretical interest and they should be 
specified so they are not associated with both EXIT and REVENUE, for example. 
If these antecedent control variables are specified with paths to both EXIT and 
REVENUE, the resulting structural equation model may be underidentified. 
Underidentified structural models do not produce unique parameter estimates 
(see Berry 1984). 
 However, if these control variables are specified with no path to a 
variable with which they are associated, the structural equation model may not 
fit the data. For these reasons we chose control variables of theoretical 
interest that would not be associated with both target variables. Relationship 
satisfaction, how long the retailer has been in business (open), and the number 
of years the retailer has done business with their primary wholesaler should 
not be associated with revenue or ROI. The subject retailer's revenue-per-
employee should also not be associated with ROI, but it should be positively 
correlated with revenue. Similarly the number of competitors should not be 
associated with EXIT. 
 Identification Proof 
 Turning to the identification of the Figure 1 structural equation models, 
the identification of the measurement and structural parameters is established 
by showing that these parameters are uniquely determined by the elements of the 
observed variables' covariance matrix. Bollen (1990) suggested a sufficient two 
step procedure to establish the identification of a structural equation model. 
In step 1, the identification of the measurement model is established, and in 
step 2 the identification of the structural model is demonstrated. 
 For the step 1 measurement model, the loading and error parameters of the 
single indicator latent variables are fixed at 1 and zero respectively. The 
variance of a single indicator latent variable X is therefore determined by the 
variance of the observed single indicator x. In symbols, 
        V(x) = V(λxX+εx) = V(1X+0) = φXX , 
where V(x) is the variance of the observed variable x; λx and εx are the loading 
and error of x; and φXX is the variance of the latent variable X. As a result 
the single indicator latent variable loadings, errors, and variances are 
identified. 
 The loadings, errors, and variances for SAT and EXI are determined 
similarly. For the indicators s1 and s2 of SAT, the covariance of s1 and s2 is 
given by  
 σ12 = C(s1,s2) = C(λs1SAT+εs1,λs2SAT+εs2) = λs1λs2V(SAT) , 
where σ12 is the covariance of s1 and s2, C(a,b) is the covariance of a and b, 
λs1, λs2, εs1, and εs2 are the loadings and errors of s1 and s2, SAT is the latent 
variable satisfaction, and V(SAT) is the variance of SAT. 
 Similarly, the covariance of s1 and s5 is determined by 
 σ15 = λs1λs5V(SAT) = λs1V(SAT) , 
since λs5 is fixed at 1 (see Table 4). Thus λs1 = σ15/V(SAT) , and σ12 = 
[σ15/V(SAT)]λs2V(SAT) = σ15λs2 . Thus 
 λs2 = σ12/σ15 . 
Similarly λs3 = σ13/σ15 , and λs4 = σ14/σ15 . 
 Because σ25 = λs2λs5V(SAT) = λs2V(SAT) , and λs2 was determined above, the 
variance of SAT is given by 
 V(SAT) = φSAT,SAT = σ25/λs2 = σ25/[σ12/σ15] = σ25σ15/σ12 , 
where φSAT,SAT is the variance of SAT. As a result 
 λs1 = σ15/φSAT,SAT = σ15/[σ25σ15/σ12] = σ15σ12/σ25σ15 = σ12/σ25 . 
Thus the loadings and the variance of SAT are identified. 
 For the errors of the indicators of SAT, since σ11 = V(λs1SAT+εs1) = 
λs12φSAT,SAT+V(εs1) , 
 V(εs1) = θεs1 = σ11 - λs12φSAT,SAT , 
where θεs1 is the variance of εs1 . The remaining errors, θεs2, θεs3, θεs4, and θεs5, 
are determined similarly. 
 The loadings, errors and variance of EXIT are determined similarly. 
 For the single indicator latent variable intercorrelations with SAT, 
 σx,s5 = C(x,λs5SAT+εs5) = λs52C(x,SAT) = C(x,SAT) = φX,SAT , 
where φX,SAT  is the correlation of x with SAT, and x Є {YRS,OPN,R/E,REV,CMP, 
ROI}. 
  The correlation between SAT and EXI is determined by 
 σs5,e4 = C(λs5SAT+εs5,λe4EXI+εe4) = λs52λe42φSAT,EXI = φSAT,EXI  , 
since λs5 = λe4 = 1 (see Table 4). 
 Therefore the Figure 1 measurement parameters are identified. 
 For the step 2 structural model parameters, we will show the 
identification of the upper half of the Figure 1 structural equation model. The 
lower half is determined similarly. The structural model parameters of the 
upper half of the Figure 1 structural equation model are given in matrix 
notation by 
where γ and β are the structural coefficients, and ζ is a disturbance term. 
 Using this equation for the determination of EXI, the covariance of SAT 
and EXI is given by 
        φSAT,EXI = C(SAT,EXI) 
              = C(SAT,γEXI,REVREV+βEXI,SATSAT+βEXI,OPNOPN+βEXI,YRSYRS+βEXI,R/ER/E+0CMP+ζEXI) 
              = γEXI,REVφSAT,REV+βEXI,SATφSAT,SAT+βEXI,OPNφSAT,OPN 
                +βEXI,YRSφSAT,YRS+βEXI,R/EφSAT,R/E . 
The covariance of OPN, YRS, R/E and CMP with EXI can be written similarly and 
the result is five equations in five unknowns, the five structural coefficients 
for EXI (γEXI,REV, βEXI,SAT, βEXI,OPN, βEXI,YRS, and βEXI,R/E). Because this system of 
equations is solvable for the five structural coefficients, the structural 
coefficients for EXI are identified. 
 For the structural coefficients of REV 
        φEXI,REV = C(EXI,REV) 
              = C(EXI,γREV,EXIEXI+βREV,CMPCMP+ζREV) 
              = γREV,EXIφEXI,EXI+βREV,CMPφEXI,CMP . 
The covariance of CMP and R/E with REV is similar and produces a system of 
three equations in three unknowns, the three structural coefficients for REV 
(γREV,EXI, βREV,CMP, and βREV,R/E). Thus the structural coefficients for REV are 
identified. 
 For the structural disturbance terms 
        φEXI,EXI = V(EXI) 
              = V(γEXI,REVREV+βEXI,SATSAT+βEXI,OPNOPN+βEXI,YRSYRS+βEXI,R/ER/E+ζEXI) 
              = γEXI,REV2φREV,REV+βEXI,SAT2φSAT,SAT+βEXI,OPN2φOPN,OPN 
                +βEXI,YRS2φYRS,YRS+βEXI,R/E2φR/E,R/E+v(ζEXI) 
                +2[γEXI,REVβEXI,SATφREV,SAT+γEXI,REVβEXI,OPNφREV,OPN+γEXI,REVβEXI,YRSφREV,YRS 
                +γEXI,REVβEXI,R/EφREV,R/E+βEXI,SATβEXI,OPNφSAT,OPN+βEXI,SATβEXI,YRSφSAT,YRS 
                +βEXI,SATβEXI,R/EφSAT,R/E+βEXI,OPNβEXI,YRSφOPN,YRS+βEXI,OPNβEXI,R/EφOPN,R/E 
                +βEXI,YRSβEXI,R/EφYRS,R/E] 
              = A + V(ζEXI) + B , 
where 
    A = γEXI,REV2φREV,REV+βEXI,SAT2φSAT,SAT+βEXI,OPN2φOPN,OPN+βEXI,YRS2φYRS,YRS+βEXI,R/E2φR/E,R/E 
and 
    B = 2[γEXI,REVβEXI,SATφREV,SAT+γEXI,REVβEXI,OPNφREV,OPN+γEXI,REVβEXI,YRSφREV,YRS+γEXI,REVβEXI,R/EφREV,R/E 
           +βEXI,SATβEXI,OPNφSAT,OPN+βEXI,SATβEXI,YRSφSAT,YRS+βEXI,SATβEXI,R/EφSAT,R/E 
           +βEXI,OPNβEXI,YRSφOPN,YRS+βEXI,OPNβEXI,R/EφOPN,R/E+βEXI,YRSβEXI,R/EφYRS,R/E] . 
Thus V(ζEXI) = φexi,EXI - A - B . The variance of ζREV is determined similarly. 
 For the covariance of ζEXI and ζREV, 
        φEXI,REV = C(EXI,REV) 
              = C(γEXI,REVREV+βEXI,SATSAT+βEXI,OPNOPN+βEXI,YRSYRS+βEXI,R/ER/E+ζEXI, 
                   γREV,EXIEXI+βREV,CMPCMP+ζREV) 
              = γEXI,REVγREV,EXIφREV,EXI+γREV,EXIβEXI,SATφREV,CMP+βEXI,SATγREV,EXIφSAT,EXI 
                 +βEXI,SATβREV,CMPφSAT,CMP+βEXI,OPNγREV,EXIφOPN,EXI+βEXI,OPNβREV,CMPφOPN,CMP 
                 +βEXI,YRSγYRS,EXIφYRS,EXI+βEXI,YRSβREV,CMPφYRS,CMP+βEXI,R/EγREV,EXIφR/E,EXI 
                 +βEXI,R/EγREV,EXIφR/E,CMP+C(ζEXI,ζREV) 
              = D + C(ζEXI,ζREV) , 
where 
            D = γEXI,REVγREV,EXIφREV,EXI+γREV,EXIβEXI,SATφREV,CMP+βEXI,SATγREV,EXIφSAT,EXI 
                 +βEXI,SATβREV,CMPφSAT,CMP+βEXI,OPNγREV,EXIφOPN,EXI+βEXI,OPNβREV,CMPφOPN,CMP 
                 +βEXI,YRSγYRS,EXIφYRS,EXI+βEXI,YRSβREV,CMPφYRS,CMP+βEXI,R/EγREV,EXIφR/E,EXI 
                 +βEXI,R/EγREV,EXIφR/E,CMP . 
Thus C(ζEXI,ζREV) = φEXI,REV - D , and the upper half of Figure 1 is identified. 
 The measurement and structural parameters of the lower half of Figure 1 
are determined similarly, and are identified. 
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the Association Between Alternative Attractiveness 





 The article investigates the moderating effect of overall 
relationship satisfaction on the relationship between the 
attractiveness of the alternative relationship and exiting the 
relationship in a marketing channel. The investigation involves a 
structural equation modeling technique proposed by Ping (1993a). The 
technique specifies the satisfaction-alternative attractiveness 
interaction using products of the indicators of satisfaction and 
alternative attractiveness, as Kenny and Judd (1984) suggested. 
However it uses fixed values for the indicator loadings and error 
variances that are determined in a measurement model. 
 The results suggest that overall relationship satisfaction 
moderates the alternative attractiveness-exiting effect. The article 
provides several interesting observations and suggestions regarding 
the use of the estimation technique proposed by Ping (1993a). 
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 Channel relationship termination has received some attention 
recently (Ping and Dwyer, 1991; Ping, 1993b). These studies generally 
contend that exiting a channel relationship has several antecedents, 
among them overall satisfaction, and the attractiveness of the best 
alternative relationship. The associations between these variables 
have rightly been modeled using linear effects, and plausible non-
linear effects have been assumed to be absent. This study investigates 
a plausible nonlinear association involving channel relationship 
exiting, the interaction of overall satisfaction and alternative 
attractiveness in their effect on exiting. 
 The investigation uses a field survey and a proposed structural 
equation technique due to Ping (1993b) that estimates interaction and 
quadratic effects for latent variables under certain conditions. The 
technique involves structural equation analysis, and is carried out in 
two steps, paralleling the two-step estimation approach for structural 
equation suggested by Anderson and Gerbing (1988) (i.e., estimate the 
measurement model before estimating the structural model). 
 In particular, the loadings and error variances for the 
indicators of the linear latent variables are estimated in a measure-
ment model. Then these loadings and error variances are used to 
calculate the loadings and error variances for the indicators of 
latent interaction and quadratic variables. The relations among the 
linear and nonlinear latent variables are then estimated in a 
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structural model. The indicators of the interaction and quadratic 
latent variables in the structural model are specified as the products 
of the indicators of the linear latent variables that comprise the 
nonlinear latent variables. The calculated loadings and error 
variances for these indicator products are specified as fixed rather 
than free variables in the structural model under the appropriate 
conditions. 
 After summarizing the current picture of channel relationship 
exiting, we propose and test the satisfaction-alternative 
attractiveness effect using a field survey and Ping's technique. We 
then discuss the implications of the test, and the use of the 
estimation technique. 
Channel Relationship Termination 
 In an investigation of generalized responses to channel 
relationship problems Ping (1993b) observed that the inclination to 
exit a channel relationship was negatively associated with overall 
relationship satisfaction, and positively associated with the 
attractiveness of the best available alternative relationship. The 
specification of these relationships involved a structural equation 
analysis of a model that implicitly posited only linear relationships 
among the variables in these relationships. 
 In a conceptualization of the history of a buyer-seller 
relationship Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) proposed that these 
relationships pass through several phases (also see Ford, 1980; and 
Gadde and Mattsson, 1987). Both parties to the buyer-seller 
relationship, they argued, pass through awareness, exploration, 
expansion, commitment, and, ultimately, dissolution phases of the 
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relationship. In the committed phase they noted that the exchange 
partners achieve a level of satisfaction that precludes other primary 
exchange partners. They stated that awareness of alternative 
relationships is maintained but without constant comparisons to the 
current relationship. One plausible result of this preclusionary state 
is that for satisfied subject firms increases in the attractiveness of 
alternative relationships would not affect relationship exiting 
intention. However since Ping (1993b) observed a positive association 
between alternative attractiveness and exiting, this suggests that 
this association is contingent on the level of overall relationship 
satisfaction. In particular when overall satisfaction is lower, 
changes in alternative attractiveness are positively associated with 
exiting. At higher levels of satisfaction, however, this association 
is not significant. Accordingly we postulate that, 
  H1: Overall relationship satisfaction moderates the 
association between alternative attractiveness and exiting. 
Specifically,  
  H2a: At higher levels of overall relationship satisfaction 
there is no association between alternative attractiveness 
and exiting, 
and 
  H2b: At lower levels of overall relationship satisfaction 
alternative attractiveness is positively associated with 
exiting. 
 In the balance of the article we will test these assertions using 
data provided by a field survey. We begin by describing the 
measurement of the study variables, satisfaction, alternative 
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attractiveness, and exiting. 
Measurement 
 Satisfaction, the global evaluation of relationship fulfillment 
by the subject firm (Dwyer and Oh, 1987), was measured using a modifi-
cation of the Dwyer and Oh satisfaction scale inspired by Gaski and 
Nevin (1985). The domain of satisfaction includes all the character-
istics of the buyer-seller relationship that the subject firm deems 
"rewarding, profitable, or instrumental" (Rukert and Churchill, 1984), 
or costly, unfair or frustrating (Ping 1993b). The items in the 
satisfaction measure assessed overall satisfaction with the 
relationship, fairness in the exchange relationship, and the degree to 
which partner was a good company with which to do business. 
 The attractiveness of the best alternative relationship, the 
subject firm's estimate of the satisfaction available in the best 
available alternative relationship, was operationalized as the subject 
firm's perception of the overall fulfillment available from the best 
alternative supplier, in addition to the overall fulfillment available 
in the existing relationship (Ping 1993b). This conceptualization 
encompasses the subject firm's generalized perceptions of the rewards 
and costs available in the most salient available relationship 
alternative. The items in this measure dealt with the subject firm's 
evaluation of how good a supplier company the alternative would be, 
its fairness, products and services, and policies; and, in general, 
how satisfied the subject firm would be the alternative supplier. 
 Exiting, physically leaving the relationship, was operationalized 
as the propensity to terminate the primary supplier relationship (Ping 
1993b). This conceptualization taps the degree of inclination to 
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discontinue the relationship with the primary supplier. The items in 
the exiting measure concerned thinking of exiting, looking for a 
replacement relationship, considering a replacement, and the intention 
to exit.  
 These measures were combined into a self administered 
questionnaire that was mailed to a sample of the study population. The 
analysis of the resulting data was conducted using structural equation 
analysis with a satisfaction-alternative attractiveness latent 
variable interaction specified using Ping's technique. Before 
describing the study, some background on this approach would be 
appropriate. 
Non-linear Latent Variables 
 Kenny and Judd (1984) proposed that interaction and quadratic 
effects for latent variables could be estimated using structural 
equation analysis and products of observed variables. Kenny and Judd 
proposed that, for example, the products the observed indicators for 
the linear latent variables X and Z could be used to specify the 
latent interaction variable XZ. Specifically, if  and Z had indicators 
x1, x2, z1, and z2, XZ could be specified using products of these 
indicators, i.e., x1z1, x1z2, x2z1, and x2z2. 
 In addition Kenny and Judd showed that, under certain conditions, 
the variance of these indicator products is determined by the variance 
of their constituent indicators. They showed that, for example, the 
variance of the indicator x1z1 depends on x1, z1, Var(X), Var(Z), x1, 
and z1, where Var(X) and Var(Z) are the variances of the latent 
variables X and Z, x1, and z1 are the loadings of x1 on X and z1 on Z, 
and x1 and z1 are the variances of the error terms x1 and x1. Assuming 
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the latent variables X and Z are independent of the error terms x1 and 
z1, the error terms are independent of each other, and x1, z1, x1 and z1 
are normally distributed, they showed the variance of x1z1 is given by 
 Var(x1z1) = Var[(x1X + x1)(z1Z + z1)] 
       = x12z12Var(XZ) + x12Var(X)z1 
     + z12Var(Z)x1 + x1z1 . (1 
 Then they specified latent variables such as XZ with indicators 
such as x1z1 by constraining the indicator loading and error term for 
x1z1 (x1z1 and x1z1) to be the combinations of linear-terms-only model 
parameters shown in equation 1, i.e., 
  x1z1 = x1z1 , (2 
and 
  x1z1 = x12Var(X)z1 + z12Var(Z)x1 + x1z1 . (3 
They also used COSAN (currently a subprocedure of the SAS procedure 
CALIS) which is particularly suited to modeling structural equations 
with nonlinear terms such as those in equations 2 and 3. 
 While the Kenny and Judd technique is an important theoretical 
contribution, the technique has proven difficult for most researchers 
to implement (Aiken and West, 1991). Ping (1993a) noted that the 
number of dummy variables required to specify each indicator of a non-
linear variable using the Kenny and Judd technique (e.g., one for each 
term in equations 2 and 3) can become overwhelming for models with 
many indicators or several non-linear latent variables. 
 Hayduk (1987) and others have proposed a variation of the Kenny 
and Judd technique that can be implemented using LISREL (Jöreskog and 
Sörbom, 1989) and EQS (Bentler, 1989). The technique is difficult to 
summarize, however, and the interested reader is directed to chapter 7 
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of Hayduk (1987) for the details of the technique. Unfortunately, this 
technique also requires the creation of many dummy variables. 
 As a result Ping (1993b) proposed an additional variation of the 
Kenny and Judd technique that requires no dummy variables and can be 
implemented in LISREL and EQS. Under the Kenny and Judd normality 
assumptions stated above and assuming the unidimensionality of the 
latent variable indicators, Ping argued that the loadings and error 
variances for the Kenny and Judd product indicators of an interaction 
or quadratic latent variable need not be estimated in the structural 
model. Specifically he demonstrated that parameter estimates from the 
measurement model (e.g., x1, z1, Var(X), Var(Z), x1, and z1), can be 
combined into structural model constants (e.g., x1z1 = x1z1 and x1z1 = 
x12Var(X)z1 + z12Var(Z)x1 + x1z1). Then the structural model can be 
estimated with the interaction indicator loadings and error variances 
(e.g., x1z1 and x1z1) specified as fixed values (equal to x1z1 and 
x12Var(X)z1 + z12Var(Z)x1 + x1z1) . This is possible, he argued, 
because with sufficient unidimensionality the measurement parameters 
for a latent variable's indicators (e.g., x1, z1, Var(X), Var(Z), x1, 
and z1) are trivially variant between the measurement and structural 
models (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). In different words the 
measurement parameter estimates for the indicators of a unidimensional 
latent variable change very little between the measurement and 
structural models (frequently only in the third decimal place). 
Therefore measurement model estimates can be specified as constants in 
the structural model, and the loadings and error variances of the 
indicators of non-linear latent variables need not be estimated in a 
structural model. 
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 He argued further that the unidimensionality assumption enables 
the omission of the non-linear constructs from the measurement model 
with no effect on the parameter estimates for the linear constructs 
because, by the definition of unidimensionality, unidimensional con-
structs are unaffected by other latent variables. Similarly adding or 
deleting unidimensional constructs in the structural model does not 
affect the measurement parameter estimates for the added or other 
latent variables in the structural model. 
 In summary, Ping's technique involves, 
  o verifying indicator normality-- however, maximum 
likelihood and generalized least squares estimates are 
robust to departures from normality (Anderson and Amemiya, 
1985, 1986; Boomsma, 1983; Browne, 1987; Harlow, 1985; 
Sharma, Durvasula and Dillon, 1989; Tanaka, 1984), 
  o assuming the latent variables are independent of the 
error terms, and the error terms are independent of each 
other, 
  o unidimensionalizing the linear latent variables, 
  o estimating loadings and error variances for the linear 
independent variable indicators using a measurement model, 
then combining these estimates into equation 2 and 3 
estimates of the loadings and error variances for the 
nonlinear latent variable indicators, 
  o specifying these equation 2 and 3 estimates as fixed 
values in a structural model, and estimating that model. 
 The balance of the paper will describe the use of Ping's 
technique in a field survey that tests the hypothesized satisfaction-
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alternative attractiveness interaction. 
Method 
 Returning to the study, the satisfaction, alternative 
attractiveness, and exiting items were combined with five point 
balanced Likert scales. The survey population was hardware retailers, 
and the sampling frame was the subscription list of a popular hardware 
trade publication. Sampling involved n-th name selects of 100 pretest 
names and 600 final test names. The pretest responses were used to 
verify the psychometric properties of the measures. The resulting 
measures appeared to be content valid, unidimensional, internally and 
externally consistent (see Gerbing and Anderson, 1984), and had 
coefficient alpha's of .8 or above. The final test produced 288 
responses after two postcard follow-ups. The psychometric properties 
of the measures were reexamined using these responses and item-to-
total correlations, coefficient alpha calculations, ordered similarity 
coefficients (Hunter, 1973), multiple group analysis (Anderson, 
Gerbing and Hunter, 1987), and LISREL single factor analysis 
(Jöreskog, 1993, pp. 297, 313). The measures were content valid, 
unidimensional, internally and externally consistent, and had latent 
variable reliabilities of .9 or above and average variance extracteds 
of .7 or above (Fornell and Larker, 1981). Table 1 summarizes the 
psychographic properties of the final test scales. 
 The normality of the indicators of satisfaction, alternative 
attractiveness and exiting was then assessed, and the measurement 
model for the linear-terms-only model shown in Figure 1 was estimated 
using EQS and maximum likelihood. The resulting measurement parameter 
estimates for satisfaction and alternative attractiveness are shown in 
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Table 2. These estimates were combined to produce the equations 2 and 
3 loadings and error variances for the satisfaction-alternative 
attractiveness interaction indicators shown in the Figure 2 structural 
model. This structural model was then estimated using EQS and maximum 
likelihood by fixing the loadings and error variances for the product 
indicators at the Table 2 values. The results are shown in Table 3. 
 Because the use of product indicators in a structural equation 
model renders the model formally non normal, estimates of the standard 
errors for the structural effect coefficients cannot be trusted (Hu, 
Bentler and Kano, 1992). For emphasis the effect estimates are robust 
to departures from normality but the standard errors do not. The 
structural model was therefore re-estimated using EQS's "ROBUST" 
option to produce more appropriate standard error and chi squared 
statistics (Satorra and Bentler, 1988) (see Bentler, 1989, p.217 et 
seq.; and Hu, Bentler and Kano, 1992). We also estimated the Figure 2 
model using ordinary least squares regression for comparison. These 
regression estimates were produced by averaging the indicators for 
satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, and exiting, and forming the 
interaction term by forming the product variable satisfaction-
alternative attractiveness in each case. These regression results are 
also shown in Table 3. 
 We will discuss these results and their implications next. 
Discussion 
 The hypothesized associations were supported. Satisfaction 
moderated the alternative attractiveness-exiting association: the 
alternative attractiveness-exiting interaction effect coefficient was 
significant (see Table 3). In addition Table 4 shows the alternative 
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attractiveness-exiting effect coefficient with the interaction effect 
of satisfaction at selected levels of satisfaction. As shown in this 
table, satisfaction attenuated the alternative attractiveness-exiting 
association as the level of satisfaction increased. In particular, at 
higher levels of satisfaction (e.g., above 4 which corresponded to 
"Agree") the alternative attractiveness-exiting association was non 
significant. At lower levels of satisfaction the alternative 
attractiveness-exiting association, however, was significant. 
 These results may have implications for practitioners. The 
observed lack of association between exiting and alternative 
attractiveness at higher levels of satisfaction in this study suggests 
that increases in the attractiveness of an alternative (competition) 
by itself may not necessarily tempt satisfied customer firms to exit 
their current buyer-seller relationship. In other words an 
alternative's efforts to be more attractive may not, by itself, 
increase exiting inclinations: decreased satisfaction may also be 
required. Viewing these results from a lower satisfaction perspective, 
increases in alternative attractiveness were associated with increases 
in exiting inclinations for less satisfied buyers in the study. This 
suggests that less satisfied customer firms may be vulernable to 
competitive moves aimed at increasing competitor attractiveness. 
 In addition the model explained 65% of the variance in exiting 
(see "Squared Multiple Correlation for EXI," Table 3), which is 
notable for marketing studies. While unmodeled antecedents of exiting 
may remain to be identified, their combined contribution to explaining 
variance in exiting in this context may not be large. For the busy 
channel manager this in turn suggests that satisfaction maintenance 
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may be sufficient for relationship maintenance. 
 Turning to the use of Ping's technique in this study, the 
efficacy of the technique was apparent in the study. The coefficient 
estimates were directionally similar to the regression estimates. In 
addition specifying the Figure 2 interaction involved considerably 
less effort than a Kenny and Judd/COSAN specification would have 
required, we suspect. A Kenny and Judd/COSAN specification of the 
Figure 2 model would have required the creation of 80 additional dummy 
variables, one for each term in equations 2 and 3. 
 While the regression estimates were similar to the structural 
equation estimates, they cannot be trusted for variables measured with 
error: OLS regression estimates are known to be biased and inefficient 
for variables measured with error (Busemeyer and Jones, 1983). The 
regression standard error estimates were different from those from the 
structural equation analysis, however, especially for the interaction 
coefficient, the key parameter in the study. While there are 
regression techniques for variables measured with error (see Feucht, 
1989 for a summary), these techniques currently lack standard error 
estimators, and as a result regression is inappropriate for estimating 
effects among latent variables. 
 However, regression estimates of the satisfaction, alternative 
attractiveness, and the interaction effects are useful as starting 
values for the structural equation analysis. We used a personal 
computer version of EQS, and the starting values from regression 
reduced the EQS execution times dramatically. 
 Starting values from several other sources were also used for the 
remaining free parameters in the structural model. Measurement model 
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estimates were used for the starting values for the linear variable 
variances, covariances, loadings and error variances. A starting value 
for the variance of the satisfaction-alternative attractiveness 
variable was determined by averaging the indicators of satisfaction 
and alternative attractiveness in each case, forming the product of 
these two averaged variables in each case, and then calculating the 
variance of the result using standard descriptive statistics software. 
An estimate of the variance of the structural disturbance term was 
calculated by hand using the regression value of R2 and the measurement 
model estimate of the variance of exiting (i.e., Var()Var(EXI)(1-R2)). 
 Several additional comments on the utilization of Ping's 
technique may be of interest. Despite the apparent unidimensionality 
of the latent variables the measurement and structural model estimates 
for the measurement parameters of satisfaction and alternative 
attractiveness were different, typically in the third decimal place. 
As a result an iterative approach was used to produce the Table 3 
results. This was accomplished by recomputing the equation 2 and 3 
values using the first structural equation estimates of the 
measurement parameters for satisfaction and alternative attractiveness 
(i.e., 's, 's, variances and covariances), and re- estimating the 
structural model with these revised equation 2 and 3 values fixed. 
Table 3, as a result, contains the estimates from the second 
structural model run. The effect of this second structural model 
estimation was to base the equation 2 and 3 values on structural model 
estimates, rather than measurement model estimates. Parenthetically 
these refined equation 2 and 3 values had little effect on the 
coefficient, standard error or chi-squared estimates between the two 
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structural equation estimations.  
 We obtained inadmissible solutions when the linear terms and the 
non linear terms were specified as correlated in the structural model. 
As a result the Figure 2 structural model shows correlations between 
the linear variables only. Because an interaction is clearly 
correlated with its unadjusted linear constituents, this may be a 
limitation of Ping's technique. Kenny and Judd (1984) also appeared to 
fix the linear-interaction term covariances at zero (although they 
freed the covariance between a linear term X and the interaction X*(Z2) 
in their third example). 
 The t-values for the ML coefficient estimates and those for ML 
estimates with EQS's ROBUST option were similar (see Table 3). This 
suggests that the standard errors produced by Ping's technique (and 
indicator product techniques in general) may be robust to formal 
departures from normality. 
 The chi-squared statistic, however, appeared to be distorted by 
the formal non normality of the product indicators (see Table 3). The 
unscaled null (independence) model and the Figure 2 model chi-squared 
statistics were large and misleading because the null model appeared 
to fit the data better than the Figure 2 model. As a result the 
Comparative Fit Index (Bentler, 1990), which relies on the chi-squared 
statistic, was also distorted. The scaled chi-squared statistic 
available with the ROBUST option appeared to be more useful. Using the 
scaled chi-squared statistic the Figure 2 model appeared to fit the 
data (the Chi-Squared p-value was 1), and it produced a Comparative 
Fit Index of 1. 




 The study investigated an hypothesized moderating effect of 
overall relationship satisfaction on the association between exiting 
and the attractiveness of the alternative relationship in a marketing 
channel. The results suggest that the moderating effect is present in 
the study context, and that at higher levels of satisfaction, there is 
no alternative attractiveness-exiting effect in the study population. 
 The investigation used Ping's technique for estimating non-linear 
latent variable effects. The results suggest that the technique is 
reasonably easy to use with existing popular estimation software, in 
this case EQS. The effect and standard error estimates appeared to be 
robust to the formal departure from normality inherent when product 
indicators are used. However the chi-squared estimates appeared to be 
affected by the formal non normality, and the scaled chi-squared 
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Psychometric Properties of the Measures 
 
 
                  Measure 
Concept           Parametera      Statistic 
 
Satisfaction      Items              5 
                  df                 5 
                  Chi-Squared        5 
                  p-value           .40 
                  CFI              1.00 
                  Avg. Std. Resid.  .006 
                  AVE               .77 
                  LV Reliability    .97 
                  Alpha             .92 
 
Alternative       Items              4 
 Attractiveness   df                 2 
                  Chi-Squared        1 
                  p-value           .19 
                  CFI               .99 
                  Avg. Std. Resid.  .004 
                  AVE               .78 
                  LV Reliability    .91 
                  Alpha             .91 
 
Exit              Items              6 
                  df                 9 
                  Chi-Squared        9 
                  p-value           .43 
                  CFI              1.00 
                  Avg. Std. Resid.  .009 
                  AVE               .72 
                  LV Reliability    .91 
                  Alpha             .96 
 
____________________________ 
a Items = Number of items in the scale. 
  df = Chi-squared statistic degrees of freedom. 
  Chi-Squared = Chi-squared statistic value. 
  p-value = Attained significance of the chi-squared 
   statistic. 
  CFI = Comparative Fit Index (Bentler 1990). 
  Avg. Std. Resid. = The average of the standardized 
   covariance matrix residuals. 
  AVE = Average Variance Extracted (Fornell and Larker 
   1981). 
  LV Reliability = Latent Variable Reliability (Fornell 
   and Larker 1981). 
  Alpha = Coefficient (Cronbach) alpha value. 
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Table 2 
Measurement Model Results 
  
Parameter    Estimate  Parameter     Estimate  
 
 s1  0.79  s4   0.12 
 s2  0.88  s5   0.10 
 s3  1.00  a1   0.27 
 s4  0.87  a2   0.24 
 s5  0.94  a3   0.07 
 a1  0.92  a4   0.24 
 a2  0.90  e1   0.52 
 a3  1.00  e2   0.19 
 a4  0.78  e3   0.11 
 o1  0.84  e4   0.32 
 e2  0.83  e5   0.09 
 e3  1.00  e6   0.12 
 e4  0.94  SAT   0.51 
 e5  0.96  SATALT  -0.37 
 e6  0.92  SATEXI  -0.43 
 s1  0.16  ALT       0.84 
 s2  0.13  ALTEXI    0.51 
 s3  0.10  EXI      0.79 
 
Equations 2 and 3 Values: 
  Parameter     Value  Parameter    Value 
 
    s1a1  .533    s1a1    .257 
    s1a2  .509    s1a2    .239 
    s1a3  .625    s1a3    .180 
    s1a4  .384    s1a4    .207 
    s2a1  .669    s2a1    .242 
    s2a2  .639    s2a2    .224 
    s2a3  .784    s2a3    .151 
    s2a4  .482    s2a4    .198 
    s3a1  .852    s3a1    .251 
    s3a2  .815    s3a2    .231 
    s3a3  1.000   s3a3    .140 
    s3a4  .615    s3a4    .208 
    s4a1  .657    s4a1    .231 
    s4a2  .628    s4a2    .213 
    s4a3  .770    s4a3    .142 
    s4a4  .473    s4a4    .189 
    s5a1  .755    s5a1    .227 
    s5a2  .722    s5a2    .209 
    s5a3  .885    s5a3    .128 
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    s5a4  .544    s5a4    .188 
 
Table 3 
Structural Model Estimation Results 
 
Structural Equation Analysis Estimates:       
                                              t-value 
Parameter    Estimate  Parameter     Estimate    ML   ROBUSTa 
 s1  0.79  s5   0.10 
 s2  0.88  a1   0.27 
 s3  1.00  a2   0.24 
 s4  0.87  a3   0.08 
 s5  0.94  a4   0.23 
 a1  0.92  e1   0.53 
 a2  0.90  e2   0.19 
 a3  1.00  e3   0.11 
 a4  0.78  e4   0.32 
 o1  0.84  e5   0.09 
 e2  0.83  e6   0.12 
 e3  1.00  SAT   0.50 
 e4  0.94  SATALT  -0.37 
 e5  0.96  ALT       0.84 
 e6  0.92  SATALT  17.95 
 s1  0.16  EXI   0.34 
 s2  0.13  EXI,SAT      -0.35     4.59   4.79 
 s3  0.10  EXI,ALT       0.65    10.58   9.61 
 s4  0.12  EXI,SATALT    -0.05     5.64   5.45 
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 Fit Indices 
                                          ML   ROBUSTa 
 Chi-Squared Statistic Value            88248     380 
 p-Value of Chi-Squared Value            .000   1.000 
 Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Index    .000   1.000 
 Null Model 2                          25884   18831 
 Chi-Squared Degrees of Freedom           595     595 
 Squared Multiple Correlation for EXI     .65 
 Total Coef. of Determination             .65 
 
 OLS Regression Estimates: 
 
Dependent  Independent      b Coef-                F-value 
Variable    Variable        ficient      p-value   and (p)     R2 
EXI            SAT     -.287         .07   79.52 (.00)  .52 
EXI            ALT       .745         .00 
EXI          SATALT          -.100         .07 
 
___________________________________ 
a ML = Maximum Likelihood estimate. 
  ROBUST = ML estimate with EQS ROBUST option (Satorra and 
   Bentler 1988) (see Bentler 1989, p.217 et seq.; and Hu, 
   Bentler and Kano 1992). 
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Table 4 
Satisfaction Moderation of the Alternative 
Attractiveness-Exiting Association 
 
    SAT      ALT         SE of the 
   Valuea  Coefficientb  Coefficientc  t-value 
 
     1       0.596        0.1239       4.80 
     2       0.539        0.1859       2.89 
     3       0.482        0.2510       1.91 
     4       0.425        0.3173       1.33 
     5       0.368        0.3841       0.95 
 
__________________________ 
a Satisfaction ranged from 1 (=low) to 5 in the study. 
b The coefficient of ALT is given by .65ALT-.05SAT*ALT = 
   (.65-.05SAT)ALT. 
c The Standard Error of the ALT coefficient is given by 
    ______________ 
   √Var(bALT-bSATSAT) 
            ______________________________________ 
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a SAT = Satisfaction, ALT = Alternative Attractiveness, 
  SAT*ALT = Satisfaction-Alternative Attractiveness Interaction, 




 The Effects of Satisfaction and Structural Constraints on 





 This article reports the results of a field survey of the relationship between hardware retail-
ers' satisfaction and their response intentions when there are channel relationship problems. The 
objective was to test a model from the social psychology literature due to Rusbult, Zembrodt and 
Gunn (1982) of the relationships between the response intention variables; exiting, voice, loyalty, 
opportunism, and neglect, and their antecedents; satisfaction, and the "structural constraints" 
(Johnson 1982) of alternative attractiveness, investments and switching cost, using structural 
equation analysis. The results suggest that the model does apply to a channel context, and the study 





 The channel legal literature1 regularly provides hints of responses to channel relationship 
problems (e.g., Business Electronics v. Sharp 1988, and Continental TV v. Sylvania 1977). One 
could ask several interesting questions about these troubled relationships, including what caused 
them to flounder and eventually terminate? Diminished relationship satisfaction is probably 
necessary, but is it always sufficient? Most Chrysler dealers did not terminate their Chrysler 
franchise during their satisfaction nadir accompanying Chrysler's restructuring in the 1970's. 
 As a result one could ask, what holds a troubled channel relationship together? Unattractive 
alternatives or high switching cost are plausible candidates, but are there other "structural con-
straints" in a channel relationship? 
 For a firm having supplier or institutional customer problems, are there other viable 
responses besides exiting? Anecdotal evidence suggests that channel relationship problems 
generate complaints. But, are there other responses as well? 
 This research proposes and tests a model, derived from the romantic relationships research 
of Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982), which relates general responses to relationship problems 
                                                 




(exiting, voice, loyalty, opportunism, and neglect), to antecedents of these responses (satisfaction, 
alternative attractiveness, investments, and switching cost). The research question was simply, 
does this model apply to buyer-seller relationships in an institutional context such as a marketing 
channel? 
 Conceptually this investigation concentrates on the committed and dissolution phases of 
Dwyer, Schurr and Oh's (1987) framework for buyer-seller relationship development. This channel 
relationship life cycle framework was comprised of several stages through which buyer-seller rela-
tionships pass to reach what Macneil (1974) described as relational exchanges, and Dwyer, Schurr 
and Oh termed the committed phase of the buyer-seller relationship. 
 While the committed phase is the locus of much of the current channel research2, until 
recently channel research has paid little attention to the last phase: dissolution. As a result we know 
little, for example, of the factors affecting the termination of marketing channel relationships. 
 Illuminating the termination phase could help avoid channel relationship termination and 
its associated costs both economic and psychic. Anecdotal evidence suggests that once problems 
become endemic, relationship satisfaction declines, conflict increases, and monitoring costs 
increase on both sides of the relationship. The low satisfaction firm's relationship investments 
slow, and without exit barriers (Porter 1980) such as switching costs, the low satisfaction firm may 
exit the relationship. Exiting, in turn, involves costs. Exiting may obsolete transaction specific 
assets on both sides of the relationship. In addition it may require both firms to incur additional 
costs such as search, negotiation and monitoring costs, and make additional investments in transac-
tion specific assets to establish and build a new exchange relationship. 
                                                 
    2 An incomplete enumeration of recent articles would include Dwyer and Walker (1981); Frazier (1983a) (1983b); 
Frazier and Summers (1984); John (1984); Dwyer and Welsh (1985); Anderson and Narus (1984); Kale (1986); 




 Researchers have commented on the need for research on troubled marketing channel 
relationships. In summarizing the aftermath of a marketing channel relationship termination, 
Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) called for research into marketing channel relationship dissolution. 
Ping and Dwyer (1988) noted that knowledge of dissolution forces provides closure in channel 
research, and promises significant implications for channel management (p. 245). 
 After reporting the results of interviews with firms with troubled relationships, we will 
argue that the Rusbult et al. (1982) model applies in a channel context, then test this argument with 
a field survey and structural equation analysis of hardware retailers involving their relationship 
with their primary supplier. 
 We begin with a summary of related research that also introduces the study concepts. 
 Background 
Economics 
 In the economics literature Hirschman (1970) proposed that exit (relationship termination) 
was one of several responses to exchange relationship problems. He argued that members or clients 
(customers) of person-organization dyads had three behavioral options when responding to organi-
zational performance "lapses" or problems: they could exit the relationship, they could use voice, 
or they could do nothing and remain loyal. Exit was the individual's cessation of buying the firm's 
product(s), or leaving the organization. Voice involved remaining in the relationship and actively 
working with the relationship partner to remedy problems. Loyal behavior also involved remaining 
in the relationship but the loyal individual suffered in silence, with confidence that things would 
get better. Hirschman proposed that these exit, voice and loyalty responses depended on the level 
of overall relationship satisfaction, the attractiveness of an alternative relationship, and the 





 The romantic relationships literature has also addressed responses to inter-person 
problems3. In a study of couples Rusbult et al. (1982) proposed that responses to problems 
included Hirschman's exit, voice and loyalty responses, and Farrell's (1983) neglect response. 
Neglect involved reducing contact with the relationship partner. Rusbult et al. also proposed that 
these general responses to problems depended upon, in addition to the Hirschman antecedents 
(satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, and switching cost), relationship investments: the time, 
effort and money spent to build and maintain the relationship. 
Organizational Behavior 
 Similarly, the organizational behavior literature has addressed employee responses to 
employer-employee problems4. Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, and Mainous (1988) argued that declined 
employee satisfaction lead to employee exit, voice, loyalty or neglect. In addition, they proposed 
and tested a model identical with Rusbult et al.'s (1982) romantic relationships model described 
above. 
Marketing 
 The marketing channel literature has addressed interfirm relationship dissolution. Dwyer, 
Schurr and Oh (1987) argued that the process of buyer-seller relationship development consisted of 
awareness, exploration, expansion, commitment, and dissolution phases. In their description of the 
dissolution phase, they offered Duck's (1982) process model of interpersonal relationship dissolu-
tion as a framework for the process of interfirm relationship termination. Duck's model was com-
prised of four broad stages: intrapsychic, dyadic, social, and "grave dressing" stages. 
                                                 
    3 This area has received considerable theoretical and empirical attention. A partial list of relevant articles includes 
Baxter (1983) (1985) (1986); Duck (1981) (1982); Hatfield and Walster (1985); Johnson (1982); Rodin (1982); 
Rusbult (1980) (1983); Rusbult and Zembrodt (1983); Rusbult, Johnson, Morrow (1986a) (1986b); and Rusbult, 
Farrell, Rodgers, Mainous (1988). 
    4 This literature is also extensive and relevant articles include Mobley, Griffeth, Hand and Meglino (1979); Porter, 




 Offering a graph-based view of a marketing channel relationship, Ping and Dwyer (1988) 
argued that the perceptual distance between partner firm's role performance (Frazier 1983b) and 
the role performance available from an alternative firm, was positively associated with propensity 
to terminate. 
 Paralleling Johnson (1982), Ping (1990) noted that firms remained in a buyer-seller rela-
tionship because they either want to or have to. He proposed that satisfaction and the availability of 
alternative relationships interacted to affect buyer-seller propensity to terminate. Ping's laboratory 
results suggested that propensity to terminate was negatively affected by satisfaction and positively 
affected by the availability of alternatives, but the interaction of these variables was not significant. 
 The consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction literature has addressed responses to consumer 
purchase dissatisfaction. Richins (1987) argued that the responses to consumer purchase 
dissatisfaction were complaints (see Singh and Howell 1985 for a review), negative word of mouth 
(Diener and Grayser 1978, Richins 1983), and brand switching (LaBarbra and Mazursky 1983).  
Although she did not cite Hirschman (1970), complaints and brand switching appeared remarkably 
similar to voice and exit. Singh (1990) has explicitly proposed exit and voice as responses to 
consumer purchase dissatisfaction. 
 
 The picture that emerges is that there are several general reactions to relationship problems: 
loyalty, voice, exit, and neglect. And, these responses are generally associated with satisfaction, 
alternative attractiveness, investments, and switching cost. In the following paragraphs we 
investigate these matters in a marketing channel context. 
 Responses to Channel Relationship Problems 
 In exploratory interviews with firms that were contemplating or had recently completed 




discussed. These interviews involved suppliers, distributors, and retailers in an area surrounding a 
major metropolitan university. We contacted key informants responsible for "up-channel" or 
"down-channel" relationships with titles ranging from owner to purchasing manager. 
 The informants in the distributor and retailer group generally reported problems created 
either by the partner firm's actions, or their inaction. These problems prompted subject firm 
responses including ignoring the problem (loyalty), or complaining to the partner firm (voice). 
Chronic unsuccessful resolution of these problems may have reduced the subject firm's overall 
satisfaction, and produced opportunism, neglect or thoughts of exiting. 
 However, the informants reported that decisions regarding exiting were complex. While not 
consistently reported, lack of an attractive alternative, many relationship investments, and the high 
cost associated with switching to an alternative buyer-seller relationship appeared to make the 
exiting decision difficult. In addition, there were hints of these variables' associations with the 
other responses to relationship problems. For example, an attractive alternative, few relationship 
investments, and low switching cost also seemed to be associated with opportunism and neglect.  
 Encouraged by these anecdotal reports, the favorable model validation results in other 
dyads (Rusbult, et al. 1982; Rusbult, et al. 1988), and the channel political-economic arguments 
that "sentiments," such as overall satisfaction, should be associated with behaviors such as exiting5, 
we maintain that responses to channel relationship problems include exiting, voice, loyalty, 
opportunism, and neglect. In addition, satisfaction, and the structural constraint variables, alterna-
                                                 
    5 Stern and Reve (1980) proposed that a marketing channel can be viewed as an institution with internal and external 
economic and political structures and processes. Achrol, Reve and Stern (1983) argued that the political economy 
domains (external, internal, polity, and economy) were associated, and Dwyer and Oh (1987) among others have 
confirmed some of these associations. Stern and Reve proposed that sentiments and behaviors were associated, and 





tive attractiveness, investments and switching cost, should be associated with these responses as 
shown in Figure 1. 
 Hypotheses 
 It is our contention that in channel relationships satisfaction and the structural constraint 
variables are associated with the responses to problems attributed to the relationship partner. 
Increases in the levels of the subject firm's overall satisfaction, investments and switching cost 
should make economic exchanges with its partner firm perceptually more valuable. As satisfaction, 
relationship investments, and switching cost increase, subject firms should respond positively to 
relationship problems by working with the partner firm (voice), or not rocking the boat (loyalty). In 
these circumstances, subject firms should be likely to be disinclined to exhibit relationship destruc-
tive (Rusbult et al. 1982) responses such as opportunism, reduced contact with the partner firm 
(neglect), or exiting because there is much to lose. Thus, 
 H1: Satisfaction, investments and switching cost are positively associated with loyalty and 
voice, and negatively associated with exiting, opportunism, and neglect. 
 Previous studies lend some support to these assertions. As we mentioned earlier Ping 
(1990) reported that satisfaction was negatively associated with exiting. Anderson (1988) reported 
that investments were negatively associated with opportunism for sales reps. In romantic 
relationships Rusbult et al. (1982) reported that prior (relationship) satisfaction and relationship 
investments were negatively associated with exiting and neglect, and positively associated with 
loyalty and voice. 
 The subject firms' perception of the attractiveness of the best alternative exchange 
relationship should have a different consequence. As the attractiveness of the alternative 
relationship increases, subject firms should be less likely to be passive (Rusbult et al. 1982) in the 




(voice), looking out for number one (being opportunistic), or exiting, and should be disinclined to 
respond passively by being loyal or neglectful. Hence, 
 H2: Alternative attractiveness is positively associated with voice, opportunism, 
and exiting, and negatively associated with loyalty and neglect. 
 There is also some empirical support for these statements. In the employment relationship 
literature Rusbult et al. (1988) reported that alternative quality was positively associated with exit 
and voice. Ping (1990) reported that alternative attractiveness was positively associated with exit-
ing.  
 
 The balance of this paper presents the results of a test of these hypotheses. 
 Method 
 The test involved a field survey and a LISREL structural equation analysis to determine the 
associations among these concepts. We gathered data from hardware retailers concerning their 
loyalty to their primary supplier, and their voice, opportunism, neglect and exit propensity6 
responses, along with their satisfaction with that supplier, the attractiveness of the best alternative 
supplier, relationship investments and perceived switching cost. 
Sample Design 
 The study surveyed hardware retailers in the 50 U.S. states. The key informant within these 
sampling units was the store owner or executive. We randomly drew the sample of these 
informants from the subscription list for a hardware retailing industry publication that appeared to 
represent all the U.S. hardware retailers.  
                                                 
    6 Because this study surveyed existing supplier relationships, we operationalized exit as the propensity to terminate 




 The final test mailer sent to 600 names and addresses included a $2 response incentive and 
it, with two follow-up post card mailings, produced 288 responses (a 47% response rate-- 9 
questionnaires were returned as undeliverable). Two hundred and twenty two of these responses 
ultimately were deemed usable (incomplete cases were deleted). Table 1 profiles the final test 
responses. 
Measures 
 The measurement of the study concepts used a combination of new and existing multi item 
Likert scales. For example satisfaction, the firm's global evaluation of relationship fulfillment 
(Dwyer and Oh 1987), was measured using a modification of the Dwyer and Oh (1987) 
satisfaction scale inspired by Gaski and Nevin (1985). Satisfaction's domain includes all relation-
ship characteristics that the subject firm deems "rewarding, profitable, instrumental" (Rukert and 
Churchill 1984), or costly, unfair or frustrating. The satisfaction scale items addressed overall 
satisfaction, fairness, and a good company to do business with. Appendix A presents the final test 
versions of this and the other study measures. 
 Opportunism, self interest seeking with guile (Williamson 1975), was also measured using 
a modification of an existing scale: Dwyer and Oh's (1987) opportunism scale, that was derived 
from John's (1984) scale. John characterized the items in his scale as distortion of information, 
failure to fulfill promises, and a shirking of obligations. The scale items involved non-compliance 
when the relationship partner will not notice, not volunteering information, exaggeration/alteration 
of reports, and shirking.  
 New scales were developed for the other study measures. Alternative attractiveness, the 
subject firm's estimation of the satisfaction available in an alternative channel relationship, was 
operationalized as the perceived global evaluation of the additional relationship fulfillment avail-




encompasses the subject firm's generalized perceptions of the rewards, and costs available in the 
most salient alternative economic exchange relationship. The scale items concerned a good 
supplier company, their fairness, supplier products and services, their policies, and overall satisfac-
tion with the supplier. 
 Investments, the costs the subject firm electively incurs to build and maintain the channel 
relationship in anticipation of future exchanges, were operationalized as the perceived magnitude 
of the relationship assets that would be lost or no longer useful if the relationship were terminated. 
Its conceptual domain involves sunk economic and opportunity costs such as money, time, and 
effort. The investment items dealt with overall relationship investments, investment uniqueness, 
and the time, effort and energy put into building and maintaining the exchange relationship. 
 Switching cost, the perceptions of the magnitude of the additional costs required to 
terminate the current channel relationship and secure the alternative, were operationalized as the 
perceived additional cost and effort to change suppliers. The domain of switching cost 
encompasses monetary expenses to end the current relationship and secure the alternative, and the 
psychic costs incurred in expenditures of time and effort. The switching cost scale items involved 
costs/spending time and money to switch suppliers, and losses in switching suppliers. 
 Because this study investigated existing buyer-seller relationships, we operationalized 
exiting, the subject firm physically leaving the relationship, as the propensity to terminate the 
current primary wholesaler-- the disinclination to continue the current relationship with the top full 
line wholesaler. The resulting items dealt with thinking of exiting, looking for a replacement 
relationship, considering a replacement, and the intention to exit.  
 We measured voice, the subject firm's active and constructive attempts to change condi-
tions, as the intention to work directly with the partner firm to attempt to change conditions 




maintenance, confronting the partner firm with problems in a positive way, and discussing and 
working cooperatively with the partner firm to improve the situation. The voice items addressed 
talking to partner, suggesting and discussing changes, and working with partner to solve mutual 
problems. 
 The study operationalized loyalty, abiding relationship problems in silence with confidence 
that things will get better, as the predisposition to live with the situation rather than confront the 
partner firm. The conceptual domain of loyalty involves viewing problems as transitory phenome-
na that correct themselves: they go away and are forgotten. Problems either work themselves out or 
the partner firm fixes them, so there is little reason to worry. The loyal firm either ignores problems 
or assumes they will go away, and concentrates on continuing with business as usual. Loyalty 
items addressed not mentioning problems, disregarding/overlooking/ignoring problems, and belief 
that problems fix themselves. 
 We measured neglect, reduced physical contact with the partner firm, as the intention to 
reduce physical contact with the principal wholesaler. Its conceptualization encompasses partially 
reduced physical contact, in which little effort is expended to maintain the relationship, and the 
relationship is a succession of discrete exchanges (Macneil 1980). In more extreme cases it 
includes ignoring the partner firm's attempts to resolve problems, and just letting the exchange 
relationship deteriorate. The resulting neglect scale items dealt with letting the relationship deterio-
rate, taking no action to improve relations, not caring about partner, and letting the relationship die.  
 To develop the new measures we generated definitions of the concept domains guided by 
existing theorizing in the marketing channel, economics, romantic relationships, and employment 





 The resulting Likert scale items were evaluated by a jury of academicians, and then 
combined with the satisfaction and opportunism scales to produce a multipage questionnaire with 
five point balanced Likert scale items. We administered this questionnaire to a convenient group of 
hardware retailers, and then tested it in a pretest mailer. 
 Using the pretest responses we gauged the psychometric properties of the measures using 
item-total correlations, ordered similarity coefficients (Hunter 1973), apparent construct validity, 
and coefficient alpha calculations. The resulting measures were face valid, unidimensional, and 
internally/externally consistent7, and had coefficient alphas of .8 or above. Appendix A presents 
the final scale items. 
 When the final test responses were available we reexamined the psychometric properties of 
the measures before structural equation coefficient estimation using item-total correlations, ordered 
similarity coefficients, LISREL single factor analysis (Joreskog and Sorbom 1984), multiple group 
analysis (Anderson, Gerbing and Hunter 1987), and coefficient alpha calculations. Table 2 
summarizes the psychographic properties of the final test scales. 
 Several measures required single item deletions to attain internal consistency (see 
Appendix A). The bases for dropping an item were an examination of construct validity, LISREL 
single factor analysis, normalized residuals, and multiple group analysis communalities. For 
example the study measured voice with items addressing talking to partner, suggesting and 
discussing changes, and working with partner to solve mutual problems. Before structural equation 
parameter estimation was accomplished the "will suggest changes . . ." item (item 1) was dropped. 
                                                 




 Similarly, loyalty items addressed not mentioning problems, disregard-
ing/overlooking/ignoring problems, and belief that problems fix themselves. Item 5, "overlook 
problems . . .," was dropped for parameter estimation. 
 The opportunism measure was comprised of items dealing with non-compliance when the 
relationship partner will not notice, not volunteering information, exaggeration/alteration of 
reports, and shirking. An item involving "shirking" (item 5) was dropped. 
 We measured neglect with items dealing with letting the relationship deteriorate, taking no 
action to improve relations, not caring about partner, and letting the relationship die. A "not caring" 
item (item 2) was dropped before parameter estimation. 
 Items from the domain of alternative attractiveness concerned the alternative's being a good 
company, their fairness, products and services, policies, and estimated overall satisfaction. The 
fairness item (item 1) was dropped. 
 The items from the domain of switching cost dealt with costs/spending time and money to 
switch partners, and losses in switching partners. One of the spending time and money items (item 
1) was deleted for parameter estimation. 
 The resulting measures were face valid, unidimensional, and internally and externally 
consistent. The coefficient alpha (Table 2), latent variable (Fornell and Larker 1981) reliabilities 
(Table 3), and the average variances extracted8 (Table 3) suggested that the measures are reliable. 
The average variances extracted also suggested discriminant validity9. 
                                                 
    8 Fornell and Larker (1981) proposed that a latent variable's average variance extracted, which ranges between 0 and 
1, measures the fraction of latent variable construct (non-error) variance. As a result, a latent variable's average variance 
extracted value of more than .5 suggests that the latent variable's measurement error variance is less than the variance 
due to the construct, and convergent validity (reliability) is indicated. 
    9 Fornell and Larker (1981) argued that discriminant validity for a pair of latent variables is suggested by average 
variance extracted values (Table 3) for each of these variables that are both larger than the squared standardized path 
coefficient between them (this coefficient is the squared correlation between these variables, which is given by the 




  Results 
 Specifying Figure 1 as a measurement model produced the measurement model results 
shown in Table 3. Although the traditional fit statistics (GFI and AGFI) for this measurement 
model were low, the number of normalized-residuals greater than 2 and the comparative fit index 
(Bentler 1990) suggested an acceptable measurement model specification. 
 We then specified the Figure 1 model as the structural model shown in Figure 2 and 
produced the maximum likelihood parameter estimates10 shown in Table 4. 
 The traditional fit statistics for this structural equation model were also low, but the normal-
ized residual behavior and the comparative fit index statistics were acceptable (see Table 4). 
Hypotheses Tests 
 Of the satisfaction, investments and switching cost hypothesis 1 associations, six were 
significant11 (see Table 4). Satisfaction's associations with exiting, voice, and neglect were signifi-
cant and as hypothesized. In addition, investment's associations with voice and neglect were as 
hypothesized, as was switching cost's association with loyalty. 
 The hypothesis 2 alternative associations were also selectively significant. The alternative 
attractiveness-opportunism, and exiting associations were as hypothesized. The alternative-
attractiveness-neglect association was significant but negative, rather than positive as 
hypothesized. 
 The observed results' consistency with prior research was mixed. Table 5 compares prior 
research results with the present study. For example the present study's significant satisfaction-
exiting and alternative attractiveness-exiting associations were consistent with prior research, while 
                                                 






the lack of an observed investments-exiting association was not. Similarly, the satisfaction-voice 
association in the present study was consistent with prior research, but the significant investments-
voice association has not been consistently reported. The lack of a significant alternative 
attractiveness-voice association in the present study was also consistent with some prior research 
results but inconsistent with others. Similarly the satisfaction-neglect and investments-neglect 
results were consistent but the alternative attractiveness-neglect association and the loyalty results 
were not. 
 Discussion 
 These results prompt several observations. First, despite the selective support for the 
hypotheses, the model appears to apply to a channel context. Each exogenous variable was 
significantly associated with one or more endogenous variables. And, each endogenous variable 
was associated with one or more exogenous variables. 
 Second, as suggested above, several hypothesized associations were context sensitive. For 
example, alternatives was not associated with voice in romantic relationships, it positively affected 
voice in employment relationships, and was not associated with voice in this study. Similarly 
loyalty variously had alternatives and investment antecedents in studies in other contexts, but did 
not in this study's channel context. However, neglect was not associated with alternative attractive-
ness in other dyads, but the association was significant in this study. 
 Third, the model explained less variation in loyalty, voice and opportunism than in exiting 
and neglect. Table 4 shows the squared multiple correlations for exiting and neglect were .35 or 
above, but this value for voice and opportunism is .13 and .12, respectively, and .04 for loyalty. 
This suggests that there were unmodeled antecedents of these variables. Indeed, while plausible 
                                                                                                                                                             




reasons for the lack of explained variation in loyalty are not immediately obvious, Hirschman 
argued that the expectation of the success of voice and the advantage to be gained by voice 
affected voice (Hirschman 1970), and that voice itself was rewarding (Hirschman 1974). 
Hirschman (1970) also contended that industry characteristics (e.g., concentration, competition, or 
loose monopoly) affected exiting, voice and loyalty. Similarly, Bandura (1978) argued that the size 
of the gain to be realized and the expectation of success affected instrumental aggression, which 
may be related to opportunism. The exclusion of these plausible antecedents in the present study 
suggests opportunities for additional investigation exist. 
 Fourth, several disconfirmed associations are interesting. Exiting, for example, was not 
associated with investments or switching cost, contrary to Porter's (1980) and Thibaut and Kelly's 
(1959) predictions. A comparison between the significant Table 3 latent variable correlations 
between exiting and these two variables, and the structural model coefficients for these two 
relationships shown in Table 4, suggests these two relationships may be mis-specified. That is, 
exiting may actually affect investments and switching cost, rather than the other way around as 
specified in the Figure 2 model. Stated another way, as propensity to exit increased investments 
and switching cost may somehow have been perceptually discounted, and thereby reduced. 
 Similarly opportunism was not associated with investments or switching cost, contrary to 
expectations and Transaction Cost Analysis (Williamson 1975) predictions. Here misspecification 
may not account for the observed lack of a switching cost association because the measurement 
model switching cost-opportunism association was not significant. There may, however, be an 
unmodeled variable such as goal congruence (see Anderson 1988) that explains the variance in 
both switching cost and opportunism. 
 Returning to the lack of explained loyalty variance, while the alternative-loyalty and 




association has been consistently significant in previous studies. None of these associations were 
significant in the measurement model, and it is possible that this is a different type of 
misspecification. While it is not clear how, or even if, such relationships could be hypothesized, 
these variables may be non-linearly related to loyalty. Such non-linear associations would fail to 
produce significant measurement model or linear-terms-only structural equation coefficients. 
 Fifth, several confirmed and disconfirmed associations have management implications. For 
example satisfaction was significantly associated with exiting, voice, and neglect, and not 
associated with loyalty and opportunism. This supports the channel management maxim that satis-
faction is necessary for relationship maintenance. In addition, while voice does not encompass all 
complaint behavior, in this study as satisfaction increased positive "complaining" did too. In other 
words some "complainers" were satisfied customers. This underscores the complexity of satisfac-
tion in long term exchange relationships: an exchange partner may be dissatisfied with an 
individual event, yet still satisfied with the relationship overall. Hirschman (1970) hinted at both in 
referring to a firm's "repairable lapses" and deterioration of a firm's performance (p.1). Repairable 
lapses referred to negative evaluations of individual events: event dissatisfaction. Deterioration of 
performance referred to the overall evaluation of the performer or the relationship. Thibaut and 
Kelly (1959) also suggested this distinction between the evaluation of relationship events and the 
relationship itself in their focus on both the rewards/costs of an interaction, and the evaluation of 
the relationship (CL and CLAlt). It is easy to speculate that event satisfactions built overall 
relationship satisfaction, which then increased buyer-seller relationship commitment (Dwyer, 
Schurr and Oh 1987), and thereby the satisfactory disposition of a voice built a buyer-seller 
relationship. 
 For channel managers neglect may spell trouble when it comes to gaining down-channel 




exchanges (Macneil 1980). These relationships were characterized by for example, ordering in 
writing not over the phone, and delegating contact to low level staff. In extreme cases neglect 
included dropping several product lines, ignoring the partner firm's attempts to resolve problems, 
and just letting the exchange relationship drift. In this study neglect was negatively associated with 
satisfaction and investments, and positively associated alternative attractiveness. Based on effect 
sizes, maintained satisfaction and reduced perceptions of alternative attractiveness were important 
for reduced neglect, and by implication increased potential for cooperation and coordination. 
 Returning to opportunism, it was associated only with alternative attractiveness: satisfac-
tion, investments and switching cost did not affect opportunism. This suggests that the much 
hypothesized (Williamson 1975) effects of investments and switching cost on opportunism were 
either contextual or more complicated than originally proposed (e.g., involving goal congruence-- 
see p. 17). However based on this study, the antecedents of opportunism included the opportunists' 
perception of alternative attractiveness: the alternative attractiveness-opportunism effect was 
among the largest in the study. 
 The study firms reported generally low levels of all reactions except voice. This suggests 
that as a group they preferred voice and working to improve relationship problems. It is tempting 
to speculate on the likelihood of favorable long term relationship impact of this apparent voice 
bias. The study's relatively satisfied subject firms sought opportunities to contact the supplier with 
problems (voice). Satisfactory resolution of these problems increased the likelihood of future 
contact, and satisfaction built. This upward satisfaction spiral, in turn, reduced neglect and exiting. 
 The satisfaction-exiting association was the largest in the study, and satisfaction, with 
alternative attractiveness, explained over half the variance in exiting. Increased satisfaction was 
therefore essential to reducing these firms exiting propensity. This was followed closely by the 




alternative buyer-seller relationship. These results cast some doubt on the channel management 
maxim that the mobility barriers of investments and switching cost reduce a buyer firm's 
inclination to exit. The significant satisfaction and alternative attractiveness effects on exiting 
suggest that increased satisfaction and the relationship partner's decreased perception of attractive 
alternatives were the key to reduced exit inclination. 
 Limitations 
 As we have seen the Figure 2 model may have been was somewhat mis-specified. The 
measurement model also showed significant interrelationships within both the exogenous and 
endogenous variables, but the structural model reflected these relationships only vaguely using 
correlations. While the effects of this lack of specification are uncertain, the study results should be 
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        Table 1 
 PROFILE OF THE FINAL TEST RESPONSES 
        
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════ 
 
 First Title Mentioned         Frequency 
       
 Owner, partner      120 
 President        67 
 General Manager        6 
 Chief Financial Officer         4 
 Other         18 
 Not reported        7 
 




Year's Sales                  Frequency 
 
>$10MM         5 
 $3-9.99MM         8 
 $1.2-2.99MM            28 
 $0.6-1.199MM                     34 
 $0.25-0.599MM                    47 
 $0.1-0.299MM                     39 
 $.01-.099MM                      22 
 $<.01MM                   0 
 Unreported                       39 
 




Primary Wholesaler            Frequency 
 
   1-2                            19 
   3-5                            54 
   6-10                           51 
  11-20                           57 
  21-30                           21 
  31+                             19 
  Unreported                       1 
 




 Table 2 
 PSYCHOMETRIC PROPERTIES OF THE FINAL TEST SCALES 
══════════════════════════════════════════════════ 
 
                                      Fit Statistics        
                               Final Test   Parameter Esti- 
Construct         Parameter*      Scale      mation Scale   
 
Satisfaction      Items                            5 
                  df                               6 
                  Chi-Squared                      6 
                  p-value                        .26 
                  GFI                            .99 
                  AGFI                           .98 
                  RMS Residual                  .009 
                  Alpha                          .94 
 
Alternative       Items             5              4 
 Attractiveness   df                6              3 
                  Chi-Squared      20              4 
                  p-value           0            .12 
                  GFI                            .99 
                  AGFI                           .99 
                  RMS Residual                  .011 
                  Alpha           .93            .92 
 
Investments       Items                            5 
                  df                               6 
                  Chi-Squared                     18 
                  p-value                       .003 
                  GFI                            .97   
                  AGFI                           .96   
                  RMS Residual                  .021    
                  Alpha                          .91   
 
Switching         Items             5              4 
 Costs            df                6              3 
                  Chi-Squared      11            .87 
                  p-value        .038            .64 
                  GFI                            .99 
                  AGFI                           .99 
                  RMS Residual                  .004 
                  Alpha           .94            .94 
 
Loyalty           Items             5              4 
                  df                6              3 
                  Chi-Squared      53            2.5 
                  p-value           0            .47 
                  GFI                            .99 
                  AGFI                           .99 
                  RMS Residual                  .014 




Table 2 (Continued) 
 PSYCHOMETRIC PROPERTIES OF THE FINAL TEST SCALES 
══════════════════════════════════════════════════ 
 
                                      Fit Statistics        
                               Final Test   Parameter Esti- 
Construct         Parameter*      Scale      mation Scale   
 
Voice             Items             5              4 
                  df                6              3 
                  Chi-Squared      75              2 
                  p-value           0            .30 
                  GFI                            .99 
                  AGFI                           .99 
                  RMS Residual                  .007 
                  Alpha           .91            .92 
 
Opportunism       Items             6              5 
                  df               10              6 
                  Chi-Squared      84           8.72 
                  p-value           0            .19 
                  GFI                            .98 
                  AGFI                           .97 
                  RMS Residual                  .015 
                  Alpha           .86            .80   
 
Neglect           Items             5              4 
                  df                6              3 
                  Chi-Squared      65              1 
                  p-value           0            .40 
                  GFI                            .99 
                  AGFI                           .99 
                  RMS Residual                  .008 
                  Alpha           .92            .91 
 
Exit              Items                            6 
                  df                              10 
                  Chi-Squared                     54 
                  p-value                          0 
                  GFI                            .94 
                  AGFI                           .89 
                  RMS Residual                  .020 
                  Alpha                          .95 
 
─────────────────────── 
* Items = Number of items in the scale. 
  df = LISREL Chi-squared statistic degrees of freedom. 
  Chi-Squared = LISREL Chi-squared statistic value. 
  p-value = Attained significance of the LISREL chi-squared statistic. 
  GFI = LISREL goodness of fit index. 
  AGFI = LISREL adjusted goodness of fit index.   
  RMS Residual = LISREL root mean squared residual. 





               MEASUREMENT MODEL RESULTSa 
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ 
 
    Latent                             Latent Variable                   
   Variable           1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9  
 
1.  Satisfaction     .82  -.56*  .35*  .26*  .01   .30* -.21* -.55* -.67* 
2.  Alt. Attract.   -.48   .91  -.28* -.40*  .04  -.09   .30*  .46*  .62* 
3.  Investments      .30  -.25   .86   .54* -.04   .25* -.17* -.34* -.27* 
4.  Switching Cost   .22  -.35   .46   .84   .10   .15* -.05  -.26* -.23* 
5.  Loyalty          .01   .04  -.03   .09   .85  -.31*  .31*  .12*  .04 
6.  Voice            .25  -.08   .22   .13  -.26   .84  -.28* -.39* -.25* 
7.  Opportunism     -.16   .24  -.13  -.04   .24  -.21   .69   .45*  .41* 
8.  Neglect         -.46   .41  -.29  -.22   .11  -.33   .35   .85   .70* 
9.  Exit            -.57   .56  -.23  -.20   .04  -.21   .32   .61   .87  
Meanb               4.16  2.54  3.73  3.25  2.36  4.09  2.24  1.85  2.13 






Chi-Squared Degrees of Freedom        =  743 
Chi-Squared Statistic Value           = 1562 
p-Value of Chi-Squared Value          =    0 
Goodness of Fit Index                 =  .79 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index        =  .74 
RMS Residual                          = .055 
Normalized Residuals greater than 2   =   40 (41 expected at 5%) 
Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Index  =  .91 
 
Average Variance Extracted: 
                              Variables              
                  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  
Average Vari- 
 ance Extracted  .76 .76 .69 .80 .55 .75 .52 .73 .75 
 
Latent Variable Reliabilities: 
                                  Variables              
                      1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  
Latent Vari- 
 able Reliabilities  .94 .92 .91 .91 .82 .92 .80 .91 .94 
 
──────────────────────────── 
* t-value greater than 2. 
a Covariances on and below the diagonal, correlations above. 









LOYALTY(η1) = γ11SAT(ξ1) + γ21ALT(ξ2) + γ31INVEST(ξ3) + γ41SWITCH(ξ4) + ζ1 
VOICE(η2)   = γ12SAT(ξ1) + γ22ALT(ξ2) + γ32INVEST(ξ3) + γ42SWITCH(ξ4) + ζ2 
OPPORT(η3)  = γ13SAT(ξ1) + γ23ALT(ξ2) + γ33INVEST(ξ3) + γ43SWITCH(ξ4) + ζ3 
NEGLECT(η4) = γ14SAT(ξ1) + γ24ALT(ξ2) + γ34INVEST(ξ3) + γ44SWITCH(ξ4) + ζ4 
EXIT(η5)    = γ15SAT(ξ1) + γ25ALT(ξ2) + γ35INVEST(ξ3) + γ45SWITCH(ξ4) + ζ5 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
               Coef-                               Coef- 
              ficient                             ficient 
Parameter     Estimate    T-value   Parameter     Estimate    T-value 
γ11          .09         1.14        ε14          .69        11.25 
γ12          .31         4.03        ε22          .30         9.81 
γ13         -.02        - .32        ε23          .16         7.21  
γ14         -.38        -5.60        ε24          .31         9.96  
γ15         -.47        -8.08        ε25          .19         8.06  
γ21          .15         1.80        ε31          .83        11.43  
γ22          .15         1.92        ε32          .75        11.20  
γ23          .31         3.74        ε33          .30         7.34  
γ24          .21         3.05        ε34          .32         7.63  
γ25          .37         6.46        ε36          .47         9.74  
γ31         -.15        -1.87        ε41          .42        10.71  
γ32          .17         2.28        ε43          .28         9.76  
γ33         -.15        -1.96        ε44          .13         6.72  
γ34         -.14        -2.08        ε45          .27         8.64  
γ35         -.02        - .41        ε51          .47        11.32  
γ41          .23         2.88        ε52          .24        10.46  
γ42          .04          .59        ε53          .12         8.65  
γ43          .15         1.89        ε54          .31        10.87  
γ44          .00          .06        ε55          .12         8.77  
γ45          .06         1.05        ε56          .16         9.50  
δ11          .34        10.59        λx11         .89        18.82   
δ12          .24         9.77        λx12         .96        22.06   
δ13          .17         8.73        λx13        1.00         0.00* 
δ14          .23         9.72        λx14         .96        22.23  
δ15          .17         8.85        λx15         .99        24.27  
δ22          .27         9.95        λx22         .89        22.76  
δ23          .26         9.86        λx23         .89        23.11  
δ24          .08         5.08        λx24        1.00         0.00* 
δ25          .31        10.31        λx25         .86        21.18  
δ31          .48        11.11        λx31         .77        15.37  
δ32          .17         8.62        λx32         .97        25.51  
δ33          .14         7.60        λx33        1.00         0.00* 
δ34          .16         8.30        λx34         .98        26.08  
δ35          .56        11.31        λx35         .70        13.27  
δ42          .26         9.93        λx42         .93        21.29 
δ43          .18         8.71        λx43         .98        24.36  
δ44          .16         8.09        λx44        1.00         0.00* 
δ45          .17         8.58        λx45         .98        24.59        
ε11          .31         7.78        λy11         .88        16.01       
ε12          .12         3.02        λy12        1.00         0.00*       




Table 4 (Continued) 
 STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL RESULTS 
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════ 
              Coef-                               Coef- 
              ficient                             ficient 
Parameter     Estimate    T-value   Parameter     Estimate    T-value 
λy14          .59         9.77        ζ4           .55         9.58  
λy22          .91        19.90        ζ5           .39         9.61  
λy23         1.00         0.00*       ψ12         -.27        -5.03  
λy24          .90        19.41        ψ13          .21         4.17  
λy25          .98        23.32        ψ14          .10         2.29  
λy31          .49         6.62        ψ15          .03          .77  
λy32          .59         8.17        ψ23         -.16        -3.56  
λy33         1.00         0.00*       ψ24         -.18        -4.23  
λy34          .98        14.39        ψ25         -.06        -1.67  
λy36          .86        12.53        ψ34          .22         5.12  
λy41          .81        16.77        ψ35          .15         4.22  
λy43          .91        20.81        ψ45          .24         6.74  
λy44         1.00         0.00*        φ11          .82         9.78  
λy45          .95        23.39         φ12         -.48        -7.64  
λy51          .77        16.03         φ13          .30         5.31  
λy52          .92        23.77         φ14          .22         4.04  
λy53         1.00         0.00*        φ22          .91        10.63  
λy54          .88        20.89         φ23         -.25        -4.43  
λy55          .99        30.01         φ24         -.35        -5.90  
λy56          .97        28.02         φ33          .86        10.11  
ζ1          .84         9.40         φ34          .46         7.43  
ζ2          .72         9.67         φ44          .84         9.90  




Chi-Squared Degrees of Freedom        =  743 
Chi-Squared Statistic Value           = 1562 
p-Value of Chi-Squared Value          =    0 
Goodness of Fit Index                 =  .79 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index        =  .74 
RMS Residual                          = .055 
Normalized Residuals greater than 2   =   38 (41 expected at 5%) 
Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Index  =  .91 
Total Coefficient of Determination 
 for Structural Equations             =  .64 
 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
                          Variables        
                    5    6    7    8    9  
Squared Multiple 
 Correlations     .04  .13  .12  .35  .55  
 
─────────────────────── 
* = Parameter fixed 
a SAT = Satisfaction, SWITCH = Switching Cost, ALT = Alt. Attractiveness, 




  Table 5 
 PRESENT STUDY AND 
 PRIOR RESEARCH RESULTS 
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ 
 
             Present  Anderson   Ping   Provan et   Rusbult et  Rusbult et  Schultz et 
Association   Study    (1988)   (1990)  al. (1989)a al. (1982)  al. (1988)  al. (1987)b 
 
Sat-Exic       -d                  -                    -           -           - 
Alt-           +                  +                    +           + 
Inv-           ns                                      -           - 
Swi-           ns 
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Sat-Voi        +                                       +           + 
Alt-           ns                                      ns          + 
Inv-           +                                       +           ns 
Swi-           ns 
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Sat-Loy        ns                                      +           + 
Alt-           ns                                      ns          + 
Inv-           ns                                      +           ns 
Swi-           + 
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Sat-Neg        -                                       -           - 
Alt-           +                                       ns          ns 
Inv-           -                                       -           - 
Swi-           ns 
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Sat-Opp        ns 
Alt-           +                            ns 
Inv-           ns        - 
Swi-           ns 
 
──────────────────────────── 
a Provan and Skinner (1989). 
b Schultz, Bigoness and Gagnon (1987). 
c Sat = Satisfaction, Alt = Alt. Attract., Inv = Investments, Swi = Switch. Cost, 
  Exi = Exiting, Voi = Voice, Loy = Loyalty, Neg = Neglect, Opp = Opportunism. 
d - = Significant negative association, + = Significant positive association, 





 A MODEL OF THE GENERAL RESPONSES TO PROBLEMS 











a See Table 4 for ξ's and η's.  
b φij is the correlation between ξi and ξj. 
c γij is the effect of ξi on ηj. 










 1. All in all, my primary wholesaler is very fair with me. 
 2. Overall, my primary wholesaler is a good company to do business with. 
 3. In general am pretty satisfied with my relationship with my primary wholesaler. 
 4. Overall, my primary wholesaler treats me very fairly. 




*1. On the whole, I would spend a lot of time and money to change primary wholesalers. 
 2. All things considered, the company would lose a lot in changing primary wholesalers. 
 3. Generally speaking, the costs in time, money, effort and grief to switch primary 
wholesalers would be high. 
 4. Overall, I would spend a lot and lose a lot if I changed primary wholesalers. 
 5. Considering everything, the costs to stop doing business with the current wholesaler and 




 1. I won't plan to do anything to improve relations with my primary wholesaler and will 
expect things will become worse. 
*2. At times I care very little about what happens to my primary wholesaler as long as I get 
what I need from them. 
 3. I have quit caring about my primary wholesaler and will let conditions get worse and 
worse. 
 4. I will passively let the relationship with my primary wholesaler slowly deteriorate. 
 5. If things are not right with my primary wholesaler I sometimes consider letting the 
relationship die a slow death. 
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*1. All in all, the alternative wholesaler would be ______ fair than/as the current wholesaler 
is. (Circle a letter) 
 a. Much more  b. Slightly more  c. As  d. Slightly less  e. Much less 
 2.  Overall, the alternative wholesaler's policies would benefit my company than/as the 
current wholesaler's policies. (Circle a letter) 
 a. Much more  b. Slightly more  c. As much  d. Slightly less  e. Much less 
 3. I would be _____ satisfied with the product and service available from the alternative 
wholesaler than/as the product and service provided by the current wholesaler. (Circle a 
letter) 
 a. Much more  b. Slightly more  c. As  d. Slightly less  e. Much less 
 4. In general, I would be _____ satisfied with the alternative wholesaler than/as I am with the 
current wholesaler. (Circle a letter) 
 a. Much more   b. Slightly more  c. As  d. Slightly less  e. Much less 
 5. Overall, the alternative wholesaler would be a/an _____ company to do business with 
than/as the current wholesaler. (Circle a letter) 
 a. Much better  b. Slightly better  c. As good a  d. Slightly worse   




 1. Overall I have invested a lot in the relationship with the current wholesaler. 
 2. A lot of energy, time and effort have gone into building and maintaining the relationship 
with the current wholesaler. 
 3. All things considered the company has put a lot into the relationship with the current 
wholesaler. 
 4. I have put a considerable amount of time, effort and energy into building the relationship 
with the current wholesaler. 




 1. I will not say anything to my primary wholesaler about mutual problems because they 
seem to go away by themselves. 
 2. I disregard problems with my primary wholesaler because they just seem to work 
themselves out. 
 3. Problems with my primary wholesaler will often fix themselves. 
 4. Sometimes I ignore problems with my primary wholesaler. 
*5. I often overlook problems with my primary wholesaler because they frequently fix 
themselves. 
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  1. Occasionally I will think about ending the business relationship with my primary 
wholesaler. 
  2. I am not likely to continue the business relationship with my primary wholesaler. 
  3. I will probably consider a replacement primary wholesaler in the near future. 
  4. I am looking at replacement wholesalers. 
  5. I will consider a replacement wholesaler soon. 




*1. Occasionally I will suggest changes to my primary wholesaler if there is a mutual problem. 
 2. If there are problems with my primary wholesaler I will work jointly with them to help 
improve the situation. 
 3. I will work with my primary wholesaler to correct any mutual problems. 
 4. I will try to discuss any primary wholesaler related problems with them. 




 1. I will not volunteer much information regarding my business to my primary wholesaler. 
 2. There will be some things I will do only if my primary wholesaler checks up and insists on 
it. 
 3. Sometimes, I will have to alter the facts slightly in order to get what I need from my 
primary wholesaler. 
 4. I may purposefully exaggerate the sales opportunities in my market in order to get 
additional allowances or assistance from my primary wholesaler. 
*5. Occasionally I may shrink certain contractual obligations to my primary wholesaler when I 
see profit opportunities from doing so. 
 6. I may neglect my program responsibilities when my primary wholesaler is not likely to 
notice my noncompliance. 
 




 The Effects of Satisfaction and Structural Constraints on 
 Retailer Exit, Voice, Loyalty, Opportunism and Neglect 
  
 Executive Summary 
 
 Because we know little empirically of the relationships between affects such as 
satisfaction and behavioral intentions such as exiting in marketing channel relationships, this 
article reports the results of a field survey of the associations between hardware retailers' 
satisfaction and their response intentions to channel relationship problems. The objective was to 
determine the relationships between the response intention variables, exiting (intention to 
terminate the buyer-seller relationship), voice (actively work with the relationship partner to 
remedy the problem), loyalty (suffer problems in silence with confidence that things will get 
better), opportunism (seek self interest with guile), and neglect (reduce contact with the buyer-
seller relationship partner), and their antecedents, satisfaction, and the "structural constraints" 
(Johnson 1982) of alternative attractiveness, investments and switching cost, using structural 
equation analysis. 
 The study introduces concepts such as neglect into the marketing literature, and tested a 
model from the social psychological literature due to Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982) in a 
channel context. In addition it provided hints of the dynamics operating within the committed 
and dissolution phases of Dwyer, Schurr and Oh's (1987) buyer-seller relationship development 
framework, and generalized Ping's (1990) model of marketing channel relationship termination 
to a more comprehensive view of interfirm response intentions  to relationship problems. 
 The results provided selective support for the hypotheses and the Rusbult et al. model, 
and the model appeared to apply to a channel context. 
 Findings included that several hypothesized associations were context sensitive. For 
example investments and switching cost were not associated with exiting, contrary to Porter 




the effect may be the other way around-- exiting may affect investments and switching cost. 
Similarly, investments and switching cost were not associated with opportunism, contrary to 
Transaction Cost analysis (Williamson 1975) arguments. 
While the study supplies no direct evidence, the discussion of the results also proposed two types 
of satisfaction in long term buyer-seller relationships: event satisfaction and overall relationship 
satisfaction. Previously hinted at by other authors, event satisfaction or dissatisfaction was 
argued to proceed from the evaluation of a relationship event, while overall relationship 
satisfaction was the overall evaluation of the buyer-seller relationship. The study results 
suggested the retailers could be dissatisfied with an event yet satisfied overall. 
 The results also suggested that the effectiveness of increased mobility barriers (Levinger 
1979) such as investments and switching cost in decreasing exiting was situationally dependent. 
In this study maintaining satisfaction and decreasing the perception of the retailers' alternative 
attractiveness were more appropriate for reducing exiting. 
 Similarly, maintaining satisfaction and reducing alternative attractiveness appeared to be 
more effective in reducing neglect than increasing switching cost, which had no effect on 
neglect, or increasing investments, which had a small effect on neglect. 
 The survey firms reported low levels of all reactions except voice. This suggested as a 
group they preferred working to improve relationship problems to the more passive (Rusbult et 
al. 1982) loyalty reaction, or negative (Rusbult et al. 1982) reactions such as opportunism, 
neglect or exit. 
 
